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
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# Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its Eastern European Allies: A Survey

J. F. Brown

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A Report prepared for  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND



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PREFACE

There has been no comprehensive analysis of Soviet-East European relations since the aftermath of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. This report is intended to fill that gap. It surveys Soviet-East European relations since 1969, analyzing Soviet goals in Eastern Europe, the successes and failures of Soviet policy in pursuing those goals, and future prospects.

Military-institutional aspects of post-1968 Soviet-East European relations are examined in greater detail in a Rand study now in progress by A. Ross Johnson. Related Rand publications on Eastern Europe are listed in the Bibliography of this report (p. 139). Prospects for solidarity in the Western alliance are examined in a parallel report by Horst Mendershausen, *Outlook on Western Solidarity*, forthcoming. These publications report research conducted under Air Force Project RAND on NATO and Warsaw Pact Security Issues. That research has examined broadly the present and future prospects of the two alliance systems in Europe. It has aimed at providing Air Force planners who have a responsibility for European affairs with an evaluation of the prospects for changes, small or dramatic, in present European security arrangements.

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SUMMARY

A primary preoccupation of Soviet foreign policy since World War II has been the control of Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe has been important to the USSR for several reasons:

1. *The military security factor*, Eastern Europe has served as a buffer zone against possible attack from the West.
2. *The springboard factor*. Eastern Europe has served as a base for possible military aggression against or the assertion of political influence over Western Europe.
3. *The Communist internationalist factor*, The Soviets have seen Eastern Europe in expansionist ideological terms, as a vanguard of Communist states forwarding the process of world revolution.
4. *The ideological security factor*. Eastern Europe has provided a defensive Soviet leadership with an ideological buffer zone in its efforts to secure its own closed system of government against the dangers of outside ideological and political penetration.

Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe has differed importantly in the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev eras. After 1956, following Stalin's attempt to achieve total control of the area, Khrushchev sought to find the right combination of cohesion and viability in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev was willing to experiment with departures from Stalinist conformity in quest of a viability that postulated making the Communist system in Eastern Europe more legitimate. Consequently, East European states were able to assert distinctive policies, domestically and internationally. The most notable reform measures of the Khrushchev era were those affecting economic structure, planning, and policy. These economic reforms had political consequences; departures from the old command system of economy tended to encourage pluralism in other branches of public life. After Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, these developments gathered a momentum of their own. Powerful forces of nationalism and

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sociopolitical challenge to Communist Party absolutism were unleashed. Earlier, the Albanian leadership had taken advantage of the Sino-Soviet dispute to remove Albania from the Soviet orbit. In Rumania, national autonomy was developed into nationalist Rumanian policy through skillful manipulation of the Sino-Soviet dispute and other factors. In Czechoslovakia, domestic reform rushed headlong toward a repudiation of all known variants of the Communist system itself.

The Khrushchev era in Eastern Europe lasted until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. That event marked the beginning of a new period in which the relationship between cohesion and viability has been strongly tilted back in favor of cohesion. As the Soviet leaders saw it, after 1968 Eastern Europe required reinstitution of orthodoxy as a means of restoring Soviet control and forestalling a revival of reform Communism threatening the Soviet system itself. Tightening up in Eastern Europe was also intended to guard the area and the Soviet Union itself against the danger of contamination from the West that had increased as a result of European détente.

The Soviet leadership has promoted cohesion in Eastern Europe since 1968 through a comprehensive integrationist policy. The Soviet Union has consulted more with its allies, but the result is directed consultations and not a genuine conciliar system. It has tried to make the Soviet-East European relationship one in which direct pressure is much less needed. An additional Soviet purpose has been the strengthening of Party orthodoxy and control throughout Eastern Europe. Economic consumerism has been accepted by Moscow as a result of social pressures in the East European countries themselves. Unlike the goulash Communism of the Khrushchev era, however, economic consumerism is pursued as an effort to increase viability in Eastern Europe without fundamental institutional change. Appraisal of the success or failure of post-1968 Soviet aims in Eastern Europe requires examination of regional developments and individual bilateral relationships.

Considering regionwide developments, the Brezhnev leadership has continued to utilize the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) to promote economic integration. A Comecon investment bank was established in 1970 that undermined the prior practice of unanimity of

decisionmaking. In 1971, Comecon promulgated a so-called comprehensive program on long-term economic integration in the Soviet orbit. The first concrete consequence was the approval in June 1975 of the first joint coordinated economic plan. Although the joint plan is mainly limited to construction of joint enterprises in the extractive industries, it could prove an important precedent. It reflected, at least in part, the serious deterioration in the economic position of the East European states in relation to that of the Soviet Union that took place in 1975, especially as a result of the increase in world raw-materials prices.

Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Moscow reassessed Warsaw Pact functions and resolved to give the East Europeans more consultative privileges. But the East Europeans have not gained significant decisionmaking authority. While the East European armed forces have been modernized, the East European military commands still lack real authority in Pact operations. Indeed, in operational terms the Pact can hardly be considered an alliance at all. This is one reason why Rumania has been able to minimize its military participation in the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). It abstains from operational maneuvers, maintains military relations with the NATO powers, European neutrals, and China, and has gone outside the Pact for weapons, at least to the extent of jointly developing a fighter aircraft with Yugoslavia.

The Soviets have also continued to search for new institutional mechanisms to achieve better control of the foreign policy of the East European states. The Brezhnev leadership revived Khrushchev's earlier call for a permanent Warsaw Pact coordinating mechanism, but this aspiration has so far been thwarted by resistance from Rumania and perhaps other countries. The Soviets have also sought to supplement reconsolidation of Party control in Czechoslovakia with the strengthening of Party authority elsewhere in Eastern Europe against pluralistic trends that developed during the 1960s. Strengthened Party control has been the organizational manifestation of the intensified ideological offensive promoted by Moscow. Multilateral meetings devoted to intensified ideological struggle reflect heightened Soviet concern with Party coordination. While recreation of such an institution as the Cominform is

unlikely, the Soviet leadership does appear bent on promoting a less formal institution for coordinating ideological struggle. The organizational dominance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that this implies will continue to conflict with the necessity for the Soviet Union to maintain at least a pretense of adhering to the principle of the equality of national Communist Parties.

Appraisal of regionwide developments must be supplemented by consideration of the bilateral relations of the individual East European countries with the Soviet Union. Bulgaria remains the most loyal and cooperative of the Soviet Union's East European allies. It has most demonstratively supported the Soviet-sponsored notion of integration within the Soviet orbit, although this does not portend the merger of Bulgaria into the Soviet Union, as some Western observers have speculated. Given the dominance over the Bulgarian Communist Party by First Secretary Todor Zhivkov for nearly 15 years, his succession is an open question. In a disorderly succession, some elements might attempt to enhance their image with the Bulgarian population by taking a more nationalist or openly irredentist position on the Macedonian issue. Bulgaria already plays an autonomous role with regard to Macedonia, however, and the notion that Bulgarian assertiveness over Macedonia is a measuring rod for Yugoslav-Soviet tensions is misleading. The Soviet Union may, of course, exploit Bulgarian aggressiveness over Macedonia for its own purposes in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria's strategic importance to the Soviets could also increase. The absence of stationed Soviet forces in Bulgaria has become an anomaly to be explained by Soviet diplomatic concerns vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Rumania. The introduction of Soviet troops into Bulgaria is a distinct possibility for the future.

Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia since 1968 has aimed at accelerating normalization, meaning removing all aspects and proponents of the 1968 reform. Soviet policy has been based on the psychologically inhibiting effect of the 50,000 Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory. By 1974 the Soviets had grounds for satisfaction with the degree of stability that had been achieved. Detracting from this satisfaction was the fact that normalization meant stagnation and apathy, not the

desired revival of ideology. And in late 1974 and early 1975 some of the notable reformers of 1968 again openly defied the policies of the present Czechoslovak leadership. The technocratic as well as the political reformers of 1968 are still excluded from positions of importance in Czechoslovak life. The economy has done relatively well in the early seventies, but underlying problems require rationalization and even reforms that are politically unlikely. Repressive measures against the Roman Catholic Church have continued. National dissatisfaction in Slovakia, an underlying motive force in 1968 reform, seems presently dormant; a frustrated Czech nationalism against perceived Slovak domination is now the main element in Czech-Slovak tensions.

In the 1960s East Germany changed from a political and economic liability to one of the most stable and economically strong Soviet allies. A consequence of this change was growing East German assertiveness within the Soviet bloc--on the proper model of socialist economy, on specialization within Comecon, and on unremitting hostility toward West Germany. In East-West relations, Ulbricht predicated his political behavior on the notion that what was good for the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was good for other Communist states, the Soviet Union included. In 1967 Ulbricht saw West German overtures to other East European governments as intended to isolate the GDR and exercised substantial and perhaps decisive influence on a vacillating Soviet leadership, eventually resulting in a rebuff to West Germany's overtures. The East German leadership took a negative position on the reform movement in Czechoslovakia earlier and far more strongly than did the Soviet leadership.

Yet the invasion of Czechoslovakia that Ulbricht appeared to promote had the effect of reducing the possibilities of East German influence on the Soviet Union. As Moscow took the reins of the alliance firmly into its own hands after 1968, and as it pursued a détentist policy toward Western Europe, it found the obstructionist measures of Ulbricht increasingly bothersome. In May 1971, the Soviets eased Ulbricht from office in what may be a model case of a well-ordered and carefully prearranged Communist succession. Ulbricht's successor, Honecker, proved more compliant with Soviet policy considerations in

Europe, although as regards relations with West Germany, he too has evidently created difficulties for Moscow. The Soviet-East German bargaining relationship is two-sided: East Germany can attempt to use its economic strength and its domestic political weakness, yet the Soviet position is decisive, for the GDR still lacks any demonstrated concept of East German nationhood and remains the most fragile of the Soviet creations in Eastern Europe.

Hungary's relationship with the Soviet Union has until recently been close and untroubled. From the 1956 revolution until 1964, this harmonious relationship was based on Khrushchev's willingness to allow Kadar to pursue a policy of national reconciliation at home, so that Hungary could again be a viable member of the socialist community. In the period between 1964 and 1968, when there was a vacuum in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe, Hungary expanded its reform domestic policies and prepared its far-reaching economic reforms. In foreign policy it showed itself originally susceptible to the overtures from Bonn in 1966 and 1967. During 1968 and 1969 a closer relationship was established between the Brezhnev leadership in Moscow and Kadar. Unlike the East Germans and the Poles, the Hungarians attempted to mediate the differences between Prague and Moscow in 1968, and the combination of initial Hungarian attempts at conciliation in Czechoslovakia and final approval of the Soviet invasion were regarded positively by Moscow. In 1969 the Hungarian Party rendered further assistance to the CPSU in organizing the World Conference of Communist Parties.

In subsequent years Hungary evidently came to be perceived by Moscow as more of a problem. Hungary's domestic economic system now stood out as too reformist, containing precisely those dangers of pluralism and spontaneity associated by the Soviet leadership with the Prague Spring. Hungary also proposed reform measures within Comecon in line with the market characteristics of the Hungarian economic system. It promoted intensified economic ties with the West with enthusiasm. Since 1972, however, the market characteristics of the economic system have been steadily circumscribed. This fact, together with the altered international economic situation and especially the imposition by the Soviet Union of greatly increased raw-material prices in 1975, helped produce a situation more in line with Soviet policy in East Europe as a whole.

The key event in relations between Poland and the Soviet Union in recent years was the Polish-West German treaty of December 1970. That treaty, embodying West German acceptance of Poland's postwar territorial boundaries, removed a primary justification for Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union: guaranteeing Poland's postwar Western frontier. Polish-Soviet relations were also affected by the riots on Poland's Baltic coast immediately after the signing of the treaty with Bonn. The Soviet response to the internal crisis was restrained; calculated risks not to intervene militarily, to back the new Polish Party leader Edward Gierek politically, and to assist Poland economically paid off. There have been no serious visible strains in bilateral relations since 1970. But developments in both Polish foreign and domestic policies have a potential for future strain. Externally, Poland has developed its trade with the West so rapidly and demonstrated such an appetite for Western credits as to be a source of concern in Moscow. And the development of economic relations with the West has a political counterpart: While never explicitly challenging Soviet policy or Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, the Polish leadership has demonstrated its desire to play its own role in the world as a loyal but not passive member of the Soviet alliance. Within the framework of détente, the Gierek leadership seeks recognition of Poland as a significant international entity in its own right.

Domestically, while the Gierek leadership managed with Soviet political and economic support to bring about dramatic improvements in the economic situation after 1970, there is strong potential for internal instability. Gierek's political position has become a hostage of his continued economic success. This was underlined in early 1975 when food shortages in many Polish cities led to widespread resentment and some incidents requiring police intervention. The Gierek leadership has nonetheless pursued domestic policies aimed at strengthening the Party's authority which in themselves have a potential for instability. On several issues it is on a collision course with the Roman Catholic Church, Poland's "other government," and conflict of some degree appears inevitable. If the regime can maintain economic prosperity, the dangers alluded to could remain potential. If it cannot, a recurrence of a crisis like that of 1956 or 1970 is likely.

The Communist leadership of Rumania has pursued a deviationist policy in conflict both with the Soviet Union's norm of relations between Communist states and with its specific policies on international issues. Relative Soviet restraint to date vis-à-vis maverick Rumania is to be explained only by a mix of factors: its secondary geographic position in Southern Europe; its perpetuation of Communist Party rule at home; and the skillful maneuvering by the Rumanian leadership in exploiting the Sino-Soviet conflict and establishing economic and other ties with Western European countries and the United States.

In 1971 Rumania intensified its contacts with China but then, in the face of clear Soviet concern and perhaps threats, backed off somewhat. The Soviet Union evidently calculated that systematic pressure on Rumania was not necessary because, in the new international situation of détente and in view of mounting economic problems, Rumania's room for maneuver internationally would be diminished. In reaction to the growing possibility of such isolation, the Rumanian leadership undertook new international initiatives after 1971 intended to bolster its position vis-à-vis Moscow. It established what amounted to an informal defensive alliance with Yugoslavia; it attempted to play an active mediating role in the Middle East; it sought acceptance in the community of developing nations. Today it is probably Rumanian economic vulnerabilities that constitute the main Soviet hope for an erosion of Ceausescu's independent position and the main reason that Moscow is prepared to be patient.

But just as Soviet restraint to date regarding Rumania has depended on a complex mix of factors, a significant change in any one of these factors could radically change the Soviet calculus vis-à-vis Rumania and lead it to intervene, with force if necessary.

After 1959 Albania took advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict and threw off Soviet tutelage, exchanging it for the protection of a more distant Chinese ally. Peking's only permanent satellite since 1961, Albania has survived as a Balkan backwater of Stalinism. Chinese economic aid enabled it to develop its basic extractive industries with some success. But the Chinese opening to the world in the late sixties--in particular, the rapprochement with the United States that began in

1971--induced strains in Sino-Albanian relations. Nervous about continued support from China, Albania normalized its relations with Yugoslavia and Greece. By 1974 uncertainties about Albania's future international position affected the internal unity of the Communist regime. High-ranking Party and military leaders, including the Minister of Defense, were ousted. There are circumstantial presumptions that the ousted generals, concerned about Albania's growing isolation and the continuity of arms supplies from China, sought improved relations with the Soviet Union. Looking toward the future, a steady erosion of the Sino-Albanian alliance is more likely than a sharp rupture or a sudden Soviet military threat to Albania's security. Erosion of the China connection, particularly with a new leadership in both Peking and Tirana, could usher in a period of domestic instability in Albania, with clan and regional politics assuming their traditionally important roles. Factions could develop with different international patrons, the Chinese, the Russians, the Yugoslavs, and the West. Dominance of the Soviet faction would amount to reincorporation of Albania into the Soviet orbit, with important political and military advantages accruing to the Soviet Union. In a prolonged period of leadership instability in Tirana, in which no faction would hold decisive advantage, the opportunities for miscalculation would be numerous. While Yugoslavia is sometimes considered the most likely future tinderbox in the Balkans, Albania's potential in this regard should not be neglected.

In contrast to this set of bilateral relationships, intra-East European ties have been insignificant in the Communist era. Soviet policy has shown itself mistrustful of associations between East European states that might acquire a momentum of their own, and Soviet determination to retain its power monopoly has impeded formation of intra-East European groupings. The Soviets have been assisted in this goal by historical intra-East European differences. The only exception has been in southeastern Europe, where independent Rumania tacitly joined with two states outside the Soviet sphere, Yugoslavia and Albania, in a grouping that some observers saw as enjoying Chinese support. Explicitly multilateral cooperation could develop among these three states in the future; the basis of this cooperation would be defense of national interests against Soviet hegemony.

In brief, the Soviets have achieved a degree of success in restoring cohesion and stability in Eastern Europe after the turbulence of the 1960s. Normalization has been achieved in Czechoslovakia; departures in Hungarian internal policy have been circumscribed; the leadership in East Germany has been changed; the 1970 upheaval in Poland was well managed; the Rumanian deviation has been contained within tolerable limits. Regionwide, multilateral integration has been pursued, and living standards have improved perceptibly. But the legitimate grounds for Soviet satisfaction with the state of affairs in Eastern Europe today probably do not incline the Soviet leadership to complacency. Eastern Europe still presents a variety of problems to the Soviet Union, of which nationalism remains the most serious and explosive. Societal tensions have been mitigated by consumerism, but a future drop in living standards in Eastern Europe portended by the present bleak economic outlook could revive societal tensions throughout the area. In a situation of economic crisis, the economically weaker East European states might be in a position to extract concessions from the Soviet Union by threatening political collapse. Leadership instability may arise during succession periods because of the longevity of most of the present East European Communist leaders.

The prospects for the immediate future are for an intensification of the Soviet integrationist policies in Eastern Europe. As long as the present Soviet leadership remains in power, attempts to reimpose orthodox conformity and closer control over Eastern Europe in the economic, military, foreign policy, and ideological realms are likely to increase in vigor. Measures intended to ensure greater coordination would meet resistance from several East European states, not just the Rumanians. Continuation of the Soviet integrationist drive in Eastern Europe will depend on the outcome of the Brezhnev succession in the Soviet Union. If the succession is a smooth one, there is every likelihood of Brezhnev's policies of cohesion in Eastern Europe being maintained or accelerated. But if, as appears more likely, there is a protracted succession crisis in the Soviet Union, then the infrastructure of integration which Brezhnev has so carefully begun to build is unlikely to survive. Centrifugal forces would reemerge at both the

domestic and the national levels. Serious friction with the Soviet Union even to the point of prompting renewed military intervention in Eastern Europe could arise. The new Soviet leaders who emerged from the succession period would have to begin again the Sisyphean task of devising a system that combined the Soviet imperative of cohesion and viability in Eastern Europe.

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INTRODUCTION

This survey is divided into three parts: Part I deals with Soviet goals in Eastern Europe, concentrating mainly on Soviet aspirations rather than on the degree or the possibility of their realization. It attempts a brief analysis of the Soviet Union's perception of the importance of Eastern Europe and goes on to discuss the characteristics of, and the differences between, the policy of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev leaderships toward Eastern Europe. In doing so, it seeks to identify the main reasons for these differences.

Part II describes and analyzes the most important developments in the interaction between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies (plus Albania), with particular stress on the period between 1969 and 1975. It includes a general survey of the most important regionwide developments and of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union, on the one side, and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Albania, on the other.

Part III draws conclusions, patterns, and generalizations from Part II, assesses the degree of success achieved by Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, identifies the serious obstacles to the pursuit of Soviet aims, and, finally, makes some projections relating to the future interaction between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

This method of approach presents problems: It inevitably leads to some repetition, and it tends also to give the impression of compartmentalization in a subject whose components are in fact very closely interrelated. In dealing separately with Soviet aspirations, for example, it might give the impression of a Soviet master plan being relentlessly implemented with unremitting success. Yet it is probably more correct to speak of Soviet "desiderata" than of a "master plan," and its implementation is often characterized more by improvisation than deliberate planning. Moreover, the second part of the survey, dealing with the main recent developments in Soviet-Eastern European relations, regionally and bilaterally, highlights not only the serious problems standing in the way of Soviet success, but also the fact that

Eastern Europe still presents a veritable patchwork quilt of internal idiosyncrasies and external obstacles to that policy. In fact, despite over 25 years of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the radical transformation along generally similar lines of the area's previously existing political, economic, and social structures, and the imposition of an avowedly unifying ideology, the expression "Eastern Europe" itself remains very much a term of convenience rather than an expression of homogeneity.

Part III is, at least in part, specifically designed to mitigate the problems of compartmentalization presented by Parts I and II. It tries to balance Soviet aspirations against the problems, present and projected, that are seen as militating against their realization. In the end, it is hoped that a balanced picture will emerge, presenting a roughly accurate mix of aims and impediments, successes and failures, with some indications of the future course of Soviet-Eastern European relations.

A recurring theme throughout this survey is the concept of *cohesion* with *viability* as the main general Soviet aim in its policy toward Eastern Europe. *Cohesion*, in this context, means a situation where--allowing for a degree of diversity caused by different local conditions--there is a general conformity of both domestic and foreign policies, as well as an identity of the institutions implementing these policies in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, respectively. Again from the Soviet viewpoint, *viability* would be defined as a degree of confidence, credibility, and efficiency in the Eastern European states that would increasingly legitimize Communist rule there and consequently reduce Soviet need for a preventive preoccupation with the region.

This concept provides a convenient framework within which the whole discussion can be placed, a serviceable handle for the presentation that follows. Extrapolating from a study of the aims of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, cohesion and (or with) viability are taken as Soviet postulates or as policy imperatives. They are mutually indispensable and interacting postulates, not, in terms of Soviet goals, subject to separation, let alone capable of being regarded as exclusive. The one should not exist without the other; both should be associated

in balance and harmony. But what more than a quarter of a century of Soviet-Eastern Europe relations has demonstrated--and what it is hoped the following survey will show--is that this Soviet aim of balancing cohesion and viability has lain at the root of the Soviet *dilemma* in Eastern Europe and is likely to remain so. Indeed, the evidence so far available tends to suggest that the two aims, rather than being interacting and complementary, have in practice often been contradictory and exclusive.

The viability, for example, that did begin to develop in Eastern Europe in the late fifties and particularly the early sixties made cohesion, from the Soviet point of view, difficult to maintain, let alone strengthen. The cohesion which the Soviet leadership since the invasion of Czechoslovakia has been seeking to impose on Eastern Europe would seem, on the basis of the evidence so far, to have little chance of being complemented by that degree of viability the Soviets would see as constituting a balanced syndrome.

Perhaps future events will demonstrate conclusively that the two concepts are not compatible, that cohesion does exclude viability and vice versa, that the syndrome is indeed a chimera. If so, the reason will be the lack of any basic identity or mutuality of interest between the Soviet Union and most of the Eastern European states that would allow the latter the degree of autonomy necessary for viability and the latitude necessary for the spontaneous thrust of change, and still maintain that degree of cohesion the Soviets consider their hegemony requires.

It has already been shown, between 1948 and 1968, that the Soviet leaders and several Eastern European leaderships--the Yugoslav, Polish, Hungarian, Albanian, Rumanian, and Czechoslovak--have viewed this relationship between cohesion and viability from quite different perspectives and that this has led to serious disunity, even dangerous instability. Another relevant factor in this context is the different attitudes to this issue adopted by various strata within the Soviet and Eastern European leaderships. In the Soviet Union, for example, even after Khrushchev's victory over the "anti-Party group" in 1957, it can be assumed that some elements were opposed to the experimentation and

innovation he thought necessary to promote a viable Eastern Europe. In 1968 there were certainly differences in the leadership over how to handle the Czechoslovak crisis. Some of the Soviet economic and technical intelligentsia welcomed the economic reforms in Eastern Europe in the sixties and probably now wish for their revival both there and in their own country. In the non-Russian republics there are unquestionably strata--probably, it is true, not in the top echelons of leadership--that would welcome the growth of national autonomy in Eastern Europe in the hope that it would provide the impulse for the same development in the Soviet Union.

In Eastern Europe the situation is even more varied and complex, mainly because of distinctiveness and sometimes conflicting aspirations of the nations within the region. Even those Eastern European leaders who are the most tractable from the Soviet point of view have had to go along with these national aspirations to some degree, at least since the death of Stalin. The less tractable have done so to a degree that has certainly conflicted with the Soviet concept of cohesion. There have also been divisions within each leadership over the degree of autonomy to be pressed for, and on domestic policy there have often been open differences between conservative and reformist elements centering on questions directly affecting the balance between cohesion and viability.

This whole combination of factors, formidable as it is, need not, however, undermine the usefulness of the cohesion-viability framework used in this survey. What it does show--and what the survey is designed to elaborate--is the enormity of the problems the Soviet Union has had, and will continue to have, in reconciling its policy imperatives in relation to Eastern Europe with the self-perceived requirements of the individual Eastern European states for their own international, political, social, economic, and cultural progress. So far the efforts to overcome these problems have not led to a satisfactory harmony of cohesion and viability, from either the Soviet or the Eastern European viewpoint, but rather have caused cyclical shifts back and forth from one pole to another. Despite Soviet efforts, this situation, satisfactory to neither side, is likely to continue, punctuated by instability in Eastern Europe if these shifts become too drastic.

PART I

SOVIET AIMS IN EASTERN EUROPE

### SOVIET AIMS IN EASTERN EUROPE

#### SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF EASTERN EUROPE

The importance of Eastern Europe from the Soviet perspective cannot be explained by any single factor. Indeed a number of factors, some of them interacting, explain why the retention and strengthening of control over this region have been perhaps the most important Soviet foreign policy preoccupation over the last 30 years. What has changed, however, has been the relative weight given by successive Soviet leaderships to these various factors during any given period.

Very briefly they can be summarized as follows:<sup>1</sup>

The military security factor. For the Soviet Union the control of Eastern Europe after World War II meant the acquisition of a buffer zone against possible attack from the Western powers. Immediately after World War II and during the period of the Cold War, this factor was probably uppermost in the thinking of the Soviet leaders, and in the minds of some of them, especially military leaders, it has presumably remained so. The methods and techniques of warfare have, of course, radically changed in the 30 years. The value of the Eastern European buffer zone in an era of nuclear weapons is much less than it was in the days of conventional-territorial warfare. But even in this new era, Soviet military thinking on nuclear war apparently still stresses the importance of ground forces in Europe, and in the case of a limited conventional conflict their value is of course self-evident. In any case, the fact that today the Soviets still keep 31 divisions in Eastern Europe, a number far in excess of what any policing role might require, attests to the importance they attribute to Eastern Europe as a security zone.

The springboard factor. In this context a Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe is seen as a base for military aggression against, or the assertion of political influence over, Western Europe or parts of it, notably West Germany. The very validity of this hypothesis has, of course, been the subject of fierce controversy, its once automatic acceptance being challenged with great vigor, if with only varying

degrees of plausibility or even accuracy. But, allowing that after the failure of the Berlin blockade and the foundation of NATO, military aggression against Western Europe became less and less a feasible option for the Soviet leadership, few would deny that political penetration in Western Europe, or diplomatic manipulation of it, based on the retention of the status quo in Eastern Europe has remained an important aim of Soviet international policy in the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev eras.

The Communist internationalist factor. Here Eastern Europe is seen by the Soviets in ideological expansionist terms, as a vanguard echelon of Communist states forwarding the process of world revolution in association with the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly this belief played an important part in Khrushchev's thinking and policy. Eastern Europe, therefore, had a special role to fulfill in a Soviet foreign policy that had world revolution as one of its basic ingredients, with the ruling parties in the area having an important and exemplary part to play in the world Communist movement.

The ideological security factor. This concept, formulated by Richard Löwenthal,<sup>2</sup> implies a Soviet leadership now very much on the defensive in its efforts to secure its closed system of government against the dangers of ideological and political penetration. Here Eastern Europe is seen not so much as a military but as an ideological buffer zone; hence the need for closer control in Eastern Europe and the imposition, as far as possible, of similar orthodox political systems on its component states. The Soviet dilemma is that the buffer zone is also a breeding ground of reformist Communist ideas that are more dangerous than whatever liberal-bourgeois notions might seep in from the West. Obviously, this view of Eastern Europe is very much a characteristic of the Brezhnev leadership.

It is evident that some of these four factors have affected the policymaking of all three Soviet leaderships since World War II, while others have not. For Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev alike, the military security factor has obviously played a key role in their view of Eastern Europe's importance. So has the springboard factor, though here opinions may differ about the relative weight it has carried in

particular periods. The concept of Eastern Europe as a base for military aggression, however, is another matter: Few would deny that this concept has lost much of its importance during the last 25 years. But as a base for political penetration and diplomatic manipulation, Eastern Europe has retained its value in Soviet eyes. The ebullient, confident Khrushchev's inclination to see world politics at least partly through an ideological prism did not preclude but actually strengthened his efforts to undermine the Western system or exploit its weaknesses. For the Brezhnev leadership, internal defensiveness and external boldness are different sides of the same coin. The aim, therefore, behind the pressure for a European security system was not solely to legitimize the retention of the status quo, though this may have been the principal motivation. It was also, as Soviet publicists have openly stressed, to facilitate the development of situations in Western Europe conducive to social change along lines favorable to the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

It is when considering the third and fourth factors described above--the Communist internationalist and ideological security factors--that there is little or no continuity; and in the context of a survey of Soviet-Eastern European relations it is precisely these two that are the most immediately relevant. They reflect the contrast between what can for convenience be called the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev eras in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev's confident "international" view of Eastern Europe accounted at least in part for his readiness for experimentation and change. In contrast, Brezhnev's "ideological insecurity" goes some way toward explaining the recent Soviet insistence on closer control and internal orthodoxy. Thus, this contrasting view of Eastern Europe in the broader perspectives of Soviet policies has had a direct bearing on the methods used, the priorities allotted, and the difficulties encountered by these two Soviet leaders in the narrower setting of the direct relationships between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.

#### THE EXPERIMENT UNDER KHRUSHCHEV

Aside from its ruthlessness and terror, the Stalinist system in Eastern Europe was mainly designed to further a dual process of

*Gleichschaltung*: at the national level through the imposition of leaderships trusted by Moscow, and at the domestic level through a revolutionary transformation which would lay the foundation for future socialist development.<sup>4</sup>

Here the *national* level involves relations between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European country concerned, through whatever channel--state, party, military, etc.; the *domestic* level involves relations between the individual Eastern European ruling elite--state, party, etc.--and the society concerned. The two levels are obviously far from being mutually exclusive.

Since Stalin's death, the main Soviet aim in Eastern Europe appears to have been to achieve the right combination of cohesion and viability. For some four years after his death, however, there was no consistent Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, primarily because of leadership divisions in Moscow and the inability to perceive the reality of a situation that demanded not simply palliatives but radical remedies. This reality became apparent almost immediately, in the Pilsen and East Berlin riots of 1953. The Soviet response was to initiate economic and political concessions collectively known as the "New Course."<sup>5</sup> But these were essentially reactions to the unstable situation left by Stalin rather than indications of any fundamentally new ideas Moscow might have had on how the Eastern European states should be governed. On the national level Khrushchev made fence-mending trips to China in 1954 and (dramatically) to Yugoslavia in 1955. As for the rest of Eastern Europe, the members of Moscow's alliance, there was considerable Soviet interference in the leaderships of some in an effort to secure more domestic legitimacy, but very little that could add up to anything like a "new system."

Indeed, the upheavals in Hungary and Poland in 1956 occurred because of the unviability of Stalin's system and because nothing basically new had been established in its place. And it was this omission, after 1956, that Khrushchev sought to rectify. Within a year of the Hungarian revolution and the upheaval in Poland, his leadership had been both recognized and consolidated in the Soviet Union; an outward appearance of unity had been created in the world Communist movement,

and he could now turn his attention to the task of creating a new system in Eastern Europe.

Khrushchev's attempts to create a cohesive, viable system in Eastern Europe and his only partial success are well enough known; they need not be enumerated here.<sup>6</sup> Against a theoretical background of newly enunciated principles of equality governing relations between socialist states, Khrushchev saw the two institutions of the Warsaw Pact and particularly of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) as the tools to weld a new, firmer and less brittle cohesion between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states and among the Eastern European states themselves. But Khrushchev, much more than his predecessor and more than his successors, stressed the viability as well as the cohesive aspect of the Soviet aim. Whether he, or his advisers, consciously believed the greater the viability the greater the cohesion, whether he saw no unity, dialectical or otherwise, between the two, is impossible to say. It is also impossible to say whether Khrushchev had any conscious design at all. Perhaps more than most leaders he tended to depend on a few rudimentary (but usually sound) notions of what was required, and then on any number of improvised, ad hoc (and sometimes unsound) means of trying to obtain it. But whatever the inadequacies of his conceptualization and the vagaries of his execution, Khrushchev, directly at home and indirectly in Eastern Europe, pursued policies and generated an atmosphere that broke the rigid frame of Stalinist conformity in quest of a viability aimed at making the Communist system more attractive and more legitimate, both to its own citizens and to those laboring under other systems.

His efforts in Eastern Europe had a profound impact on both the national and the domestic levels. The Eastern European states gradually became able to assert, if not their national identity, then at least their distinctiveness to a degree impossible under Stalin. It was never intended, of course, to allow them anything more than a semblance of independence. Any illusions on this account Khrushchev sought to dispel immediately. But, still, he did much to foster a situation in which Eastern European leaderships, the composition of several of which he helped to change, developed some degree of autonomy and even

some degree of bargaining leverage in their relations with the Soviet Union. The Eastern alliance began to assume some of the features of stress, strain, and bargaining that have characterized the traditional alliances of history.

The autonomy the Eastern European states developed served to quicken the stimulus for change at the domestic level, especially when sweeping domestic change, set off by destalinization, seemed likely in the Soviet Union itself. The degree of domestic change in Eastern Europe varied considerably from state to state. Many factors affected this; perhaps the most important were the level of economic advancement, public pressure, and the degree of self-confidence of the ruling elite. Sometimes the very autonomy the various leaderships now enjoyed served to prevent rather than promote serious change, as in Rumania, in Czechoslovakia before 1962, and in Poland after 1958. But domestic needs, plus the innovative examples of the Soviet Union, produced considerable domestic reform and experiment in Eastern Europe--important steps toward viability and the first faltering steps toward the legitimization of Communist rule.

After the very uneven process known as destalinization in Eastern Europe, the most noticeable, positive reform measures of the Khrushchev era were those affecting economic structure, planning, and policy. Practically every country was affected by these measures, and in view of the close interaction between Khrushchev's leadership in Moscow and Eastern European reform, it was hardly coincidental that the go-ahead signal for them was given by the publication of the Liberman proposals in the Soviet Union in 1962.<sup>7</sup> Reform blueprints or series of single measures for greater economic efficiency subsequently appeared in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and even the Polish and Rumanian leaders were constrained to make some efforts at piecemeal change.

These reform measures--again, an illustration of growing diversity--met with different fates in different countries. In the GDR and Hungary they were to achieve great success; in Czechoslovakia they were one ingredient which contributed to the heady mixture of the reformist political transformation of the Prague Spring of 1968; in Bulgaria they were hardly given a chance to operate before they were withdrawn.

But just as important as their degrees of success or failure were their embryonic and potential effects on the political and social life of the countries involved. Even the more cautious of these reforms, because they departed from the old command system of economy, tended to encourage pluralism in other branches of public life as well. This is what bold and perceptive reformers realized and sought to accelerate; it was also what perceptive and apprehensive party *apparatchiki* realized and sought to brake. In spite of this, some embryonic form of political life began to reemerge in Czechoslovakia and Hungary in particular (not to mention the distinctive case of Yugoslavia which was developing its own system in a completely different environment). In these countries, the existence of social and professional interest groups came not only to be recognized (they had always existed) but also to be quietly accepted and, as a result, the leading role of the Communist Party, the fundamental power of Marxism-Leninism, began to be slightly and quietly modified. As the amount of leeway grew for the interaction between various interest groups, so the Party's direct and total control over public life tended to diminish, despite all the official disclaimers that anything of the sort was happening.

The degree of such development must not, of course, be exaggerated. What is really being discussed here is more the potential than the actual and, except for Yugoslavia, it was only in Czechoslovakia and Hungary<sup>8</sup> that the signs referred to above were becoming clearly visible. But, for all its limitations, the development of pluralism in some Eastern European states was a political fact of life of increasing importance in the sixties.

Khrushchev lost power in October 1964, but the developments that began in Eastern Europe during his period of rule continued for several years after it was terminated. In this sense, the Khrushchev era in Eastern Europe ended in August 1968 rather than October 1964. The momentum of what had begun during his rule increased after it, and had he remained in power no one would have tried harder to check it than he. He allowed forces to be set in motion which he appears to have seriously underestimated. One of these was certainly that of Eastern European nationalism--a strange miscalculation for a man politically

groomed in the Ukraine; another was the threat to Communist Party absolutism by other political, economic, social, and cultural forces within some Eastern European societies. Thus, forces which were first considered feasible to harness for purposes of legitimizing Communist rule were found to be so strong as to undermine the legitimacy they had been intended to strengthen. In the pursuit of viability, the goal of cohesion was made less attainable.

There were three outstanding examples of this: One was the rather special case of Albania, whose leaders, from nationalistic motives, took advantage of the Sino-Soviet dispute and exchanged Moscow's tutelage for that of Peking. More important, however, were the cases of Rumania and Czechoslovakia. In the former, national autonomy developed into a nationalist Rumanian policy, repudiating Soviet hegemony, not only as in the Albanian case, but steadily through the skillful manipulation of various factors, of which the Sino-Soviet dispute was perhaps the most important. In the Czechoslovak case, domestic reform rushed headlong toward a repudiation of all known variants of the Communist system itself. Both processes were set in motion during the Khrushchev era and were made possible by it; both accelerated after his departure.

There were several reasons for this acceleration after 1964, of which perhaps two were preeminent. The first was the lack of decisiveness on the part of the Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe for about three years after Khrushchev's fall from power. The most striking example of this was in relations with the FRG, the most serious European foreign policy issue the Soviet-led alliance had to face throughout the sixties. The overtures made to Eastern Europe by the Kiesinger-Brandt coalition in late 1966, including the offer to establish diplomatic relations, appear to have caused serious indecision in Moscow resulting in disarray in the ranks of the Soviet allies themselves. Apart from Rumania, which reacted with positive alacrity, there seems little doubt that Hungary, Bulgaria, and perhaps even Czechoslovakia were prepared to respond favorably to the West German initiative. But Soviet hesitation resulted in Ulbricht and Gomulka assuming a totally disproportionate influence on alliance decisionmaking in this context.

Subsequently, when Rumania independently established diplomatic relations with Bonn in early 1967, the rest of the alliance closed ranks to reject the West German overtures and Moscow then assumed the lead in a strong anti-West German campaign. But in the months of December 1966 and January 1967 East Berlin and Warsaw seemed to wield the decisive influence. This was but the most conspicuous example of a vacuum in Soviet leadership greater even than that which occurred after Stalin's death. In a way this was perhaps understandable: The new Soviet leadership was too preoccupied with consolidating its power in the Soviet Union itself to be able to think and act decisively in Eastern Europe.

The second important reason for the acceleration of processes that had begun before Khrushchev's fall was simply that the seriousness of the consequences and implications of some of them could not be realized until much later. The most obvious case of this was the basic transformation in Czechoslovakia. This metamorphosis began in 1963, although its explosive significance did not really become evident until early 1968.

But even allowing for the great difficulties in anticipating the course of developments in Czechoslovakia, there remains more than a suspicion of Soviet indecisiveness. For anyone who watched the careering of events in the Prague Spring, the hesitance of the Soviet leadership emerges as a factor in the equation. Moscow left no doubt as what it did not like in the Czechoslovak situation but considerable doubt about what it was prepared to do about it. Whatever the reasons for this--internal divisions, broader policy considerations--it was an important factor contributing to the eventual Czechoslovak tragedy.

At this point, it might be worth digressing briefly to review the several elements of comparison between Soviet policy, or the lack of it, in the periods preceding the two great crises that have punctuated Moscow's period of hegemony in Eastern Europe: the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Both these events took place roughly the same time after the departure from the scene of the Soviet leader who had dominated it. During these intervening periods Soviet policy in Eastern Europe had been considerably less than decisive and, at least partly because of this, ferment in the

region developed quickly and dangerously. In 1956 the problem of response to the Hungarian situation caused indecision in the Soviet leadership, with a role of some importance being played by a then subordinate ally, China. In 1968 the situation was not very dissimilar: the events of July and early August obviously reflected hesitation. Once again, subordinate allies, this time the East Germans and perhaps the Poles, may have helped the Soviet leadership to make up its mind.

These similarities are suggestive enough to warrant more extensive discussion. It is more to the point here, however, to stress the lessons each of the two Soviet leaderships drew from the two crises once they were over. Both embarked on policies designed to prevent anything similar from happening again.

#### COORDINATION UNDER BREZHNEV: THE MOTIVATIONS

The steps Khrushchev took in Eastern Europe ushered in the era associated with his name; the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia marked the end of that era and the beginning of a new period in which the relationship between cohesion and viability has been strongly tilted back in favor of cohesion. The trauma of Czechoslovakia itself, the disruptive potential the Prague Spring had for other parts of Eastern Europe and for the Soviet Union itself, convinced the Soviet leaders that the spirit of innovation and experimentation, of reformation, that had been abroad in Eastern Europe during the sixties had to be substantially curbed. The situation, as they saw it, now demanded a counter-reformation, the reinstitution of orthodoxy, as a means of restoring control over Eastern Europe and buttressing the Soviet Union itself against the dangers inherent in the pre-August Czechoslovak developments.

But the need for immunization against any possible reemergence of the "Czechoslovak virus," urgent and immediate though this was, was not the only factor prompting the Soviet leadership to restore cohesion and orthodoxy in Eastern Europe. It was probably coincidence that the Warsaw Pact's declaration in Budapest in March 1969, renewing the call for international relaxation and the convening of a security conference in Europe, was issued only a few weeks before the deposition of Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia, the political consummation of the military

repression of the previous August. But this close chronological proximity does serve to emphasize the linkage between the Soviet determination to stamp out contamination in the East, its own sphere of influence, and at the same time to take all possible steps to guard against the dangers of contamination from the West which closer relations, under the rubric of Brezhnev's *Westpolitik*, might present.

The Soviets' reasoning here was quite logical. Having begun the process of restoring stability in Eastern Europe after Czechoslovakia, they were understandably loath to see it cracked by fissures emanating from the West. Both they and all the Eastern European leaders were aware that the very existence of Western Europe is a destabilizing element in Eastern Europe and that any real interaction between the societies of Eastern and Western Europe might lead to a restlessness, a questioning of accepted norms, a widening of horizons, new standards of comparison--in fact, to a situation incomparably more fluid, unpredictable, and disruptive even than that prevailing in the sixties. Indeed, any such interaction would endanger not only Soviet but also Communist control in Eastern Europe, at least in the form and manner in which it has been exercised up to now.

Knowledge of this was behind the strenuous Soviet and Eastern European attempts to resist Western proposals at first at Helsinki, then at Geneva, for a "freer flow" of information, people, and ideas. (Rumania has resisted the least, not because it is any less fearful of what the West proposes but mainly because of its dislike of acting *en bloc* with the rest of its nominal allies.) The contacts covered under "basket three" on the Helsinki and Geneva agendas, which the Soviet and Eastern European leaderships will tolerate, are mainly those carefully conducted exchanges they have countenanced previously. They have even admitted their readiness to allow more of these. "Freer flow," in the Western sense, they wait little part of, despite the last-minute concessions in the summer of 1975 to speed the end of the deliberations--concessions that will probably prove more optical than substantial.

The Soviet Union has, moreover, clearly shown that it is not prepared to take any chances even on the limited degree of genuine *détente*

it would be prepared to allow. In the more than two and a half years between the first preparatory meetings for the European Security Conference in the autumn of 1972 and the crowning summit in Helsinki in the summer of 1975, the Soviet leadership accelerated those cohesive processes that have been taking place in Eastern Europe since August 1968. Indeed, so intensive were the Soviet moves during this period that some observers concluded that the drive for cohesion was a relatively new phenomenon prompted solely by Soviet fears of the impact of détente. They overlooked the fact that these Soviet fears were another powerful component in an already existing complex of fear, a complex in which the components have been mutually reinforcing.

Détente, therefore--the pressure for it, the perception and the prospects of it--has certainly been a strong additional motivation for the Soviet drive for cohesion in Eastern Europe. The almost simultaneous issuance of the Budapest Declaration and the replacement of Dubcek by Husak in Prague symbolically dramatize the linkage between the trauma over Czechoslovakia and the fears attendant on international relaxation. It is tempting, in the circumstances, to posit another linkage here, highlighted by another event that occurred at almost exactly the same time in 1969 as these events in Budapest and Prague: the clash on the Ussuri between Soviet and Chinese forces.

Obviously in the case of war with China or the perceived imminence of it, any Soviet leadership would have to decide on the best means of ensuring stability in Eastern Europe. It would presumably be realistic enough to assume that this was a factor that had to enter into its calculations. And, given the Brezhnev leadership's determination to restore cohesion in Eastern Europe, if Ussuri was interpreted in Moscow as a possible prelude to a general conflict with China, it would certainly be plausible to add this factor to the two already mentioned as an important, even crucial, motivation for the safety precautions that were taken in Eastern Europe. But seriously though Ussuri was taken in Moscow, prompting, as it did, the large-scale transfer of Soviet troops to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union, there is no convincing evidence that it was taken so gravely as to warrant the switch to a war-footing strategy that would also have involved policy in Eastern

Europe. Ussuri and the Chinese threat, therefore, cannot realistically be included as part of a linkage motivating Soviet policy in Eastern Europe from 1969 onward.

The competitive threat of China to Soviet influence in Eastern Europe itself has receded greatly during the seventies. Previously it had intermittently been a factor of some importance. In quite contrasting ways, Chinese influence affected Soviet policy in Hungary and Poland in 1956; it also influenced Soviet efforts to recreate a formal edifice of socialist unity in 1957. Later, when the Sino-Soviet conflict became an acknowledged reality, Albania broke with Moscow and accepted the tutelage of Peking, while Rumania adroitly manipulated the situation to enlarge its own area of autonomy. More recently, in the summer of 1971, when Soviet relations with both Yugoslavia and Rumania appeared to deteriorate markedly, there was serious speculation about the prospect of a "Balkan triangle," composed of Albania, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, looking to China for protection. This speculation was soon dissipated, however, by the conciliatory change in Soviet policy toward Belgrade and Bucharest and a realistic assessment in both capitals of the feasibility of any putative Chinese protection against Soviet coercion. Since 1971, though China has maintained its alliance with Albania, its close connection with Rumania, and cordial relations with Yugoslavia, its prime interest in Europe has been concentrated in the West rather than the East. Its link with the European Economic Community, its resolute backing of NATO, and its contempt for the whole European security exercise indicate that it now sees more opportunity to damage the Soviet Union in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe.

Regarding Chinese influence on internal developments in Eastern Europe, this factor still lacks any dimension of seriousness. Apart from the special case of Albania, the only demonstrable instance of regime domestic policy ever being influenced by China was the Bulgarian "great leap forward" in 1958 and its antecedent propaganda. Just how far Ceausescu's "mini-cultural revolution" was affected by what he saw in China in 1971 is debatable, but the fact that this question can even be raised shows the sparseness of ready examples of Chinese influence on the Eastern European domestic scene.

Considerably more significant--with the potential for becoming even more so--has been Chinese influence on "nonofficial" elements in Eastern European societies. The dazzling militancy of Peking has attracted a few discontented older Communists and many more younger intellectuals and students, both categories seeing the socialist order as developed in Eastern Europe, not to mention the Soviet Union, as a debasement rather than a fulfillment of original revolutionary ideals. But, with the possible exception of the veteran dissidents in Bulgaria in the first half of the sixties and, possibly, very recently in Hungary, they have as yet had no noticeable impact on the regimes they despise.

COORDINATION UNDER BREZHNEV: AIMS AND METHODS

The Soviet-inspired coordination process as applied in Czechoslovakia is all too well known, but the "normalization" imposed by the Husak regime should not distract attention from the broader developments in Soviet-Eastern European relations over the last five years. Immediately after August 1968 there were many who feared that the crushing of the Czechoslovak experiment would lead to the imposition of a relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe akin to that which existed in Stalin's day. No such relationship, however, was attempted. What has evolved is a far more complex effort to promote cohesion through a comprehensive integrationist policy at every level. With its own powerful armed forces and, through the Warsaw Pact, its control over the Eastern European military, with the invasion of Czechoslovakia as a reminder of its ultimate willingness to use them, and with the Brezhnev Doctrine as its ideological support in case it did, the Soviet leadership embarked on a comprehensive policy designed eventually to create a situation in which the circumstances that led to the necessity for invasion would no longer arise.

Integration is usually a term associated with economics, and in the Soviet-Eastern European context, it is still most often used that way, in referring to the Soviet Union's continued efforts, through Comecon, to exploit its own and its allies' economic strength and potential. In this, of course, the Brezhnev leadership is continuing the policy begun by Khrushchev. But whereas Khrushchev precipitately

sought integration from above, through a supranational planning body, and failed, Brezhnev, more realistic and more patient, seeks it from below, "from the bottom up," through a systematic interlocking of the basic elements of the Eastern European economies with each other and, principally, with that of the Soviet Union. It is a multifaceted and a long-range program, publicly admitted to be so. But a start has at least been made with the agreement of several Eastern European governments, including even the Rumanians, to invest in Soviet raw-material industries following the publication in 1971 of the "Comprehensive Program" for integration, and the agreement to an overall plan of cooperation, effective from 1976, outside the individual national plans of the member states. Presumably the interlocking is eventually expected to be so complete as to make supranational planning the logical, almost the natural, culmination of this.

Economic integration, therefore, is still an essential part of the Soviet Union's plans, but its concept of integration now goes much further and wider. There is now much greater stress on political, cultural, ideological, and, of course, military integration. The summit meetings of Party leaders represent only the apex of a whole pyramid of the most varied types of meetings, at senior, intermediate, and junior levels of the various hierarchies, that are taking place with great regularity. On the face of it, this Soviet method of consultation with its allies may look like a genuine conciliar system, an appearance strengthened by the fact that many of the various meetings being held take place in Eastern European cities and are presided over by Eastern European officials. But this is not a genuine conciliar system: Consultation there certainly is, but it is not joint consultation. The inequality of the partners is accepted, and both discussion and decision proceed on this basis. This is not to deny that heated discussion takes place and that sometimes it is difficult to reach the directed consensus wanted by the Soviets. The Rumanians certainly have balked at many attempts to reach decisions they oppose. They have made it a policy not to attend meetings where decisions might be taken infringing their notion of sovereignty and, at meetings they have attended, their delegates have sometimes refused to accept the otherwise

general consensus. Nor have the Rumanians been entirely alone in this. It can be inferred from the Hungarian economic press, for example, that in various Comecon meetings the Hungarian delegates have put forward specific points of view--convertibility, enterprise-to-enterprise cooperation--that are at variance with those of the Soviets. So, presumably, have the Poles and the East Germans. It can also be assumed that in matters of lesser importance to the Soviet Union, its delegates allow a real sense of the meeting to prevail or occasionally allow themselves to be dissuaded from their original viewpoint. A rigid, domineering approach at all levels, on all matters would be counterproductive. Moreover, one important use of some comprehensive consultation by the Soviets is to keep track of allied thinking on a very wide range of subjects.<sup>9</sup> To do this, the occasional opportunity for dissent and self-interest has to be allowed. But on subjects in which the Soviet leadership sees itself vitally or seriously concerned, the consensus has to be directed, and what distinguishes the Rumanians' posture regarding the Soviet consultative method is their readiness to differ with the Soviets on precisely such matters.

This tactic of directed consensus does not mean that the Soviet leadership eschews direct pressure when it is considered necessary. There was evidence of this in the removal of Ulbricht in the spring of 1971 and in the pressure on Rumania and Yugoslavia the following summer. There is reason to suspect some direct interference in some aspects of Polish domestic policy. Some of the personnel changes in Hungary and the shifts in policy emphasis beginning in March 1974 were reflections of the Soviet will. But if the Soviet leaders have not suddenly become hidden persuaders, they have genuinely tried to make the Soviet-Eastern European interaction one where direct pressure is much less needed than it was in the first generation of Communist rule.

They have, in fact, shown considerable sophistication and restraint in recent Eastern European situations requiring crisis-management techniques. Pressure was undoubtedly exerted on Ulbricht, but his age and health were convenient pretexts on which to remove a serious impediment to Brezhnev's *Westpolitik*. The most striking example was the Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis in December 1970. This was one of

restraint, confidence in the new leader, Gierek, and readiness to help defuse an explosive situation--all successful decisions as things turned out.

In this context, Soviet policy toward Rumania and Hungary in the last few years deserves special consideration because each of these countries, in its own way, has presented challenges to Moscow's goal of cohesion. The Rumanian challenge, first ideologically formulated over 11 years ago in the April Declaration of 1964, has been, on the national level, against Soviet hegemony. As long as Ceausescu continues in power, that challenge will remain--and the steps taken by him to institutionalize his personal rule at the end of March 1974 indicate his determination to bolster his power still further. But since about the summer of 1971, the Soviet leaders seemed to have banked on the possibility that this challenge can be reduced to the level of a tolerable irritation as a result of great-power diplomacy which, Ceausescu's globe-trotting notwithstanding, it is hoped will enhance Rumania's isolation, through that country's growing economic vulnerability and through an increasing disenchantment among some sections of the population with Ceausescu's highly idiosyncratic style of rule. Working on these assumptions, there would seem, therefore, to be little need for anything but the more indirect kinds of pressure on Rumania, and there is no doubt that this Soviet policy certainly produced results between late in 1971 and the spring of 1974. There was little serious strain between the two countries and, especially in its economic relations with the Soviet Union and with Comecon, Bucharest probably showed more cooperation than at any time since the late fifties.

But there was never any guarantee that this satisfactory calm would continue indefinitely. In fact, by the spring of 1974 there were definite signs that it would not. The Warsaw Pact summit in April 1974 obviously indicated differences between Rumania and the Soviets, basically over Rumania's reluctance to consider itself an integral member, politically or militarily, of the alliance. Further differences appeared over Rumania's independent behavior at the European Cooperation and Security Conference at Geneva, its attitude to the preparations for a European Communist conference, its suspicions that the Soviets intended

to press supranational initiatives in Comecon, and its growing insistence that one of Comecon's main purposes was to equalize the levels of development of its members. In seeking to develop closer links with the developing countries and the nonaligned movement,<sup>10</sup> Rumania is also seeking to distance itself further from the Soviet connection. Some of these differences need not be permanent and, in keeping with the cyclical character Soviet-Rumanian relations appear to have developed, the current strain might not be maintained. But as long as Rumania maintains its friendship with China--no matter how discreet or restrained it may be--the grounds for serious friction will always remain. It is this aspect of Rumania's "policy of independence," far more than any others, which must outrage the Soviets and which could, if Sino-Soviet relations continue to deteriorate, provoke a drastic reaction. In Moscow's view, China threatens both the Soviet Union's national security and its Communist interests and commitments. And yet, in spite of this, Rumania maintains the most cordial Party and state relations with Peking. Even the more reasonable among the Soviet elite must find this indefensible; the others must find it treasonable.<sup>11</sup>

The problem presented by Hungary has been quite different. Hungarian foreign policy has been virtually indistinguishable from that of the Soviet Union, although there is occasional evidence, as for example over economic relations with the West, of differences in detail; on China, Budapest has supported Moscow fully. Yet the implicit and silent Hungarian challenge to the current Soviet view of Party rule, to what the Eastern European states should look like, was for several years much more serious than the Rumanian. Ceausescu's domestic policy, whatever its vagaries, presented little problem to Soviet orthodoxy; Kadar's presented several. Hungarian domestic policy, in the shape of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), has been what might be called a "Khrushchevian anachronism." It has embodied those dangers of economic and social pluralism, of real political interaction, of institutional reform which burst out of control in Czechoslovakia and which the Soviet leaders since 1968 have been seeking to eliminate.

Once again, the Soviet response to the Hungarian reform as it developed was, in view of its dangerous implications, one of poise and

restraint. In part it was a restraint induced by a great deal of Hungarian skill and finesse, not least on the part of Kadar himself. The Hungarian leadership not only supported Soviet foreign policy, it constantly assured Moscow of the Hungarian Party's control over the situation and strongly rejected any notion that its domestic policy should be a model for others. It thus sought to preempt any charge that Hungary was an agent of contamination, the charge leveled against Czechoslovakia and, earlier, against Yugoslavia. Moreover, from the very beginning Kadar used whatever bargaining leverage he had with the Soviet leaders to good advantage. To many it seemed doubtful whether Hungary would be able to proceed with the implementation of its NEM after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, or at least after the replacement of Dubcek by Husak in April 1969. There was considerable surprise when the Hungarian leaders not only continued the reforms but expanded their scope. In retrospect, however, it appears that Kadar was well placed, vis-à-vis the Soviet leadership, to do exactly what he did. He had supported Brezhnev in an action against Czechoslovakia the wisdom of which he doubted and which both knew to be fraught with great political and diplomatic risk. It succeeded, and Kadar's (unstated) price for his service must hardly have seemed too exorbitant to the Brezhnev leadership at the time. After all, having caused the worst Eastern European crisis since 1956 in its determination to punish the wayward, the Soviet Union could hardly at that moment do anything but reward the obedient.

It was only later, perhaps sometime in the course of 1972, that the Soviet leadership's tolerance of what was happening in Hungary appeared to give way to something approaching concern. Its tactics then were to add its own skepticism about the situation to the already existing--and increasing--difficulties the reforms were facing in Hungary itself. These included some purely economic problems, such as investment "overheating" and inflationary tendencies. But far more important was the growing discontent of large sections of the working class over what they (rightly) considered their own too small rewards from the prosperity the NEM had brought the society as a whole. Some conservatives inside the Hungarian Party itself appear to have sided

with these working-class dissidents in an effort to slow down or change the course of the reforms. It was these two elements in Hungary, working together, plus the Soviet leadership, working--one assumes--independently for the most part, which succeeded, not in destroying the Hungarian reform (nobody ever wanted that) but in pulling it back toward, if not yet inside, the bounds of what the Soviet Union apparently considers acceptable.

The first important step in this direction was taken at the Hungarian Party Central Committee plenum in November 1972 (a visit by Brezhnev took place immediately afterward). The second was in March 1974 at the plenum which demoted the "father of the NEM," Reszö Nyers, and several other leaders closely identified with various aspects of reform in Hungary. The same plenum also emphatically reaffirmed the working-class orientation and doctrinally orthodox character of Party policy which had, after an interval of several years, first reappeared in so unequivocal a form at the November 1972 plenum. The Hungarian Party Congress in March 1975 saw the virtual disappearance from public life of Nyers and Lajos Feher, the official largely responsible for administering the NEM in agriculture; and the following May, Jenö Fock, an enthusiastic partisan of reform, lost his position as premier. Throughout this period of retrenchment, Hungarian politicians (including Kadar himself) and the communications media have sought to reassure the public that there will be no essential policy changes. No one expects the NEM to be scrapped overnight; changes that are made may be quite gradual, almost unobtrusive. But few expect Hungary in the future to be as different from the rest of Eastern Europe as it has been for the past several years.

#### THE GENERAL RETURN TO ORTHODOXY

Even from this cursory analysis, it can be seen that there has been a strong revival of what may be termed "conservative orthodoxy" at the domestic level throughout Eastern Europe since 1968. This, however, could hardly have been achieved solely through Soviet manipulation. The truth is that Moscow's post-1968 concept of cohesion found ready acceptance among numerous officials in the Eastern European

Communist Parties who had been threatened by the reform trend of the previous decade. If one of the main reasons for Khrushchev's fall was the opposition of the entrenched Party apparatus in the Soviet Union, then the distrust of Khrushchevism by large numbers of Eastern European Party officials has been the main reason for their acceptance of the new emphasis in Soviet policy.<sup>12</sup> The reversion to orthodoxy, the counterreformation, has meant a shoring-up of their power under the ideological rubric of reaffirming the leading role of the Party. In fact, considerations of power--the power of the ruling Communist Party--have been behind much of the ideological offensive waged in Eastern Europe since the end of 1968.

It is in these terms that the effect of this ideological offensive should be judged. Of basic importance is the effect it is having on the interaction of Party and society in the various Eastern European states. To put it simply, the Party is being strengthened. There are several telling examples of this. The case of Hungary has just been mentioned; that of Czechoslovakia needs no elaboration. In the GDR the New Economic System, the highly successful, if rather modest, East German economic reform, was finally wound up in 1971.<sup>13</sup> The quite large private entrepreneurial sector in trade and services, after surviving the long years of Walter Ulbricht's apparent rigor, has been whittled away to practically nothing under his successor, Honecker; in agriculture, the considerable number of lower-stage collective farms in which various aspects of private ownership and interest remained untouched have now been converted into full-fledged collectives in which the private interest is at a minimum. In Poland, the reforms of local administration in 1972 and 1975 and the proposed comprehensive reform of the educational system, to take place over a number of years, will also shift the interactional balance between Party and society in favor of the former. There is no denying that reforms in both these sectors of Polish life were long overdue and that they will produce more efficient local government and better, more modern education. But their profound political implications are not lost on many thoughtful Poles who, at the same time, see their advantages. Similarly, since about the beginning of 1973, the Polish leadership has been nudging forward

on the broad front it calls the "socialist transformation of agriculture." It has ruled out collectivization of the crude, classic type and concentrates on financial discrimination and incentives to strengthen the state farms and agricultural circles at the expense of the private sector, which still covered over 80 percent of Poland's arable land at the beginning of 1975. Again, there is no doubt that many of Poland's small private farms, though resilient in a crisis, are highly inefficient by most other standards of judgment. Increased efficiency, therefore, is one motive behind this quiet revolution that is just beginning in Poland. But the power-ideological motive--and effect--is very much apparent also: the tilting of the balance between Party and society further in favor of the Party. One of the outstanding characteristics of Gierek's Poland has, in fact, been this interconnection between ideology and pragmatism.

Perhaps Bulgaria, of all the Eastern European states, is the one where the relationship between the ideological offensive and the building of a command structure dominated by the Party is at its clearest. Party power and its augmentation is often what many regime spokesmen openly and unashamedly refer to when invoking the need for more ideological fervor. Indeed, in terms of its Party-dominated centralized governing structure and the integral philosophy of rule expounded by its leadership, which at the same time has shown a receptiveness to bold innovations within the limits it sets itself, Bulgaria may well be considered by Moscow as an exemplary Eastern European state, thoroughly attuned to, and up-to-date with, the Soviet leadership's ideal of a model, yet by no means inert, satellite. Another such model, this time with the inestimable advantage of a relatively modern, efficient economy, is probably the GDR. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that the GDR under Honecker is now seen in Moscow as something Ulbricht's GDR tried very aggressively to be and never quite succeeded: an example of industrialized, socialist modernity which others should follow.

#### A NEW VIABILITY WITHIN COHESION?

The process described above has been aimed at restoring cohesion or, more correctly, at creating a new kind of cohesion between the

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This has been the main Soviet pre-occupation for the last six years. But essential to cohesion is public stability, a truism the Soviet and Eastern European ruling parties have frequently been taught by experience not to overlook. No sooner had consolidation in Czechoslovakia appeared to be restored than the workers' riots in Poland broke out in December 1970. This upheaval not only led to a change of leadership in Poland but also produced tremors of uncertainty in other Eastern European countries. The Polish temper was mollified by a number of important material concessions which have considerably raised the workers' standard of living. As for the rest of Eastern Europe, it appears that Gierek's desperate actions in early 1971 gave a strong impetus to other governments, as well as to that of the Soviet Union, to incorporate "consumerism" as a basic part of their economic policies. In the GDR it had, in fact, become entrenched even before the Polish upheavals. It was also implicit in the Hungarian NEM. It was to become a basic part of the Husak regime's "normalization" policy in Czechoslovakia--perhaps the only really successful aspect of the policy so far. It was also embraced in a typically massive Bulgarian way at the end of 1972. Only in Ceausescu's Rumania, with its leader's almost messianic urge to full industrial development, has it failed to become such an integral part of official policy, though even here the real incomes of most of the population have increased perceptibly.

An important point worth stressing about this present phase of "consumerism" is that it had its origins in Eastern Europe, not in the Soviet Union. This should be pointed out in view of the now prevailing opinion that since August 1968, if any appreciable change were to occur in Eastern Europe it would have to originate in the Soviet Union. This generalization may well turn out to be true and if the Soviet leadership continues in its present conservative mold, the changes forced on it by intellectual dissent, youthful dissatisfaction, and ethnic discontent could be all the more extensive and painful. Such changes would almost certainly have an instantaneous and enormous, if not easily definable, effect on Eastern Europe. But the possibilities of important change still originating in Eastern Europe should by no means be discounted.

A second point to be made is that an attractive, though far from satisfactory, analogy can be made between Brezhnev's "consumerism" and Khrushchev's notion of "goulash Communism." The analogy is obvious and need not be labored. It obviously prompts the question of whether the differences between Brezhnev's and Khrushchev's policies or philosophies are indeed so basic in view of similarities like this. The ultimate goals of the two leaders can presumably be considered similar, but the policies and methods adopted to achieve them cannot. In this particular instance, "goulash Communism" and "consumerism" obviously imply the same goal: a higher standard of living. But the means each of the two leaders was prepared to use to attain his ends appear to be quite different. Khrushchev seems to have seen "goulash Communism" being attained through a relaxation of the command economy and the command governmental structure in general. Brezhnev, with "consumerism" at least partly forced on him by the Polish crisis, sees it being achieved through a recentralization of economic planning and management, a tightening of Party control at the expense of other institutions or power centers in the state or society. It is probably also seen as an appeasement mechanism, designed in part to compensate for the loss of societal fulfillment in other areas of public life.

But some may also see "consumerism" not just in the negative sense of fending off trouble but more positively, as a means of regalvanizing economic life, of promoting a kind of surrogate viability that would accompany the recreated cohesion. If this were possible, then viability could of course be achieved without those dangerous institutional and societal developments that had seemed so dangerous in some parts of Eastern Europe during Khrushchev's time. There indeed appear to be a considerable number of officials in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who believe this is possible. Perhaps the best and most attractive example is Edward Gierek himself. Basing his philosophy on his practical success as Party leader for 13 years in Silesia, Poland's heavy industrial center, Gierek appears genuinely to think that good wages, good working and living conditions, and an open, but still paternalistic, two-way system of communication between management and shop floor will, at one and the same time, appease worker discontent,

blunt any demands for institutional innovations like real workers' councils, and generate conditions for an efficient upsurge in production.

Gierek is a leader devoted to modernization and has what appears to be a genuine concern for social welfare. He is not a technocrat himself but a political manager appreciative of the technocrats' role as agents of modernization and receptive to their suggestions. Hence in this respect also, he is typical of a current trend in both Soviet and Eastern European leadership practice: the cultivation of the economic and technical intelligentsia as the executors of economic policy. This stratum of society has been growing steadily in Eastern Europe for the last 15 years. It is manifestly the aim of the political leaderships to make it as proficient but also as apolitical as possible. They have been ready to make material concessions to its members--so much so that in some countries, notably Hungary, this has caused worker resentment--and to bring increasing numbers of them into positions of real responsibility in the governing economic hierarchy. It is on this class, in cooperation with a materially contented working class, that hopes for viability in the new order would seem to depend. The great problem facing all the regimes with regard to the growing economic and technical intelligentsia, however, is how to invest them with responsibility without, at the same time, giving them real power. It presumably can be done as long as the political leadership remains united and self-confident. In cases of disunity and lack of purpose, members of this intelligentsia could exert strong influence over political decision-making. As will be shown in Part III of this survey, the foreseeable future could bring situations in which this possibility may be tested in practice.

PART II

RECENT FACTORS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN  
SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS

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This part of the survey is divided into three sections: First, the most important regionwide developments in Soviet-East European relations since 1969 are discussed, as well as the factors affecting them; second, a brief account is given of the main factors governing the bilateral relations of the individual members of the Warsaw Pact with the Soviet Union; and third, intra-East European relations are discussed. Included in the second section is a brief account of factors in Albania's situation that could affect that country's relations with the Soviet Union in the future. The inclusion of Albania, of course, only makes the anomaly of excluding Yugoslavia from the entire purview of this study all the more conspicuous. Soviet-Yugoslav relations have, however, been analyzed in considerable detail in other studies,<sup>14</sup> and they constitute a subject of such importance--not to say possible gravity--that a general survey like this could not hope to do them justice and might understate their significance. Soviet-Albanian relations are of course unique in the sense that for almost 15 years they have scarcely existed. But that is not to say that neither country has played a role in the other's calculations. In the future this role is likely to become greater. For this reason, and because of the simple fact that since 1961, when Moscow broke off relations with Tirana, there has been a dearth of analysis of any possible Soviet-Albanian interaction,<sup>15</sup> we have decided to include Soviet-Albanian relations here.

REGIONWIDE FACTORS AND DEVELOPMENTS

The general aim of Soviet policy during the period considered in this study has already been reviewed in Part I. The concept of integration involved in the pursuit of this aim can be divided broadly into four main facets: economic, military, political and foreign policy, and Party affairs, ideological and organizational. In the first three of these the institutions of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact have

been seen by the Soviets as the chief instruments for the furtherance of their goals. No instrument has yet been created in the pursuit of ideological integration like, for example, the Cominform, established by Stalin in 1947 and disbanded by Khrushchev in 1956. But even here it would seem that some attempts are being made to regularize a process that has so far been characterized by ad hoc methods or improvisation.

Economic Factors

The Comecon, begun under Stalin but strengthened by Khrushchev and already seen by him as a strong potential means of advancing cohesion,<sup>16</sup> has continued under Brezhnev as the main instrument for promoting economic integration. More deliberate and less precipitous than Khrushchev, the Brezhnev leadership has seen Comecon as completing and then tightening the infrastructure of economic dependence of the Eastern European economies on that of the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup>

Unquestionably, progress has been achieved in this regard. It was formally decided at the 23rd Comecon Council Session in April 1969 to draw up an economic integration program, but, as expected, the search for integration has proved slow and difficult. At the 24th Session in May 1970 some progress was made in drafting various aspects of the program, but judging from the reticence expressed in the final communiqué and in some of the speeches of the delegates at the session, there seem to have been considerable disagreement over its pace and characteristics. This session, however, was notable for the agreement to establish the Comecon Investment Bank; its initial capital was contributed by each of the members on a proportionate basis, and it has already made a considerable number of loans to member countries to assist in the development of certain industries.

But the establishment of the Comecon Investment Bank also signified an important departure from previous Comecon practice. The bank's operations were made subject not to the practice of unanimity which Comecon used previously in its operations, but to the majority principle.<sup>18</sup> If a majority of the members of the bank were in favor of a certain project, then one or more countries who objected to the project could not veto it by refusing to join; the majority would carry on the

project without them. Rumania at first refused to join the bank but later changed its mind, partly because it apparently assured itself that no infringement on its sovereignty was involved and partly because its own economic situation was such that it could hardly turn its back on the advantages membership in the bank offered. Subsequently this majority principle was to be referred to more commonly as the "interested party" principle, particularly with regard to the joint investment projects that have recently become a major feature of Comecon activity. Joining in such projects is not compulsory; those countries not interested simply do not participate. Obviously the discontinuance of the veto practice and the introduction of the "interested party" concept removed a serious impediment to Comecon's growth and efficiency. For the foreseeable future it will presumably work well. It contains within itself, however, the eventual danger of division, if not fragmentation. More countries--not only Rumania--could opt out of projects, undermining the unity of Comecon undertakings and threatening the very concept of integration.

This, however, would be very much for the future. At the 25th Comecon Council Meeting in July 1971 the so-called Comprehensive Program, a document on integration, was finally approved and published. But it was hardly the decisive action program that Soviet and Eastern European preliminary publicity may have led some observers to expect. It comprised 17 sections apparently drawn up by different working groups which, though not mutually contradictory, showed little sign of coordination. Throughout the document there were few indications of agreement on the various kinds of systemic reform necessary to lay the groundwork of true integration. Among the most important of these reforms are a realistic and coordinated pricing and costing system, ruble convertibility, and a system of transnational enterprise cooperation. On these economic aspects of integration, it has not been so much a question of the Soviets pressuring their reluctant allies as vice versa. For several years, for example, Hungarian economic analysts, projecting the principles of their own NEM outward onto Comecon as a whole, have argued the need for such reforms, and similar, though more muted, voices have been heard from Poland. Acceptance of such

reforms would, of course, necessitate drastic changes in the Soviet economic system which the Soviet leaders are not yet ready to contemplate.

For three years after the publication of the Comprehensive Program there were few substantial developments in Comecon worth recording. The most notable were probably the agreements on multilateral investments in joint projects in the Soviet Union, of which the Kursk metallurgical project was probably the most publicized. In 1974, however, a number of changes in the Comecon statutes were approved, reflecting in part the increasing acceptance of the integration process. But at the 29th Comecon Council Session in Budapest in June 1975 a new departure did occur which in retrospect may be regarded as a most important precedent: The members approved a joint, coordinated plan--distinct, that is, from their individual national plans (whose coordination with one another is, of course, by now a regular feature of the Comecon scene). The highlight of this new plan was the agreement to construct or expand 10 joint enterprises, mainly in the extractive industries, at a cost of about 9 billion rubles. The details, however, are less important than the Soviet achievement of getting agreement on a joint, overall Comecon plan outside the separate plans of the members concerned. Presumably the Soviet aim will now be to expand this concept to bring more and more facets of planning that previously fell within the province of national planning into the orbit of joint planning directly under Comecon's aegis.

The fact that this could be done--that even Rumania agreed to it--was probably a reflection of the very serious deterioration in the economic position of the Eastern European states relative to that of the Soviet Union that took place in 1975. Indeed, this deterioration has been one of the most important factors affecting Soviet-East European relations for several years. Since the beginning of 1975 the Eastern European states, already feeling the effects of Western inflation, have been forced to pay drastically increased prices for Soviet deliveries of raw materials. These prices are at present still considerably below most of those prevailing on the world market, but the increases were damaging enough. Soviet oil, for example, is costing

the Eastern Europeans about 120 percent more than it did in 1974. For the future, a new raw-material pricing system has been established. Under the old system, prices remained fixed for a five-year period, but under the new dispensation they will be modified every year on the basis of the average price of the commodity concerned for the previous five-year period. Western experts have estimated that under this new system, the price of Soviet oil to the Eastern Europeans by 1977 or 1978 should be about the same as the world price.

Certain compensatory concessions, it is true, have been granted the East Europeans. The prices of their exports of manufactured goods to the Soviet Union have been increased and, at least in the case of Hungary, Soviet credits are to be made available to help cushion the financial blow. But the increases in the price of Eastern European exports to the Soviet Union are relatively small, and whatever the concessions granted by Moscow, Eastern European spokesmen have not hesitated to make clear the serious blow to their economies these new prices represent. Poland and Rumania, both relatively rich in raw materials, may suffer the least, but even their economies will not escape lightly. The others, so heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for raw materials, particularly in the energy sector, face perhaps their most difficult economic period since the early fifties.

There is, of course, economic justice in what the Soviets have done; this is far from being a case of rampant exploitation. The previous pricing system meant that for several years the Eastern Europeans had been getting Soviet raw materials, particularly oil, at rates well below the world level. A readjustment upward had been expected--not, however, as of the beginning of 1975 but from 1976, with the start of the new five-year planning cycle. But it is not the economic merits of the issue that are relevant here; it is the effect of this drastic economic shift on Soviet-East European relations. At least over the short term, it gives the Soviet Union a most powerful additional leverage over its weaker allies, a leverage just as much political as economic. It also moves the center of gravity within Comecon further in the direction of Soviet advantage and correspondingly reduces the ability of its weaker members to resist or delay Soviet moves to use

that institution as an instrument for enforcing closer cohesion and control.

Military Factors

The Warsaw Pact--or, more correctly, the Warsaw Treaty Organization--celebrated the 20th anniversary of its founding on 14 May 1975. According to the treaty the Pact was to last for 20 years. There was, however, an article providing for its automatic prolongation for a further 10 years if no moves were made to dissolve it at least one year before its official date of expiry. Similarly, any member had the legal right to withdraw from the Pact provided it gave notice at least one year before 14 May 1975. Not surprisingly, nobody did, although there was some speculation in 1973 and early 1974 that Rumania, while not wanting to withdraw from the Pact, might take the opportunity to press for changes, as it is believed to have done in 1966.<sup>19</sup>

Immediately before the period under review in this survey (1969-1975), the Warsaw Pact forces (Rumania excepted) had been actively used for the first time in their history: They were mobilized in August 1968, not against an ostensible adversary, but against one of the Pact's own members, Czechoslovakia. This action constituted a reminder of one of the basic truths about this institution--that the Soviet Union sees it just as much as an instrument for policing Eastern Europe as one for use against the "external enemy" outside the borders of the alliance.

The perceived need to use Pact forces in a police action of this kind evidently led to a new assessment in Moscow of the Pact's functions, organization, and future. This reconsideration appears to have resulted in a decision to give the Eastern European members more consultative privileges than before.

In March 1969 a number of reforms were announced in the Pact's organization. These involved the establishment of the Committee of National Defense Ministers and the Military Council. It was the former which did most to give an appearance of Soviet readiness to allow their allies more decisionmaking powers. The Committee is composed of the defense ministers of the member countries and has a rotating chairman

who is always the defense minister hosting the meeting. Since its establishment the Committee has met twice a year.

These concessions were presumably designed to meet the demands for more equality made by the Rumanians as early as 1966 and by some Czechoslovak reformers between 1966 and 1968. They should also be seen in the general context of the Soviet policy of "directed consensus" pursued on many levels in Eastern Europe during the seventies. But here again the semblance seems more important than the substance. It appears that since 1969, the Eastern Europeans have been consulted more and advised more but have hardly been given more decisionmaking authority. This has obviously still not satisfied the Rumanians, who have continued to develop and organize their armed forces as independently as their membership in the alliance permits while, at the same time, maintaining their pressure for a more effective say in its workings, in order to head off important decisions being reached with which they cannot concur.

In the *military-operational* aspects of the alliance, Soviet domination has been maintained despite the reforms of 1969. This crucial area is the aspect in which Soviet distrust of the reliability of the Eastern Europeans seems most manifest. The Soviets have continued to modernize the armed forces of their allies, which supply well over half the total number of Warsaw Pact troops in the European theater, but they continue to deny these allies any real authority in Pact operations. In fact, the Warsaw Pact as a military entity continues to have an unreal quality precisely because it is so dominated by the Soviet Union. Its command structure remains primarily the preserve of Soviet officers; the Soviet Union alone controls the alliance's nuclear warheads; the Pact command lacks its own logistic support in key areas like communications, transport, and supplies (these being provided by the Red Army in its own right). These are just some examples that raise doubts about whether, militarily, the Pact can be considered an alliance at all. Finally, as mentioned in Part I, mainly because of the troops stationed in Czechoslovakia since 1968, there are today 31 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, five more than in 1967. Though outnumbered by the indigenous Eastern European forces, it is this

large Soviet element that provides the real military strength in the region.

This lack of reality about the Warsaw Pact as a military operational alliance might explain, or be a reflection of, the presence of the mutual defense obligations contained in the 20-year *bilateral* treaties of friendship the Soviet Union has with each of its Eastern European allies and which the latter have with each other. The original treaties expired in the late sixties and were then renewed. Their existence makes the Warsaw Pact, if not redundant, at least largely dispensable in terms of the military obligations each ally has toward the other. Its disbandment, therefore, for which the Soviet Union and its allies have intermittently declared themselves ready if there is a simultaneous dissolution of NATO, need not greatly affect the Soviet-dominated military posture of the Eastern alliance.

Only the Rumanians appear to have taken steps to blunt the edge of the military commitment involved in these bilateral treaties, by a typical constitutional stratagem giving their Grand National Assembly the right to decide whether any given situation requires the invoking of this commitment or not. No other Soviet ally has guarded itself in this way, and Rumania's precaution is a further indication of the uneasiness with which it regards its alliance obligations. Its military participation in the Warsaw Pact is at a minimum; it still refuses to take part in *operational* maneuvers conducted by the Pact. It seeks, through constant exchanges of military delegations, to maintain relations with the defense establishments of NATO powers, European neutrals, and China. It may also be seeking to rearm its forces with equipment of other than Warsaw Pact provenance; a joint fighter-plane project with Yugoslavia, under way since at least 1972, came to fruition early in 1975 with the announcement that the prototype had been built.

Rumania is, of course, alone in taking such a nominal view of its military obligations, whether bilateral or under the Warsaw Pact aegis. Other states seem occasionally to have complained about the way the alliance is conducted but not to have seriously challenged Soviet dominance and modes of management. On one issue, however, there appears to be a general reluctance to agree to assist the Soviet Union, if

such assistance were ever required: the case of a military confrontation with China. In March 1969 at the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact's political consultative committee, at which the institutional changes previously mentioned were approved, the Soviets apparently sought to gain some public commitment to assistance from their allies in case of war with China. (The Budapest meeting was held in the wake of the Ussuri clash.) In this they were unsuccessful, and subsequent Soviet claims that the Warsaw Pact obligations extended to Asia as well as Europe were ignored in Eastern Europe. In the event of war with China, the Soviets would presumably try to invoke the military clauses of their bilateral treaties with the Eastern Europeans. It is doubtful, however, whether they could get more than a token response. Perhaps, indeed, the Soviets might demand nothing more, calculating that the Eastern European forces, stiffened by Soviet troops, might be needed to counter possible instability at home.

#### Political and Foreign Policy

Part I presented a description of how the Brezhnev leadership has sought to restore political cohesion in Eastern Europe after the relative diversity that developed during the Khrushchev era. While the successes it has achieved so far should not be belittled, Soviet leaders still have not found the most convenient institutional form or machinery to promote this political cohesion and secure its permanence.

It might appear that there are already enough convenient forms at hand. The Warsaw Pact, after all, is, like NATO, a political as well as a military institution. Its political-consultative committee, whose meetings are attended by the Party first secretaries of its member states, seems to have been designed originally to fulfill this institutional need. Initially, this body was supposed to meet at least twice a year, but this intention has obviously turned out to be impossible to fulfill. For a period this top-level committee was convened each year, but after 1968 its meetings became less regular. Indeed, since the end of 1970, only two meetings have been called, one in January 1972 in Prague and one in April 1974 in Warsaw.

Since 1959, meetings of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers have been convened from time to time, but, again, these have been far too infrequent to play any kind of regular coordinating role. The Soviets apparently would like a strong, permanent Warsaw Pact secretariat led by a secretary-general, capable of both decisionmaking and action, who does not have to refer every decision of importance to the governments of the member countries for endorsement. The secretariat would presumably be dominated, like the Warsaw Pact's military command, by Soviet officials. In short, the new machinery would become essentially an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet search for such a body dates back many years. In April 1964, shortly before his fall, Khrushchev strongly hinted at its desirability during a speech in Budapest. Within a year of his own assumption of the Party leadership, Brezhnev did likewise at a Soviet Central Committee plenum in September 1965. It is possible that a similar idea was mooted at the April 1974 meeting of the Warsaw Pact's political-consultative committee, and this, along with differences over military cooperation, probably accounted for the obviously outsider role Ceausescu played during the whole session. More recently, in the spring of 1975, it was once again reliably reported that the Soviets were pressing the same idea and meeting the same resistance from Rumania. And one need not assume that Rumania is alone in its objections--it will certainly be the most vociferous in airing them, but other states, notably Poland and Hungary, may have similar misgivings.

What is, of course, surprising is that no such machinery was ever set up in the first place. Comecon, for example, has always had a secretariat with a secretary-general; and the same is true of the Pact's Western counterpart, NATO. It is not easy to account for this administrative casualness on the Soviets' part, particularly at the very beginning (in 1955) when there would have been no difficulty in setting up a body of this sort. (The same argument, *mutatis mutandis*, can also be applied to Comecon. There would have been no difficulty in investing it with supranational powers when it was established in 1949. But 13 years later, when Khrushchev suggested a supranational planning

agency, it had to be shelved because of Eastern European, notably Rumanian, opposition.) Presumably the Soviets counted on their military, political, and economic domination as being sufficient to achieve their goals. Khrushchev obviously set great store by his personal contacts with the Eastern European leaders. There were also the bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and its allies which contain articles relating to foreign policy coordination. Over the last six years, Brezhnev, as mentioned in Part I, has encouraged a whole series of multilateral conferences at various levels, to facilitate political integration. But despite the frequency of their occurrence, these have had an essentially ad hoc character, and even the Crimean summit meeting of alliance party leaders, which seemed to have assumed the regularity of an annual occasion in the early seventies, failed to take place in 1974.

Evidently none of these means of securing political and foreign-policy coordination--the Warsaw Pact political-consultative committee, conferences of foreign ministers, the bilateral treaties, the welter of multilateral conferences at different levels--has been deemed satisfactory by the Soviets. And now, in an era of détente, of agreements on European security and cooperation, the need for something satisfactory must be seen by the Soviets as all the more urgent. Obviously if the fear attendant on rapprochement with the West has been one of the main reasons for the imposition of a new cohesion in Eastern Europe, then it must also posit the urgency of a mechanism to control the foreign policies of the Eastern European states more effectively.

In retrospect, the Soviet failure to establish a coordinating mechanism when the Pact was first set up, like their failure to invest Comecon with supranational powers in 1949, and their obvious desire for both now significantly reflect the development of Soviet-East European relations generally. At first the Soviets' ability to get what they wanted was taken for granted; now they must seek attainment of some of their most important goals through ostensibly collective mechanisms or through patient groundwork and persuasion.

The Rumanian reaction to such a Soviet initiative for a political cohesion mechanism was, of course, to be expected. But, as mentioned above, other members of the alliance might well have their misgivings

too. Even the strongest loyalty to, and closest dependence on, the Soviet Union has never precluded a desire for as much leeway as possible in foreign affairs. And in the present setting of international relaxation, governments like those of Hungary and Poland, for example, mindful though they are of the internal dangers of détente and ready to avail themselves of the Soviet buttress against them, may well wish for more, rather than less, freedom to take advantage of the new international climate.<sup>20</sup> Thus the factor that is partly causing the Soviet Union to renew its efforts to devise a foreign-policy control and co-ordination mechanism is precisely the same factor that could be stifling the resolve of some of its allies to resist such a development.

Party Affairs: Ideological and Organizational

The main burden of the Soviet charges against Dubcek and the Czechoslovak reformers was that under them the supremacy of the Party in Czechoslovak public life was being disastrously weakened and the Party itself was disintegrating. Since the deposition of Dubcek in April 1969, the main thrust of the normalization process in Czechoslovakia has been the purification of the Party from all "reformist" elements and its restoration as the leading force in public life.

This emphasis on Party authority has been seen at its most dramatic in Czechoslovakia, but it has been a strong feature in the political life of other Eastern European states as well. Outside Czechoslovakia, of course, what was involved was not so much a restoration as a strengthening of the Party's authority against those pluralistic trends that had been developing, at least in some countries, during the sixties.

The process has been accompanied by a freshly mounted ideological offensive emanating from Moscow, an offensive sharpened by the progress of détente. International relaxation, it has been constantly stressed, carries with it the dangers of ideological subversion. Hence, the ushering in of détente meant not the weakening of the ideological struggle against various "bourgeois" doctrines, but its intensification. And this intensified struggle was not simply to be waged defensively, within the borders of the socialist camp, but was to be carried offensively into the camp of the ideological adversary itself.

The ideological offensive in Eastern Europe has been not only intensive but also extensive. It has been waged on a large number of fronts affecting all public media, literature, and the arts, as well as education. This, of course, is neither essentially new nor surprising. What has been new, however, during the six years covered by this survey, has been the transnational character of this broad offensive. The number of multilateral conferences involving delegates from the Soviet Union and all the Eastern European states and the number of meetings of officials engaged in various kinds of ideological work--journalists, writers, musicians, radio and television commentators, agitprop workers, Party ideological workers, etc.--have increased perceptibly. This reideologization under Soviet direction is an essential part of the drive for cohesion.

The logic of this process has already begun to raise serious problems and contradictions in inter-Party relations with the Soviet alliance, and much more so in the international Communist movement. If this offensive with all its attributes is Soviet-inspired, if it seeks to establish ideological conformity according to Soviet requirements and patterns, then obviously one of the great post-Stalin formal gestures to the world Communist movement--the acceptance of inter-Party equality, with no single directing center--loses whatever validity it had. This applies not only in the ideological sense but in the organizational also. As the mainspring of the present ideological offensive, the CPSU sees itself not simply as the guide but as the director of lesser parties whose task is essentially confined to *relying*, rather than codetermining, the ideological ground rules to apply in the present historical phase.

Most Eastern European parties have always continued to recognize CPSU leadership in practice. But the formal acceptance of equality has been invoked at intervals by the Soviet Union itself during its periods of courtship with Yugoslavia and has been turned against Moscow by the Rumanians, who have made inter-Party equality one of their axioms in the defense of their policy of independence.

Now, however, it would seem that the myth of inter-Party equality is becoming a dilemma for the Soviet Union. Its propagation is still

necessary to reassure ruling parties like the Rumanian and the Yugoslav in Eastern Europe. It is also essential to ventures like the proposed all-European Communist Party Conference whose convening, in late 1975, was still encountering great difficulty precisely because of the distrust of certain parties--both ruling and nonruling, like the Italian, the Spanish, the Yugoslav, and the Rumanian--of the sincerity of Soviet professions of fraternal equality. Further, its propagation is also necessary if a new World Communist Party Conference, now being called for by an increasing number of parties in the world movement, is ever to have a chance of being convened successfully.<sup>21</sup>

Yet precisely because it is taken seriously by a growing number of parties, ruling and nonruling, the political convenience of the profession of equality is decreasing while its dangers are increasing. In Eastern Europe the necessity for the clear ideological and organizational dominance of the CPSU is an imperative for Soviet policy, but it is still strongly rejected by the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs--not to mention the Albanians. These parties and others, including the growing number of new ruling parties in Asia, must see what has happened in most of Eastern Europe during the last six years as little short of a *Gleichschaltung* in Party relations, an expression of real intentions behind outward professions of something quite the opposite.

How the Soviets will resolve this dilemma will have an important bearing on the future of the world Communist movement. If it is to prevent the existing fissures from proliferating it must, on the one hand, seek to strengthen its ascendancy and, on the other, to perpetuate the notion of fraternal equality. The dilemma is probably insoluble. Its seeming intractability must strengthen the already existing Soviet tendency of withdrawal from the ongoing world revolutionary process and concentration on the Soviet *raison d'état*. But as long as China, for whatever motivation, chooses to remain involved in the world revolutionary process, then a total Soviet withdrawal from it would be difficult. The dilemma would appear inescapable as well as insoluble.

This digression has been necessary because it demonstrates an

important aspect of the interaction between Soviet relations with the Eastern European parties and the Soviet position in the European and the world Communist movement: the problem, in the wider setting of Europe and the world movement, of Soviet insistence on ideological dominance in the narrower setting of Eastern Europe itself.

Few would expect, of course, an attempt to recreate anything similar to the Cominform founded by Stalin in 1947 and dissolved by Khrushchev in 1956; the undoubted advantages of such a body would be vastly outweighed by the alienation it would engender among the more independently oriented parties. But in December 1973 a conference was held in Moscow of the Soviet and Eastern European Central Committee secretaries to discuss ideology and inter-Party relations--as far as can be ascertained, the first of its kind. In March 1975 a conference of ideological secretaries met in Prague. (The Rumanian Party, apparently alarmed at the course the proceedings might take, sent a relatively minor official to this conference.) Very little was divulged about the deliberations at either of these gatherings, but the calling of such conferences and the regularity with which they are convened should be watched closely. Perhaps an informal institution for the ideological "exchange of information" is in the making here--not conspicuous or high-level enough to create alarm but potent enough as a channel for Soviet direction in Party affairs, both ideological and organizational.

#### BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

##### Bulgaria

Since the purge of Traicho Kostov in 1948, Bulgaria has been the most loyal and cooperative of all the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies. At the domestic level it has also given the Soviet Union the least cause for worry. Those complications that have arisen have had, interestingly enough, Chinese characteristics about them. Bulgaria had its own "great leap forward" in 1958 and 1959; some of its Party cadres were obviously intrigued by the Chinese communes in the latter part of 1957. In April 1965 an Army/Party conspiracy was uncovered

which, though officially said to have had pro-Chinese motivations, was probably inspired more by nationalism than by outside "provocation." But, highly intriguing though these developments were, they have been practically negligible compared with the problems other Eastern European states have posed for the Soviet Union.

There are a number of reasons for this. The most touted--traditional Bulgarian sympathy for Russia--certainly has validity. A closely connected but more operative reason is that the Bulgarians certainly dislike the Russians less than they do any of their neighbors, particularly the Turks, the Greeks and, of course, the Yugoslavs. The fact that the Turks and the Greeks are part of the Western alliance and that neutral Yugoslavia, of which Macedonia is a constituent republic, has for over a quarter of a century enjoyed the support of the West for its neutrality and often suffered the enmity of the Soviet Union for exactly the same reason, has in itself been an important factor in cementing the unequal alliance between Sofia and Moscow.<sup>22</sup>

A further reason should probably be sought in the early post-1945 history of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). The oldest and originally the strongest Communist Party in the Balkans, the BCP emerged from World War II strong, relatively popular, and self-confident. Its homing wing was led by Traicho Kostov, and its "Muscovite" wing by the internationally famous George Dimitrov, who was the unquestioned leader of the Party. Each in his own way seems to have seen Bulgaria's future as that of a loyal but autonomous ally of the Soviet Union, not as a subservient satellite of the Stalinist variety. By the end of 1949 both Kostov and Dimitrov were dead. Kostov was executed in Sofia after one of the most notorious show trials, and Dimitrov died of alleged natural causes but in mysterious circumstances in Moscow. This was a psychological blow the BCP took many years to recover from; it appears to have affected seriously whatever self-confidence the Party might have had in its external relations.

A fourth and highly important reason for the relatively untroubled relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union has been the plain fact of Soviet solicitude in the form of vast quantities of economic and financial assistance and close observation through numerous bilateral

visits between officials of the two regimes and a very active Soviet embassy in Sofia. This Soviet solicitude can be explained in three ways: First, Bulgaria is a socialist outpost in the Balkans. It is of great strategic value to the Soviet Union, bordering, as it does, on Greece and Turkey, two NATO members. Moreover, the domestic instability of both these Western allies makes it all the more necessary for Bulgaria to appear as a stable and efficient alternative (any possible Bulgarian attractiveness is diminished in this context, however, by Greek and Turkish national dislike of Bulgaria). Second, since the defection of Yugoslavia in 1948 and that of Albania in 1961, and owing to the unreliability of Rumania since the middle 1960s, Bulgaria has been the only loyal Soviet ally in the Balkans--hence the need to keep it that way. And third, Moscow seems to have made a point of ostentatiously rewarding Bulgaria for its loyalty, obviously hoping that such actions would not be lost on its other Eastern European allies. As the least developed, except for Albania, of the Eastern European states, Bulgaria obviously needed more economic assistance than the others. But the sheer volume of that assistance almost certainly had a political aspect.

Bulgaria strongly supported, and participated in, the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Its contribution was very small and involved geographic-logistic problems not incurred in the case of the other invading units. But the decision to include Bulgaria in the operation was obviously political: The invasion must be seen to be as widely supported as possible. Had Bulgaria not participated, this would undoubtedly have given rise to some speculation about whether Sofia had in fact any enthusiasm for the project, especially in view of neighboring Rumania's defiant nonparticipation. Since the invasion, Bulgaria has supported more demonstratively than any other Eastern European state the Soviet-sponsored notion of integration; indeed, so much so that responsible Western observers have speculated about the possibility of Bulgaria's being voluntarily incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This speculation is based on the statements made by Todor Zhivkov and other Bulgarian leaders about newer and "qualitatively higher"

phases of integration being entered or prepared, and the undoubtedly closer interlocking of the Bulgarian with the Soviet economy that has taken place in the last six years. A Bulgarian Central Committee plenum (about which very little was published) was held in July 1973 to discuss further integration measures, and another met the following October, after a visit by Brezhnev to Bulgaria the previous month. Two very brief extracts from the resolution published at the end of this second plenum are good examples of the sentiments that have caused such extreme speculation in the West about Bulgaria's future: Reference was made to the "further all-round coming closer together, collaboration and integration" of the two countries, and later Zhivkov was praised for his "work on behalf of a doctrine based on principle and his unswerving practical pursuit of a consistent policy of all-round rapprochement between the BCP and CPSU, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union...."<sup>23</sup>

What either the Bulgarians or the Soviets precisely mean by integration, what it will constitute when complete, nobody knows. Probably they do not know themselves. Taken at its face value, or literally defined, the culminating point of integration could mean the incorporation of the weaker into the stronger, the smaller into the larger. If such is ever contemplated, Bulgaria, from several points of view, would appear the most suitable first candidate for integration. But practical difficulties of a very serious nature seem to obtrude. Bulgaria is not contiguous with the Soviet Union. It is separated from it by Rumania, whose jealous defense of its own sovereignty would certainly make this geographical obstacle a real one. (Conversely, Bulgaria's close economic and military integration with the Soviet Union makes Rumania's present defense of this sovereignty more difficult.) Even more important would be the repercussions of such a move, undoubtedly the most momentous in the history of Russia's relations with Eastern Europe, more so even than the Sovietization of the region after World War II. Not only would many (probably most) Bulgarians, including Party cadres, oppose it, in the rest of Eastern Europe it would be greeted as an ominous precedent and would encounter the fiercest resistance. It would tend to jeopardize the very close

official cooperation between the Soviet Union and almost all the Eastern European states, and in a country like Poland could well provoke serious instability. It seems a very doubtful proposition, now and in the foreseeable future.

Many Bulgarians may feel uneasy with the degree of collaboration already reached with the Soviet Union, and there is probably some resentment over the ostentatious manner in which this collaboration is publicized by regime leaders and media. This section of public opinion would probably welcome genuine détente in Europe, as a means of broadening the almost suffocating narrowness of Bulgarian life while at the same time preserving the strong Soviet connection. Public officials, like the late foreign minister Ivan Bashev, probably hold such views; so do many economic officials, managers, and technocrats aware of Western superiority and patriotically eager for Bulgaria to learn and benefit from it. A vast number of young Bulgarians would certainly subscribe to it; there is much evidence of this in the railings of officialdom against the Western social addictions of the country's youth. It has been against expectations or yearnings such as these, articulated or suppressed, that the Bulgarian leadership has felt it necessary to act and admonish. A special Central Committee plenum was called in February 1974, evidently a consequence of the ideological conference held in Moscow the previous December, to discuss the strengthening of ideological activity and to warn against precisely the kind of heresy referred to above.

The role the present Bulgarian leadership appears to see itself in vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is obviously not that of a subservient lackey but of a faithful lieutenant, entrusted with certain responsibilities and receiving in return certain favors--indeed, almost a genuinely feudal relationship. It is not a relationship that should necessarily be disparaged out of hand. It certainly does not preclude domestic innovation, albeit under rigid Party control, in Bulgaria itself, as witness the formation of agro-industrial complexes in the countryside.<sup>24</sup> Zhivkov, for his part, may well consider this relationship with the Soviets as carrying both dignity and fulfillment. In March 1974 Zhivkov celebrated 20 years as Bulgarian First Party

Secretary. He is the dean of Warsaw Pact Party leaders and the Soviet leaders might well find his particular blend of reliability, experience, and perseverance useful. For example, it is likely that in the fall of 1973 Zhivkov was used by Moscow to sound out key parties, notably the North Korean and Italian, about their views on the calling of a new World Communist Conference. Subsequently, Zhivkov and Kadar, during a visit of the former to Budapest, were the first leaders of ruling parties to call openly for such a conference. There are also grounds, referred to later in this part of the survey, for suspecting that the Soviet leaders may have used Zhivkov to keep a channel open to Ceausescu during periods of strain or incipient strain between Moscow and Bucharest.

Todor Zhivkov, born in 1911, is by no means the oldest member of the Bulgarian Politburo; that body consists of one octogenarian and three septuagenarians, whose membership now can hardly be anything more than symbolic. But he is aging and is reliably reported to be failing, and succession is very much an open question. A notable feature of Zhivkov's methods of rule has been the successive elimination of putative heirs. Mitko Grigorov, Lachezar Avramov, and more recently Ivan Abadzhiev, all regarded as strong contenders for succession, were removed from office when their promise appeared likely to become a threat. The real result is that succession may be relatively disorderly in that it could generate the kind of factionalism that was prevalent in the Party leadership from Zhivkov's accession in 1954 to his final securing of authority in 1962.

Obviously, no matter how far integration with the Soviet Union has been achieved by then, an important aspect of the special relationship between Sofia and Moscow will have been removed. Will Zhivkov's successor and the new leadership coterie seek to restore it by equally zealous devotion to Moscow, which by that time is very likely to have a new leadership of its own, or will it seek new paths in the search for fulfillment, dignity, legitimacy, or survival? One such path might lead toward Macedonia.

The frame of reference in which the Macedonian "problem" has been viewed since 1948 is considerably in need of overhaul. It was based

on several premises, at least two of which are no longer quite as valid as they were. The first is that Bulgarian assertiveness over Macedonia is a measuring rod for Yugoslav-Soviet tensions--the greater the assertiveness the greater the tension, and vice versa. The assumption that Bulgaria could be controlled, puppet-like, by the Soviet Union even in the face of something so searingly emotional to many of its citizens as Macedonia has, since 1967, been rather shaky, although there is no reason to doubt that Moscow could also seek to exploit this for its own purposes. In the past few years the Bulgarian leadership has encouraged--at certain times more actively than others--strong publicity for Bulgaria's own history. One motive has been to overcome the alleged "national nihilism" of the youth in its susceptibility to Western cultural influences. Another, though left unsaid, was undoubtedly prompted by the wise realization that even Bulgarians cannot live by proletarian internationalism alone. An inevitable result of this development was that concentration on the vital part Macedonia has played in Bulgarian history became a kind of surrogate (or vicarious) Bulgarian nationalism and something not nearly so amenable as before to manipulation in the interests of Soviet foreign policy.<sup>25</sup>

Another premise that must now be modified, however, is that it was Bulgarian irredentism alone that was souring relations between the two countries. Apart from the fact that irredentism is hardly the correct epithet for Sofia's public attitude over Macedonia, it fails to take into account the consistent Yugoslav campaign since 1973, spearheaded from Skopje, against Sofia's ethnic policy in Pirin Macedonia, just across the border in Bulgaria. The main Yugoslav complaint is the "denationalization" of the Macedonians, who in the official 1956 Bulgarian census numbered over 170,000 and since then have been virtually lumped with the Bulgarians. The Skopje *Nova Makedonia*, second to none in the assertiveness of its nationalism, also criticizes the Bulgarian celebration of national figures or events in Pirin Macedonia because they are celebrated as Bulgarian rather than as Macedonian. All this the Bulgarian leadership regards, with some justice, as interference in Bulgarian internal affairs.<sup>26</sup> Such behavior is certainly unique in Eastern Europe. In Central Europe there was something of a parallel in

the Yugoslav attacks during the first half of 1975 on the Austrian policy toward the Slovene minority in the province of Carinthia. But the Hungarian regime, for example, does not criticize policy toward the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia or Rumania, except in the most oblique way, regardless of how strongly it may feel about their situation in either Transylvania or Slovakia.

So far, the official Bulgarian response has been extraordinarily restrained. A new leadership, however, anxious for popular support, less inhibited by the restraints of the Soviet alliance than its predecessor, and less experienced in the pitfalls of Balkan diplomacy, might reply in kind to what it considers Yugoslav provocation. It might go further and, using this alleged provocation as a pretext, choose to revive the whole Macedonian question in unmistakably irredentist terms. Such speculation need not be totally dismissed as fantasy; the war in Cyprus in July 1974 showed the continuing resilience of nationalist passions in Southeastern Europe.

Depending on how Moscow viewed the situation in Yugoslavia from the perspective of its own advantage, it might even support or condone any Bulgarian aggressiveness on the Macedonian issue. But even if it supported such action, thereby receiving the gratitude of both regime and nation, the relationship between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union would have subtly but appreciably changed. Bulgaria would have initiated a major change in its policy without direction from the Soviet Union. In fact, probably for the first time since Stalin vetoed Dimitrov's suggestion that Rumania join a Balkan federation, Moscow would actually be responding to a Bulgarian foreign initiative. That it could be a disastrous initiative, perhaps setting off a chain reaction in other disputed areas in Eastern Europe, goes without saying. But the Communism that has been applied in Eastern Europe has not solved, or sublimated, the national problem. It has ignored it or, where necessary, repressed it and in doing so has potentially exacerbated it. The consequences of this have yet to be faced and experienced.

Carrying speculation even further, it appears quite likely that Bulgaria's strategic importance to the Soviets could increase in the next few years. The instability in the southeastern Mediterranean

increases the opportunities for the growth of Soviet influence in the area. But the possibilities of asserting a decisive role are handicapped by the inability of the Soviet Union at present to concentrate enough military strength close enough to the region--and, at one remove, to the Middle East. In such an unfolding scenario, the importance of Bulgaria will be readily apparent. It would not be surprising if, in the near future, with the European Security Conference safely out of the way, the Soviet military presence in Bulgaria is strengthened even to the point of stationing Soviet troops there.

Indeed, in view of the strategic importance to the Soviet Union of Bulgaria and the fact that for more than 25 years the Soviet position in the Balkans has been steadily weakening, with Bulgaria now its only loyal ally, it is surprising that the Soviets have not established a military presence there already. The puzzle can only be explained by the priority of diplomatic over military-strategic considerations. Soviet troops in Bulgaria would have seriously harmed both Khrushchev's and Brezhnev's efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. They would also have alarmed both Greece and Turkey, shored up stability in both these countries, perhaps facilitated a defensive cooperation between Ankara and Athens, and anchored both states more firmly in the NATO alliance.

But the Soviets may now see a situation developing where previous diplomatic inhibitions should give way to the seizing of opportunities and the direct exploitation of an instability that could be turned to their advantage. The risks and the repercussions of moving Soviet troops into Bulgaria would still, of course, be serious. In addition to the dangers mentioned in the preceding paragraph, such a move could provoke a new Rumanian-Soviet crisis,<sup>27</sup> and even increase East-West tension, now mitigated in Central Europe, in Southeastern Europe. In short, it could start a chain reaction of the most dangerous dimensions.

But in the Soviet perceptions, these risks might not appear so grave or certain; some, like a new crisis with Rumania, might appear worth taking. The rewards that may appear to the Soviets to be available might seem worth the price to be paid and the risks run. Soviet troops in Bulgaria are, therefore, a possibility with which Western planners, Balkan leaders, and the Bulgarian people should reckon.

Czechoslovakia

Soviet policy toward Czechoslovakia since the 1968 invasion, or, more correctly, since the removal of Dubcek in April 1969, has been almost exclusively aimed at accelerating the "normalization" process. From Moscow's point of view, "normalization" has meant the rooting out from public life of all aspects and proponents of "rightist revisionism" (i.e., the 1968 reform), a restoring of Leninist norms (especially Party supremacy), and a full return to allegiance to the Soviet Union.

These presumably were the main demands leveled on Gustav Husak when he became First Party Secretary in April 1969. The decision to accept Husak was a bold one, as bold in fact as the Soviet choice of Kadar in 1956 in Hungary. In a situation demanding the highest reliability, neither could have been considered very orthodox in Soviet eyes. Both had been cruelly imprisoned by leaderships professing the truest orthodoxy and the most unflinching allegiance to Moscow; both had previous reputations as reformers and were men of an established profile. Each had obviously sought to convince the Soviet leaders that he was the right man to handle this particular crisis. Still, although the risk was considerable, as it turned out in both cases, the decision was inspired.

The most important difference in the two situations is that Kadar appears to have won the confidence of Khrushchev almost immediately. Husak, on the other hand, seems to have had to undergo a long probation as far as Brezhnev was concerned. There was also a strong suspicion that for some time after April 1969, other Czechoslovak leaders (such as Vasil Bilak and Alois Indra) had contacts with the Kremlin that were hardly consonant with loyalty to Husak. Perhaps Brezhnev deliberately played off men or factions in Prague; perhaps various groups in the Czechoslovak leadership had their own constituencies in Moscow. What is certain is that the Soviet ambassador, Stepan V. Chervonenko, who played a key role in inspiring the invasion and promoting the transition from Dubcek to Husak, continued to play an important role in the policies of normalization under Husak. His recall in 1973 may well have been the final sign of Soviet trust in Husak and of confidence in the normalization he had achieved.

Since 1969, Soviet-Czechoslovak relations have been conducted through various channels and at different levels, as is normal in relations between Communist states and parties. In the Czechoslovak case, however, two particular elements in the relationship are worth noting. The role of the Soviet embassy in Prague as relay, counsel, and monitor--much as Soviet embassies were throughout Eastern Europe in the Stalinist period--has already been briefly mentioned. The Czechoslovak embassy in Moscow, of much less importance, has been used primarily as a relay. But the "extracurricular" role of both institutions as centers of intrigue and factional lobbying should not be underestimated. There appears little doubt that Ambassador Chervonenko maintained contact with dissident groups inside the Czechoslovak Party who were opposed to Husak both personally and because they considered his policy too moderate. When Bohuslav Chnoupek was Czechoslovak Ambassador, from September 1970 to December 1971, it appeared that this left-wing dissident group, believed to be associated with leaders like Bilak and Indra, had a friend either at or close to the Soviet court. Presumably, the Czechoslovak embassy also monitors shifting groups and trends within the Kremlin as these might affect policy toward Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe. Chnoupek, incidentally, has been Czechoslovak Foreign Minister since December 1971 and has emerged as a vigorous activist in Czechoslovakia's attempts to improve its relations with the West. Perhaps his recall, like Chervonenko's, signaled an increase of Soviet confidence in Husak.

A second distinctive element in the Soviet-Czechoslovak relationship is the presence of at least 50,000 Soviet troops (still) "temporarily stationed" on Czechoslovak territory. By their very presence these troops exercise a psychologically inhibiting effect on Czechoslovak public life that is immeasurable, even allowing for the fact that every effort is made to keep them unobtrusive and acceptable. Apart from public-relations sorties like helping in harvesting, they are sealed off as hermetically as possible from a population that may lose its hostility toward them but never its resentment at their presence.

How long they (some or all) will remain probably depends on a

number of factors, of which the internal situation in Czechoslovakia is only one. Presumably, a more important factor is Soviet military strategy in Europe in the light of the MBFR talks in Vienna. It is estimated that the Soviets now have five extra divisions in Central Europe as a result of the 1968 invasion. These divisions give them an extra pawn to play in Vienna. A considerable number of troops could be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, some behind the Carpathians, others into Hungary, a country deliberately excluded by the Soviets from the purview of the Vienna talks.

The real question is whether the Soviet Union will judge the internal situation in Czechoslovakia as stable enough to permit the withdrawal of any of its troops at all; in other words, how important a component of "normalization," in Moscow's view, has the presence of Soviet troops been? No firm answer, of course, can be given to this question. Probably up to about 1972, a strong Soviet military presence was considered an important factor in ensuring stability. Subsequently, it may have appeared that other factors were assuming a more important role as the "normalization" process developed. Husak appeared to have repressed political dissent with relatively little direct oppression, and a general political apathy replaced the ferment that had previously existed in public life. In this context a certain national fatalism has reemerged. Munich 1938, the *Putsch* of 1948, the Soviet invasion in 1968 are experiences that would have broken most nations. With the Czechs, particularly, these events have produced an alienated resignation, a withdrawal into the private and self-seeking. It is this mood that is generally prevalent today.

This spirit of resignation has had a profound, but double-edged, effect on Husak's Soviet-sponsored normalization drive itself. In one sense it has helped it. For several years the situation remained calm, with practically no cases of violence or direct sabotage and relatively little open defiance. With Soviet aid, the economic situation has improved year by year--dramatically in the consumer sector. There has been ample opportunity for many to parlay their political withdrawal symptoms into a tolerably comfortable private life. In 1973, for example, the economic situation was such that a dacha craze caught on

among some citizens of Prague; the supply of automobiles, domestic and foreign, had become plentiful by then. But implicit in the official view of normalization was an essential second stage. Once quiet had been achieved, the spirit of 1968 exorcised, there was to be an upswing of Leninist social consciousness, the revival of ideology. Obviously this hope has foundered on the obstinacy of the Czech and Slovak spirit. The outlook for the future, therefore, is one of stagnation and apathy. Cohesion has been achieved, but the prospects for a genuine viability look poor indeed. Nevertheless, in view of the stability that had been achieved by the middle of 1974 and the dangers that had been averted, both the Soviets and the Husak leadership had far more grounds for satisfaction than dismay.

But the end of 1974 and the first half of 1975 brought a show of open defiance from some of the most notable reformers of the Prague Spring that must have shaken this satisfaction. A memoir of the late Josef Smrkovsky was published in the West, as was a letter written by Dubcek to Smrkovsky's widow. In April 1975, extracts of a long letter written by Dubcek the previous October to the presidium of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly protesting police harassment and the policies of normalization in general also found their way into Western newspapers. So did protests by writers Vaclav Havel and Ludvik Vaculik and by the philosopher Karel Kosik. Probably the most important of all was a document of more than 200 pages prepared by Zdenek Mlynar<sup>28</sup> defending the reform policy of 1968, which Czechoslovak reformers, both at home and in exile, hoped could be presented to the European Communist Party Conference being prepared.

The significance of this rebellious flurry should not be exaggerated. Seen against the background of the *whole* Czechoslovak scene and the six years that have passed since 1969, it may be relatively small--an accident, to paraphrase M. Michel Debré, on the road to further normalization. But it must have caused considerable nervousness in both the Prague and Moscow leaderships and may well be an important factor in inducing the Soviets to leave more troops in Czechoslovakia, and for a longer time, than they had previously intended.

As for Husak, it might have been expected that this outburst of

dissident protest would be a considerable political setback for him. Soviet confidence in him might have been shaken and his rivals in the leadership, some of whom had always urged a stronger hand against the 1968 reformers, may have seen this as an opportunity to discredit him. His task of establishing his authority as Party leader had already been a difficult one. First, there were serious doubts as to whether Moscow had complete confidence in him. These doubts encouraged elements within the Czechoslovak leadership to question his authority, a fact which led to a series of personal humiliations, perhaps the most bitter being the decision to recall Dubcek from the Ambassadorship to Turkey in 1970 (Husak had arranged the appointment to shield his predecessor from the vindictiveness of his enemies). On several occasions, it seemed that either Bilak or Indra, rather than Husak, was the real Party leader.

But gradually his own political skills and Soviet realization that his relative moderation was at least stabilizing the situation turned events in his favor. The demotion of Pyotr Shelest in the Soviet Union in 1972 may well have been a blow to Husak's opponents in both Prague and Bratislava, since Shelest was considered a strong advocate not only of the invasion but also of a repressive policy following it. A more direct blow had been the removal of Indra in December 1971 from the Central Committee Secretariat on his appointment as President of the Federal Assembly. As for Bilak, once considered the Soviets' really trusted man in Prague, he has continued to be active and vocal, with a broad range of responsibilities. His harder line is at times quite clearly distinguishable, but he is now not usually considered a serious personal threat to Husak. He still probably has considerable support among those sections of the party apparatus which would have liked more severe repression than Husak would countenance, including trials of reform leaders like Dubcek, the now deceased Smrkovsky, Kriegel, Spacek, and others. Shortly after the invasion, the Soviet leadership may also have been inclined toward such repression, but Husak seems to have opposed it consistently. Gradually, Moscow came round to support his view on the grounds of expediency. Later, in 1973, there were reliable reports about Soviet contacts with some of the now ostracized technocrat reformers concerning their return to

their former professional occupations. Such a turnabout spelt defeat for Bilak, but not necessarily political demise. In post-1968 Eastern Europe, to err on the side of rigidity is by no means as dangerous as it was, for example, in the post-Stalin period. It is safer, at any rate, than erring in the opposite direction.

It was to such men as Bilak, therefore, that the serious embarrassment to Husak in the spring of 1975, particularly that caused by Dubcek, might have been construed as presenting an opportunity that previously seemed to have been lost. But the embarrassment turned out to be more personal than political. In fact, the episode appears to have strengthened Husak politically--at least temporarily. The Soviet and, presumably, most of the Czechoslovak leadership apparently decided that this reformist defiance, and the worldwide publicity it received, should be a signal, not for disunity in Prague but for a reinforcement of the status quo and of Husak's own position. Nor was this endorsement solely verbal: In May 1975 he was elected president of the Czechoslovak Republic to replace the now totally incapacitated General Svoboda, retaining at the same time his leadership of the Party.

What now remained to be seen was whether this evident strengthening of Husak's authority would lead to any changes in Czechoslovak domestic policy.<sup>29</sup> First, however, it is necessary to consider what kind of changes might be feasible.

Husak's original appointment as First Party Secretary in 1969 was compared earlier with that of Kadar in 1956. In this connection, some have questioned whether, with normalization complete, Husak would initiate a reform program similar to that of Kadar in Hungary. For only such a program, it is argued, could revitalize Czechoslovak society and go at least a little way toward reconciling it with the new order. The question, however, appears falsely predicated. It ignores the external factor of Soviet influence and intentions. (Indeed, to describe Soviet influence as an *external* factor in any Warsaw Pact state except Rumania is probably inaccurate. It is most inaccurate of all in Czechoslovakia, where Soviet influence remains one of the most powerful *internal* factors.) Husak has been able to consolidate his rule in Czechoslovakia only through Soviet support and on Soviet terms. This does

not preclude considerable leeway in implementing and adapting Soviet intentions, but it certainly does preclude initiating a policy quite antithetical to prevailing Soviet concepts of how Eastern Europe should be governed. The point is that the political environment has changed markedly from that in which Kadar introduced his program of reform. By the time Kadar had consolidated his own power and reconsolidated Communist power in Hungary, the relative permissiveness of the Khrushchev era, as outlined in Part I, had been established. This enabled Kadar's "new course" to begin and to prosper, evoking a steadily growing response from the Hungarian people. Husak's environment is totally different. None of those revolutionary, pluralistic, interactional facets of a reform policy are open to Husak. His framework is very much narrower.

But within this narrower framework, there appear to be steps that Husak could--and wishes to--take. There is enough evidence to suggest, for example, that he would like to bring back into the economy many members of the economic and technical intelligentsia still barred because of their record in 1968. (As previously mentioned, some Soviet leaders would also accept this.) But Bilak is on record as strongly opposing such a move,<sup>30</sup> and he is obviously not alone. If Husak now feels strong enough, he can surely begin this process of bringing the thousands of specialists concerned back into the economy, over the objections of Bilak and his like. Elsewhere in the economy some rationalization measures are possible and have indeed been undertaken, as, for example, a reform of the wages system. Opinions are appearing in the press which emphasize what almost everyone in the Czechoslovak elite must realize: that the growing prosperity over the last few years is more optical than real, lacking any genuinely efficient economic base, and that very serious economic difficulties can now be expected. Some of those who point this out also gingerly offer suggestions for change.<sup>31</sup> But even if opportunities exist for changes within the framework set, two points must be remembered here: First, neither by inclination nor by experience is Husak a genuine "reformer"; his predilection is for centralized planning and management and strong political control. Second, the economic difficulties that now afflict

all the Eastern European states tend to make central control over, for example, investment allocations and manpower development objectively more rather than less necessary. Neither the man, the moment, nor the operational framework, therefore, promises anything more than piece-meal rationalization.

Similarly, few notable changes can be expected in other aspects of domestic policy. Overt acts of dissidence will be repressed, as they have been in the past six years, with the *letter* of the law generally being observed.<sup>32</sup> To those former reformers who are prepared to cooperate, however--for example, writers and journalists--there may well be a quickening of the conciliatory overtures that have already achieved some results over the past two years. On the other hand, repressive measures against the Roman Catholic Church, already intensive and sometimes brutal, are likely to continue. This persecution will be especially sharp, at least at the lower level, in Slovakia, where Catholicism, even clericalism, remains problematically strong from the regime's viewpoint.

The religious persecution in Slovakia has contrasted rather strongly with other aspects of the Slovak government's policy. Generally, the normalization process over the last six years has been applied considerably less rigorously in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. The main reason for this is that the impulse for reform in the latter had been stronger than in Slovakia, where the attainment of nationalist goals had been seen by many, inside and outside the Party, as taking priority over political and institutional reform. The result was that after August 1968, there was less need to root out liberalism in Slovakia, and the regime there became considerably softer and more politically and culturally tolerant. Thus, though the federal structure--the fulfillment of strong Slovak aspirations--has been considerably modified since it was originally approved in October 1968 so as to give the central authority in Prague greater powers, this does not appear to have led so far to any degree of national frustration among the Slovaks. Indeed, such national frustration as exists in Czechoslovakia today tends to take the form of Czech resentment of the Slovaks, rather than disgruntlement among the latter. The Czechs thus

affected are annoyed by the more lenient treatment of Slovakia during normalization; they also resent what they see as a regime in Prague with a much too strong Slovak coloration. (The elevation of Husak to the presidency will hardly have allayed this disquiet.) Many visitors to Prague over the last two or three years have referred to the virulence of this feeling, and some even report that it is being exploited as a political instrument against Husak, with Indra seeking to head a Czech national lobby against "Slovak domination." It is an extraordinary swing of the pendulum, to be explained more in psychological than in any other terms. But it could develop into a problem of some seriousness.

Finally, a word on foreign policy. If Czechoslovakia's domestic policy is largely conditioned by the framework set by the Soviets, its foreign policy is, of course, even more determined by this factor. Yet it has been precisely in one aspect of foreign policy--relations with the FRG--that Czechoslovakia, if not resisting Soviet wishes, may at least have balked at the speed with which Moscow wished them carried out. Prague showed a total lack of flexibility in the long and painful negotiations with Bonn in 1973 over the treaty normalizing relations between the two states, a treaty involving the repudiation by West Germany of the 1938 Munich Agreement. The details themselves are irrelevant here. What is relevant is the distinct possibility that the Czechoslovak leadership approached the climax of years of wrangling with Bonn with a reluctance and nervousness that must have been frustrating from the Soviet point of view.

If this was the Czechoslovak attitude, it was readily explainable. There was presumably still a residue of hostility toward Germany dating from World War II; there were still men in the regime who, like ex-President Novotny, were alumni of various concentration camps. But--more politically to the point for the current regime--the Prague Spring had its own trauma, in which West Germany figured, since subversive influences, allegedly funneled across the western frontier from the FRG, were considered to be one of the components of the reform movement.

Now, only five years later, Czechoslovakia was being pushed into

an agreement with Bonn. Could this not lead to the kind of relations that promote the revival of liberalism? Perhaps the once-perceived danger from alleged West German "revanchism" had receded, but now Czechoslovakia was being asked to expose itself again to the insidious dangers of ideological subversion. Not surprisingly, it was the harder-line elements that were the most vocal on this score. But their misgivings may have been shared, at least to some extent, by the Husak leadership as well.

This analysis invites objections. The main one is that if the Czechoslovak leadership were so comprehensively dependent on Moscow, it would hardly show defiance against one of the most crucial parts of the Soviet Union's foreign policy--its *Westpolitik*. Therefore, even here Prague's reluctance would be explained by some Soviet diplomatic gambit. To this it might be replied that Czechoslovak relations with Bonn were but one aspect of the Soviet *Westpolitik*; it was not one of the most important and, in any case, the Soviets, like everybody else, knew the agreement between Prague and Bonn would be signed eventually. Therefore Soviet coercion for immediate Czechoslovak acceptance was not applied. Second, Czechoslovak balking could quite reasonably be seen as the not untypical reaction of a dependent and weak regime that was fearful of new exposure. The regime's behavior was not, therefore, inconsistent with the character of its relationship with Moscow. In a partnership of the dominant and the helpless, the latter, by threatening disintegration, sometimes has its own bargaining leverage.

It is usually conceded that East German obstinacy in negotiations with Bonn has been the result of the perceived dangers of closer relations with the FRG. Indeed, there appears to have been a mutual Czechoslovak-East German alliance of defensive self-interest here, an aspect of a special relationship to be discussed later. And this Prague-East Berlin obstinacy amounted to a negative display of autonomy on the part of both states. Since East German obstinacy was the more serious for the Soviet Union it led to repercussions: the removal of Ulbricht. The Czechoslovak obstinacy, of less consequence, was tolerated. Finally, in December 1973, the Czechoslovak-West German "normalization" treaty was signed. The Czechoslovaks may have made their point; the Soviets had gained theirs.

The German Democratic Republic

Since the establishment of the GDR as the second German state in 1949, Soviet-East German relations have passed through several phases. The first, from the late forties until well into the second half of the fifties, was marked by total East German dependence on Moscow--militarily, economically, politically, and ideologically. Without Soviet domination the GDR would simply not have survived.

This was generally true right up to the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. But by the late fifties the East German state was already showing the first signs of assertiveness, which were to multiply after 1961. For example, at the same time that Comecon was being refurbished under Khrushchev's direction after the Eastern European upheavals of 1956, East German economists were presenting their ideas on economic specialization which were obviously designed to further the embryonic East German national interest. More important, since the German question had developed into one of the main factors in East-West relations, was the strong probability of Ulbricht's influence on Khrushchev when the latter created the Berlin crisis in 1958.

What seemed to be developing was a growing self-confidence on the part of the regime and a growing acceptance of, or resignation to, the existence of the GDR on the part of many East Germans. There was, of course, a very close interaction between these two factors, both of which were deeply affected by the crushing of the July 1953 rebellion. For the population, the escape route to the West was still open and was extensively used. But there were many who, for various reasons, could not or would not escape. As for the regime, shaky and artificial though it still was, it was at last taking physical shape, including its coercive apparatus. The GDR was not yet viable, but it was now more than a paper creation.

The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 was obviously the result of desperate pressure by the Ulbricht regime on a probably initially reluctant Soviet leadership. It was an almost classic case of the weaker ally wielding quite disproportionate influence over the stronger because of threatening total collapse. The Wall had several important

consequences, international and domestic. Within East Germany itself, the self-confidence/resignation syndrome, affecting regime and population respectively, became greatly intensified. The population's resignation, developing since 1953 but strongly mitigated by the continued presence of the escape hatch, was complete. In any case, many of the most vigorously anti-Communist East Germans had left before the building of the Wall. The regime's self-confidence, growing slightly in the late fifties and undermined again by the popular defections through Berlin in 1960 and 1961, was first restored and then boosted. Then followed the quite spectacular developments in the GDR during the sixties.

These developments inevitably had a major impact on relations with the Soviet Union. No longer a political and economic liability, the GDR now became one of the most stable Soviet allies and one of the strongest economically. In Walter Ulbricht it had a strong, able, and experienced leader who claimed seniority of status among Eastern European leaders and even a special relationship with the Kremlin itself. Though there is little solid evidence to substantiate some of them, the GDR's claims under Ulbricht appear to have been extensive. For example, the New Economic System, approved in 1963, was, in the East German view, a model for socialist economies, since it combined economic expansion with political stability. The economic reforms subsequently implemented in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the East Germans claimed, incorporated the first of these criteria but definitely not the second and, hence, should be opposed. In economic relations, whether bilateral or in the framework of Comecon, there is reason to assume an East German assertiveness in keeping with its growing power. Pankow's weight in the alliance is indicated by the fact that Khrushchev appears to have at first accepted its arguments on Comecon specialization that the less-developed members should concentrate mainly on raw-material and agricultural production. The fact that this arrangement was to be rejected in the early sixties, because of Rumanian and other opposition, was a blow to the East Germans but not one that ended their claims for special consideration.

It was, however, in East-West relations as they affected the German

question that Pankow's assertiveness was at its most apparent. At stake here was the GDR's state interest--state survival, in fact. The great problem facing Walter Ulbricht as leader of the GDR was how to promote and, at the same time, reconcile two apparently contradictory notions: proletarian internationalism and East German statehood. (It was very much a personal problem for Ulbricht who, during the latter part of his life, became, like Tito in Yugoslavia, identified so inextricably with his state.) There appears little doubt that by training, inclination, and experience Ulbricht was a devotee of proletarian internationalism and that for the greater part of his life he was prepared to accept the Soviet tendency to identify it with the Soviet national interest. For the last half-decade of his active political life, however, as the East German state grew more powerful and at the same time was pitchforked into the center of the international arena, Ulbricht came to realize that the Soviet view that what was good for the Soviet Union was good for proletarian internationalism need not always hold true for the GDR. He faced the same problem, therefore, in a very immediate way, that other Eastern European Communist leaders have faced: issues of perceived national interest independent of (sometimes actually contrary to) those of the Soviet Union. Ulbricht's response was almost ineffable in its simplicity. More and more the philosophy that appeared to dominate his political behavior was that what was good for the GDR was good for proletarian internationalism--and thus for the Soviet Union.<sup>33</sup>

It was a philosophy that brought him into some degree of conflict with Khrushchev before October 1964. It was used, however, with considerable success in the early indecisive years of the new Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership. This period, roughly coinciding as it did with a new direction in Bonn's Eastern policy, brought dangers to the GDR's position. Moving into the vacuum left by the lack of Soviet leadership, Ulbricht proceeded in early 1967 to exercise substantial, perhaps decisive influence, in persuading a vacillating Soviet leadership finally to reject--for Eastern Europe--Bonn's offer to establish diplomatic relations. The East German leadership (correctly) saw West German overtures to the other Eastern European governments as an early

move in a strategy of isolating the GDR. Similarly, Ulbricht established himself relatively early in 1968 as an implacable enemy of the Czechoslovak reform movement. Not only did the developments in Prague violate his Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, they spelled danger to the East German state. Any permanent triumph of reform in Czechoslovakia would produce a leadership there that was hostile to Pankow and relatively more sympathetic to Bonn. The GDR would be outflanked. If, as was clearly a possibility, Poland should sooner or later fall victim to the reformist virus, then the GDR would be surrounded. Once again East German influence in a crisis was made to seem disproportionately great because of Soviet wavering. The Brezhnev leadership was not nearly so ready for action against Czechoslovakia as was Ulbricht.

The irony was, however, that Moscow's decision to crush reform in Czechoslovakia was precisely the factor which led to the decline in East German influence over the Soviet Union and finally to the removal of Ulbricht altogether. On the one hand, the invasion saved the GDR from the much feared danger of outflanking; it also appeared to have so worsened the international situation as to kill any further prospects of Bonn's improving its relations with the rest of Eastern Europe. Further, it seemed to have killed the virus of political revisionism. But, on the other hand, the Soviet decision to invade proved to be the sign that its leadership was finally taking the reins of the alliance firmly into its own hands. The leadership vacuum was over and so was the opportunity for Pankow to wield the influence it certainly had between 1964 and 1968.

Indeed, Ulbricht's satisfaction after the invasion of Czechoslovakia must have been short-lived. Whatever pleasure he may have derived from the comprehensive moves to restore political orthodoxy was bound to be sullied by moves Moscow was either making or inspiring in East-West relations. Here "proletarian internationalism" (as the Soviets saw it) and the interests of the East German state were definitely colliding. At the Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Budapest in March 1969 the decision was made to resume, though in stronger form, the overtures for East-West détente in general and a conference on European security in particular that had been interrupted by the

Czechoslovak crisis. The following May, the Polish Party leader, Gomulka, a strong ally of Ulbricht against West German overtures in early 1967 and against Czechoslovak reform in 1968, announced Poland's readiness to begin negotiations with the FRG for the normalization of relations. In the fall of 1969, a social-liberal coalition government determined to improve relations with the East assumed power in Bonn. The Soviet leadership responded readily and cooperatively to that determination.

The turn of events, it was true, did have its consolations. The Brandt *Ostpolitik* was not so blatantly aimed at outflanking the GDR as was the policy of the previous West German administration. Coming after the Czechoslovak invasion, it recognized that to attempt negotiation with the Eastern European governments independently of Moscow was futile. It repudiated the Halstein Doctrine and cleared away virtually all obstacles to the international recognition of the GDR--aims which the East German regime had been pursuing for years.

What mainly alarmed the Ulbricht leadership was the unashamed candor of the new *Ostpolitik* in its desire for multifaceted official and nonofficial contacts with the GDR. Despite the impressive domestic successes of the East German regime, the consolidation of its political elite, the creation, promotion, and dedication of a technocratic elite,<sup>34</sup> its administrative and technical efficiency, and its "economic miracle," in everything except the sporting arena it continued to retain its chronic sense of inferiority vis-à-vis the FRG. What it wanted from Bonn was the political victory of full official recognition (which it was not quite to achieve) with contacts kept to a minimum, a posture to become known as *Abgrenzung*.

The Soviet Union and the other Eastern European states were also, of course, firm believers in *Abgrenzung*. They were to show this clearly in their responses to certain negotiating points put forward by the West in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. But what amounted in most Eastern European capitals to serious nervousness about societal contacts with the West amounted in Pankow to something like paranoia. The reason for this was that the success the regime had achieved in inculcating its population with an East German national

consciousness was still very limited. The sense of nationalism was, for example, not yet judged strong enough to be exposed to anything but the most rigorously screened and selected contacts with the FRG. One of Ulbricht's priority policies had been the creation of societal strata which would have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the East German state. These strata have undoubtedly contributed to the impressive successes of the GDR. But East Germany's rulers are very loath indeed to put them to the only worthwhile test of national loyalty: sustained contact and, if necessary, competition with West German society and its corresponding strata. (It is interesting in this context to compare the West German and the East German opponents of Bonn's *Ostpolitik*; the former opposed it because it might reduce the chances of reunification, the latter because it might reduce the chances of separation.)

Normally, Ulbricht might have been expected to draw comfort from the fact that Brandt's *Ostpolitik* went first through Moscow and not directly to the Eastern European states, some of which he knew from experience were more than ready to establish full diplomatic relations with Bonn. In general, the GDR has been disliked by most other Eastern European states. Many of the apparent reasons for this may be subsumed under two factors, arrogance and jealousy: Ulbricht's claim to being an ideological and practical model for Eastern Europe; the GDR's claim to a special relationship between itself and Moscow; discriminatory economic principles and/or practices vis-à-vis the rest of Eastern Europe; the "back door" GDR trade and credit concessions from Bonn; the very success of the East German economy. Finally, much ill will has resulted from the personal arrogance of many East German representatives who have often appeared to embody those failings usually associated with the "bad German." By contrast, despite the continuing efforts of the East German leadership to sustain the West German "bogy" image, West Germans, on a personal level, began during the middle sixties to acquire in both official and nonofficial Eastern Europe the image of "good Germans." Nowhere was this more apparent than with the tiny West German trade missions established in 1963 and 1964 in the Eastern European capitals (in Prague only in 1967). Eastern European

officials, and often citizens, tended to regard these missions as surrogate or interim embassies and had constantly to be disabused of this notion by tenacious and alarmed East German embassy officials. This came to be yet another reason for the East German unpopularity (presumably the situation has been made more acute now by the elevation of the West German trade missions to embassies). For Ulbricht it was, of course, power rather than popularity that was important. But in the GDR's distinctive case he probably saw the connection between the two and how it worked in the FRG's favor. He should, therefore, have welcomed Brandt's decision not to tempt the Eastern Europeans directly in the *Ostpolitik*. But now he was losing his influence and constituency in Moscow. As long as his own and the Soviet leadership's definitions of "proletarian internationalism" coincided, Ulbricht was safe and satisfied. When they started to differ, even to clash, the state interest of the GDR--and his own interest--were in jeopardy. When he refused to back down, his position was in danger.

Ulbricht was ceremoniously and most tactfully eased from office in May 1971. His age and health were used as the reasons, and he retained the imposing, if largely titular, position of President of the State Council until his death in 1974. In one of the very few well-ordered and carefully prearranged Communist successions, Erich Honecker, long considered the heir apparent, was elected First Party Secretary of the SED. The Soviet leadership so far has no basic reason to be dissatisfied with Honecker. In domestic affairs, he has combined ideologically motivated measures in the economy with a more flexible approach toward intellectuals (Ulbricht could hardly have been less flexible) and a more relaxed style of rule. He has made a conscious effort to improve the GDR's image among its allies and has dropped some of the more abrasive East German claims to special status or consideration within the alliance. In relations with West Germany, either *in toto* or on the particular problem of West Berlin, he has raised considerable difficulties and will no doubt continue to do so. What is not clear is which difficulties have been prompted solely by the GDR and which have been prompted or shared by the Soviet Union also. There is reason, however, to suspect that East German objections delayed, for

example, the final agreement of the four powers over Berlin in 1972 and that Pankow held up its own agreement on diplomatic exchange with Bonn longer than the Soviet Union would have liked. But these have not been fundamental as far as Moscow was concerned. Enough of a breakthrough with the FRG had already been made that hindrances of this kind could be tolerated.

The basic factor in Soviet-East German relations has remained constant and presumably will continue to do so: Both sides have bargaining levers. The East German leadership knows that the very existence of the GDR is Moscow's most valuable single gain since World War II. In negotiations with Moscow it can play both on its strengths and its weaknesses. Its economy is developed and relatively modern; it plays a key role in Soviet trade and still supplies the Soviet Union with much of its more sophisticated machinery. It occupies a key strategic position in East Central Europe, facing the FRG. It constitutes a barrier to the westward gravitational pull of Polish society. On the world level, it is now recognized by well over 100 states. So much for its strengths. Its weakness lies in its gnawing uncertainty about the loyalty, not of the elites it has created, but of the large mass of the German population it rules. This is the weakness it can still use when necessary in its bargainings with Moscow.

But Moscow's lever still remains the ultimately decisive one. The GDR is a Soviet creation and, because of the presence of the FRG--and the presumed continuance of a prosperous, liberally democratic FRG--it is still the most fragile of all the Soviet creations in Eastern Europe. The others at least have a concept of their nationhood. Until the East Germans develop this, all roads from East Berlin will eventually lead to Moscow.

#### Hungary

From the 1956 revolution until very recently, the Soviet Union's relationship with Hungary has been close and untroubled. On neither the national nor the domestic level have abrasive differences appeared in the unequal relationship between Moscow and Budapest. It must be noted that this inequality has certainly not meant a total lack of

leverage for Hungary. In fact, the presence of such Hungarian leverage has probably been one of the main reasons for the harmony of the relationship. From the moment of his appointment by Khrushchev as Hungarian Party leader during the revolution, Janos Kadar was able to capitalize on his total weakness, Khrushchev's vested interest--both at home and in Eastern Europe--in his success, and the genuine confidence that developed between the two men. It was this unique bond between Khrushchev and Kadar, together with the character and atmosphere of the Khrushchev era as a whole in Eastern Europe, that gave Kadar the opportunity to initiate his program of reform in 1960. This program became known as "Kadar's new course," and the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), fully introduced only in 1968 after most efficient preparation, was its most important institutional feature.

Khrushchev was also evidently convinced that only a leader of Kadar's style, pursuing a policy of national reconciliation, could make Hungary a viable member of the socialist community. To achieve this Khrushchev was, characteristically, prepared to take risks. But here his judgment was shrewd. Under Kadar, Hungary not only remained domestically stable, it supported the Soviet Union in every aspect of its foreign policy. Sometimes it did this with apparent reluctance; it was, for example, evident that Kadar did not agree fully with Khrushchev's efforts to precipitate a confrontation with China shortly before his dismissal from office. But Khrushchev knew that in the end Kadar would support this policy, as he did, and it was this knowledge that gave Kadar even more room for maneuver.

The Kadar leadership managed the transition from Khrushchev to Brezhnev without much difficulty, although Kadar himself left little doubt about his attachment to Khrushchev. Quite soon, however, he settled down to a cooperative relationship with the new Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, although it was never to have the personal flavor of his relationship with Khrushchev.

Seen now in the perspective of over 10 years, the Soviet-Hungarian relationship since the accession of Brezhnev seems to fall into three periods. During the first period, between 1964 and 1968, when there was a vacuum in Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe, the Hungarian

leadership devoted itself mainly to expanding the "new course" reform policy and to preparing the NEM. In foreign policy it showed itself quite susceptible to the overtures coming from Bonn and in early 1967, Hungary might well have been the second country after Rumania to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG had not the Soviet Union, at East German and Polish urgings, closed the door.

The second period, covering 1968 and 1969, with the invasion of Czechoslovakia as its high point, saw Soviet-Hungarian relations at their closest since Brezhnev and Kosygin took office. The Soviets knew that Kadar, unlike Ulbricht and Gomulka, urged patience with Prague and was reluctant to the very last to approve invasion. His final concurrence, therefore, was all the more valuable to obtain, and all the more prized when given. This may have given Kadar the necessary bargaining leverage with Moscow, enabling him not only to continue his economic reform but to expand it. It was also during this period that the Hungarian Party, mainly in the person of the since deceased Central Committee Secretary Zoltan Komocsin, was of great assistance to the CPSU in preparing and organizing the World Conference of Communist Parties which finally took place in June 1969. In more respects than one, therefore, Moscow had reason to be grateful to Budapest during 1968 and 1969.

The third distinguishable period in Soviet-Hungarian relations since October 1964 has extended from 1969 to the present. It has been a time in which the close, almost conspiratorial, cooperation of the preceding period changed, slowly, almost imperceptibly, into one where Hungary was becoming a serious problem for the Soviet Union. It is worth comparing here the differing circumstances in which the Rumanian and Hungarian "deviations" arose. Moscow and Bucharest became aware as early as 1962 of basic differences on vital issues. Later these differences became deepened and broadened in an atmosphere of growing estrangement between the two leaderships, in spite of periods of relative calm. The Hungarian deviation developed in an entirely different environment. Its danger to the Soviet Union was not realized for a considerable period--perhaps not until 1972. It never constituted a direct defiance of any stated Soviet policy or goal; Hungarian-Soviet relations have, at least on the surface, remained very cordial.

One reason, of course, for this stark difference between the Romanian and Hungarian "deviations," as perceived by Moscow, was that the former has been on the national level and the latter on the domestic. The one, by its very nature, usually tends to be more overt and sharply focused than the other. Another reason lies in the sophistication and restraint Moscow showed in coping with the Hungarian "deviation" when it decided it existed, and the finesse and tact shown by the Hungarian leadership in its constant efforts to play the economic reform in as low a key as possible. The main reason, however, was that the NEM in Hungary was born and grew, if not with Moscow's blessing, then at least with its tolerance.<sup>35</sup> Whether this tolerance was the result of Soviet preoccupation with other affairs, ignorance, or an implicit bargain struck with the Kadar leadership for services rendered in 1968 makes no difference. It made it less easy for the Soviet leaders to put pressure on Budapest when they came to realize the serious implications of the Hungarian reform.

The kind of problem presented by the NEM to the Soviet leaders has been described at some length in Part I and need not be repeated here. What might be added, however, is that although the Hungarian "deviation" has been at the domestic level, it has inevitably had some impact on Hungarian policy at the national level. The general statement that Hungarian foreign policy has not differed from Soviet foreign policy holds true; in fact, insistence on their similarity has, as mentioned previously, been used by the Kadar leadership to disarm or preempt criticism of its internal policy. But the nature and mechanics of Hungary's reform, the enthusiasm and insistence on efficiency it generated, inevitably had their effects on official attitudes and approaches to some aspects of foreign economic relations. This was made all the more inevitable by the fact that nearly 40 percent of Hungary's national income comes from foreign trade. Some of these effects carried the potential for conflict with the Soviet Union.

In the first place, even before the raw-material crisis brought on by the sharp Soviet increase in prices, Hungarian economic planners were clearly anxious to pin the Soviets down on long-term guarantees of raw materials, a subject on which the Soviets were just as clearly

elusive. All the Eastern European states have been affected by this elusiveness, but none more seriously than Hungary, simply because of its abject poverty in raw materials.

Second, in the mechanics of Comecon cooperation, the Hungarians have advanced suggestions entirely consonant with the relatively market character of their own economic system but not at all similar to what the Soviets are evidently prepared to countenance. These include a convertible rouble, genuine across-the-board systems of prices and cost accounting, and--probably the most controversial of all--enterprise-to-enterprise cooperation, cutting out the ubiquitous socialist middleman, the ministry.

Third, this "market approach" has been very apparent in the Hungarians' eagerness for economic relations with the West and their flexibility in conducting them. This was a field they entered later than either the Yugoslavs or the Rumanians, but they have made great strides in it since 1970, as can be seen in the impressive number of cooperation agreements with Western countries, the number of commercial loans granted to Hungary by Western banks, and the growing Western presence in important branches of Hungarian economic life.<sup>36</sup> These developments were natural enough in an economy increasingly dominated by a technical intelligentsia motivated by efficiency, not by doctrine. The Soviets, of course, have themselves increasingly been going to the Western market, and it is difficult for them to object when allies like Hungary do the same. But one important reason why the Eastern European technocrats delight in trade with the West is simply that it is not trade with the Soviet Union--a very special kind of enthusiasm which is but one aspect of that strong gravitational pull the West in general, and Western Europe in particular, has for the societies in Eastern Europe.

In Part I of this survey we described how a combination of factors, including some Soviet pressure, had put a check on essential aspects of the Hungarian reform process which could well prove decisive. Now, with the greatly increased raw-material prices Hungary has to pay the Soviet Union--the imposition of which, especially since the beginning of 1975, the Hungarians are known to have resisted strongly--the Soviets have administered a new blow to Hungarian economic development, at the

same time introducing a very jarring element in Hungarian-Soviet relations. The Soviets' leverage ratio has increased, while the Hungarians' economy and self-confidence have been weakened. Before the retrenchment in the NEM and the raw-material crisis, many Hungarian reformers would have argued that it was precisely in Hungary that the right balance of cohesion and viability had been attained. This balance is now shattered: Cohesion, from the Soviet perspective, has been greatly strengthened; viability, from the particular Hungarian perspective that had developed, has been greatly undermined.

Since Hungary seems unlikely to become a listless satellite or to edge toward open disaffection, it is doubtful whether this balance can be restored quickly. The crucial problem for Hungary now and in the foreseeable future will be to pull through its economic crisis and, at the same time, preserve at least some of the relaxed political, cultural, social, and "atmospheric" aspects of public life which, along with its growing standard of living, have made it unique in Eastern Europe since 1969. One important factor in meeting this problem--one showing the continued importance of personality in Communist politics--lies in Kadar himself.

Kadar's personality and extraordinary political skill contributed greatly to Hungary's uniqueness in recent years, in its internal situation and its relations with the Soviet Union. The retrenchment in the NEM and now the economic crisis represent, in quick succession, the second and third most serious defeats he has suffered since becoming party leader 19 years ago, the first being the fall of Khrushchev. He has not, like Tito in Yugoslavia, tended to place himself above the domestic issues of the day and hence remain relatively unaffected by necessary changes of course. Though elevated to a unique position in the political emotions of most Hungarians, Kadar is inseparably identified with reform in Hungary. He might survive its eclipse but much of his political effectiveness would be neutralized. It is not surprising, therefore, that rumor was rife before the Hungarian Party Congress in March 1975 that he would retire. The fact that he did not do so reassured a worried Hungarian public. The question now is whether he can remain as an effective leader, overcoming the worst effects of the defeats he has recently suffered.

His prime task at present is to minimize the effects of the current economic crisis and to try to secure at least a maintenance of mass living standards. A more long-range task is to prevent the alienation of the economic and technical intelligentsia. A considerable degree of alienation must already have taken place among members of this milieu as a result of restrictions placed on their material self-aggrandizement and the conspicuousness of their consumption--an optical aspect of the NEM, by the way, which has perplexed, angered, or "subverted" Soviet visitors. But this is not all. In this stratum there did exist an enthusiasm for the NEM and its potentialities which must now be largely evaporating.

If this alienation becomes widespread, the legitimacy of the Kadar leadership in such eyes will be seriously undermined. If, at the same time, the economic situation leads to cuts in the general standard of living in Hungary, then the political position of Kadar, dependent on mass as well as elite support, could become gradually undermined. This would have to lead to a tightening of political and administrative control in Hungary that would only result in further disaffection. No one would do this more unwillingly than Kadar himself; he might even resign rather than have to do it. But with or without Kadar, the grim scenario presented above is a distinct possibility in Hungary for the rest of the seventies.

#### Poland

The most important event in Soviet-Polish relations in recent years was the Polish-West German treaty of December 1970. This treaty gave *de facto* recognition by Bonn to Poland's postwar frontier on the Oder-Neisse. Both German states, therefore, the one 20 years after the other, had now recognized this frontier; no state, anywhere, questioned it. Wladyslaw Gomulka, who was overthrown by popular upheaval a few days after the treaty was signed, should be remembered for two extraordinary feats: stabilizing the internal situation and preventing war with the Soviet Union at the very beginning of his rule in 1956, and winning West German recognition of Poland's western frontier at the very end of it in 1970.

The significance of the West German treaty for Soviet-Polish relations was that it removed the one profound justification for the alliance with the Soviet Union. For some Poles the alliance with the Soviet Union could be rationalized in terms of Poland's geopolitical position. For the most resignedly realistic, a relationship similar to that enjoyed by Finland with the Soviet Union would be acceptable. But few Poles, either in the Party or out of it, readily accept alliance with, much less subordination to, the Soviet Union as a function of "proletarian internationalism." Up to December 1970, therefore, whatever degree of acceptance of the Soviet alliance there was among the Polish people existed solely because of perceived Polish nationalist reasons: The Soviet Union was the sole powerful guarantor of Poland's new post-war Western frontier.

Once the Western frontier was recognized by Bonn, each partner to the alliance, Moscow and Warsaw, had a new problem on its hands. The Polish leadership's problem was to check, distract, or even sublimate the nation's instinctive, cultural, traditional, religious gravitation to the West. For the Soviets, the logic of the situation now seemed to dictate the even stronger necessity to bind Poland more closely to the East, through integrating it more closely into the Soviet-dominated bilateral and multilateral system of alliances and, at the domestic level, seeking to mitigate the role of those institutions and systems--notably the Roman Catholic Church and the private peasantry--which seriously impede the ruling party's monopoly of power.

Logic would also appear to necessitate a closer supervision of the Polish leadership itself. Indeed, the anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiments of most Poles are such that even a Communist leader must try to adapt to them in some measure if any national viability is to be achieved. There was little opportunity, and probably little will, to do this under Bierut in the Stalin era, but there is no doubt that Gomulka always tried to preserve the distinctive "Polishness" about himself and his leadership. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his speeches in late 1956 and early 1957 attacking Soviet control in Eastern Europe under Stalin. As his rule wore on, however, as he lost whatever inspiration he may have had and as, under him, the whole

political life of the country decayed, he came increasingly to support whatever initiative came out of Moscow. It was this aimless drift of the Polish leadership in the sixties and what appeared to be the consistent negation of the Polish national spirit that provided a suitable environment for the prospering of a faction within the ruling Communist Party--the "Partisans" under General Mieczyslaw Moczar--which played openly on frustrated Polish nationalism and covertly on its anti-Soviet mainspring. Toward the end of Gomulka's rule this faction enjoyed considerable popularity among the workers and in the Party; it also had several journalistic outlets. (Not least among its appeals was an open anti-Semitism.)

No one, of course, would suggest that the Soviet leadership had a new policy for Poland prepared and ready to be implemented as soon as the Polish-West German treaty was signed at the end of 1970. What has been ventured above are a set of postulates suggested by the logic of the situation. But, granting that logic and reality often fail to coincide, it does appear in the Polish case that the Soviet leadership drew the necessary lesson from Warsaw's treaty with Bonn. What the lesson amounted to in practice was a reinforcement of the lesson already drawn from the Prague Spring, with specific application to the peculiarities of the Polish situation: greater vigilance and control mainly through a tightening of procedural measures; more cohesion applied at the national level through the comprehensive integration process; and, at the domestic level, greater cohesion through the spreading of Party power, something Gomulka gradually lost the dynamism to attempt.

In view of the risks inherent for the Soviet Union in the Polish-West German treaty, it is, indeed, perhaps surprising that Moscow decided to countenance it. Just how much Polish initiative there was in the famous Gomulka speech of May 1969 proposing the dialogue with Bonn and how far it was all prearranged with the Soviets is very difficult to tell. It was probably a Polish initiative within a framework of policy toward the West originating in Moscow, a conjecture which leaves open the question of the degree of conscious Polish self-interest, even distrust of a Soviet-German rapprochement (the "Rapallo" psychosis), that lay behind Gomulka's overtures. These overtures were undeniably

similar to many made in recent years by Rumania in, for example, the Balkans and with regard to European security--in accordance with broad Soviet policy, but motivated by national interest and of a preemptive character, prompted by suspicion of ultimate Soviet aims.

For their part, the Soviets must have been aware of the historic nature of Poland's agreement with West Germany. They must also have been aware of the risks, for Polish-Soviet relations, of the undertaking. And while they surely suspected some of the Poles' motives for wanting the treaty, they obviously considered the risks worth taking. But the riots on Poland's Baltic Coast immediately after the signing of the treaty with Bonn must have convinced at least some Soviet leaders that the calculation behind the risks had been shattered. There is no evidence to suggest a connection between these two momentous events for Poland in December 1970--the one international, the other domestic--but for the Soviet leadership, confronted with the shock of the upheaval, ideologically trained and practically groomed to suspect precisely such a connection, the possibility must have at least been practically considered. This makes the Soviet decision not to intervene all the more remarkable.

Soviet restraint can perhaps be explained by the interaction of several factors: It was just over two years since the invasion of Czechoslovakia; it would almost certainly have put back the promising hopes of détente in Europe for a considerable time; many Poles, perhaps even sections of the armed forces, would, unlike the Czechoslovaks, have resisted; at least some Soviet leaders probably read the riots as an internal Polish upheaval unconnected with the signing of the treaty with West Germany; above all, there was a well-judged estimation that the upheaval would not spread out of control.

It was in these precarious circumstances that Edward Gierek became First Party Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party. The Soviet leaders' decision to trust him, at least on a probationary basis, was probably based as much on a reluctance to face the alternative as on their full confidence in him. He was certainly a new phenomenon among Eastern European ruling party leaders: not a "Muscovite," or even a full-fledged home Communist, but a "Westerner" with many years'

experience in the coal mines of France and Belgium, only returning to Poland in 1948. He was known as a strong man of independent views who had brooked no interference in his province of Silesia (Poland's "Katanga"), which he had successfully ruled for 13 years. Gierek was presumably aware of the Soviet hesitations, and his effort to overcome them may have been one reason for the great deference he was prepared to pay the Soviet leadership. Another, more substantial reason was the initial total dependence of the new Polish leadership on Soviet good will. Had the Soviets, for example, not given Poland a considerable credit, reported at 100 million dollars, in February 1971 to enable the regime to revoke the price increases on basic foods that had sparked off the December riots, the Gierek leadership might not have survived. Moreover, Gierek's own authority inside the leadership was still not firm enough. General Moczar had been brought into the Politburo as a full member after Gomulka's fall and, backed by a considerable element in the Party and police apparatus, continued his factionalist activities. Gierek was soon to deal with Moczar, and later, in 1974, with Interior Minister Franciszek Szlachcic, a lesser threat but of similar hue, in a masterly manner. But to be confident enough to do so he needed the increased authority which only Soviet support could give him.

As for the Soviets, the transition from Gomulka to Gierek, which could have been a prelude to disaster, turned out to be a masterpiece of crisis management. They took calculated risks--not to intervene militarily, and to back Gierek--which paid off, and they helped their own cause by materially helping the new Polish leadership at just the right moment. The parallel between Soviet policies toward Poland in 1956 and those in 1970 is close. In 1956 Khrushchev's handling of the serious instability and of the new leader, Gomulka, also involved serious risks, probably greater than those taken by Brezhnev in 1970. Both situations needed, and got, the right blend of judgment, boldness, and restraint.

By about the middle of 1971, some six months after Gierek took office, the internal crisis had largely passed. In fact the Polish economy was already on the way to an astonishing recovery; an increase

in the standard of living was already appeasing the popular temper. From then on, therefore, it is worth examining Polish-Soviet relations in the light of those postulates mentioned earlier--postulates affecting Polish-Soviet relations in view of the new historical phase ushered in by the Polish-West German treaty of December 1970.

It would appear that over the short term some of the putative Soviet fears were groundless. At the national level, Poland has participated fully in the process of integration, through the bilateral and multilateral network of alliances sponsored by the Soviet Union. It even appears to have done so enthusiastically. But in bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union there have almost certainly been difficulties over Soviet long-term raw-material supplies, and these difficulties have now been greatly increased by the increase in Soviet prices at the beginning of 1975. Even before this Soviet decision was made known publicly, Poland had in the winter of 1974-1975 scrambled to buy emergency quantities of Middle East oil and was making plans to increase sharply its imports of oil from non-Communist sources over the next ten years. Poland is, of course, no exception in this situation: Every Eastern European state is heading for some kind of crisis in its bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union. The question here is whether this anticipated crisis could lead to any special strain in the Soviet Union's relations with Poland.

Such a question cannot be addressed solely within the framework of Poland's bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Poland's booming trade with the West could already be causing the Soviet Union considerable anxiety. East-West trade, of course, is a factor in détente and in a situation where Moscow sets the precedent, it can hardly prevent the lesser capitals from following suit. But the Western share of Polish trade shot up so rapidly in 1974, with imports by Poland far exceeding exports, and the Polish compulsion for Western credits has appeared so insatiable that Moscow might well have already begun to fear that this massive development of economic relations with the West is undermining its efforts to integrate Poland more with the East.<sup>37</sup> It is futhering the already existing tendencies to Westward gravitation in Poland's situation rather than

checking them, opening up Poland and its highly amenable economic intelligentsia to precisely that kind of influence which could perhaps be more dangerous in Poland than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, given the existing political framework.

There is clearly a potential for collision in these two current trends of Poland's external economic relations--with the Soviet bloc and with the West. If the Soviet Union were to bring serious pressure on the Polish leadership to curb those economic relations with the West, it could provoke for Gierek (as it could for Kadar in Hungary) a crisis of commitment, even legitimacy, in his relations with the economic and technical intelligentsia. This is the milieu to which Gierek, with his efficiency-oriented image, has most appealed. This element also sees efficiency as of Western rather than Eastern provenance. Being forced to close or cut down this opening to the West might constitute a serious blow to Gierek's authority, certainly to his standing. Moreover, this would apply not only to the economic and technical intelligentsia but also to other sections of the population, if for no other reason than that the sizable increases in their standard of living over the last four years have been derived, in large part, from the Western economic connection. In this context, needless to say, it would also exacerbate anti-Soviet sentiment in a society where that phenomenon is never far below the surface.<sup>38</sup>

Nor is it solely the economic aspects of Poland's relations with the West that could cause future difficulties with the Soviet Union. Though there seems little doubt that economic factors, for the present, play the dominant role, these relations may not be without their political or diplomatic significance. Gierek's own personal visits to the United States in 1974 and to Sweden in 1975, for example, and President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Poland in June 1975, followed in July by that of President Ford, cannot be viewed solely in the light of Poland's desire for economic support. Also implicit in them is Poland's desire to play its own role in the world--as a loyal member of the Soviet alliance, no doubt, but not as a passive member of it. Similarly, in the difficult course of recent Polish relations with West Germany, Warsaw's eagerness for a large credit from Bonn, finally agreed to in the

corridors of Helsinki, undoubtedly played a big part. But there was also a distinctly *national* tone and character to the Polish negotiating stand. This stand was neither that of a suppliant to Bonn nor that of a Soviet lackey. It would appear that, within the framework of détente, the Gierek leadership seeks not just financial support, but also recognition for Poland as a significant entity in its own right. Any comparison with Ceausescu's policy here could be misleading, since the essential complement to Rumania's policy outside the Soviet alliance is the neglect of its obligations inside it. Gierek's motivations and aims are quite different. But this is not to say that they will always be seen as such in Moscow.

At the domestic level a series of measures have been enacted under Gierek's leadership that certainly conform with what the Soviets would want to see in post-December Poland--after the Warsaw Treaty and after the Baltic riots. The purpose of these measures has been to increase the power of the ruling Communist institution, the Party, at the expense of societal institutions, systems, or processes, to strengthen the *pays d'état* and weaken the still very powerful *pays réel* in Poland. There is no reason to believe that this was a policy forced on Gierek or even initiated in Moscow and then accepted by his leadership. Indeed, to any modernizing leader of whatever political hue, the internal situation in Poland would have been something of an affront: a powerful Roman Catholic Episcopate claiming the patriotic and spiritual allegiance of most Poles; a backward, if resilient, agriculture dominated by private, postage-stamp plots; a backward educational system; a ramshackle structure of local government--the list could be considerably longer. For Gierek, therefore, basic change was an inevitable part of his domestic program. It has a twofold aim: to modernize the state and to make the *pays réel* more identical with the socialist *pays d'état*. The means used must be flexible, pragmatic, and restrained. But the end must be clear and mandatory.

In Moscow's view the Gierek leadership's domestic record so far can hardly be other than positive. From a desperate beginning, it has, through good management and good luck, brought the country to an unprecedented prosperity and, mainly on that account, to a perceptible degree of stability. Comprehensive steps have been taken to strengthen Party

control in several walks of life, but this is being done tactfully so as not to destabilize the situation. On the national level, the volume of Poland's economic relations with the capitalist West must, as previously mentioned, be worrying to Moscow, but against this, Warsaw has supported all Soviet initiatives in international politics, was a staunch ally at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and has presented little or no problem in the world Communist movement.

But, looked at a little more closely, the situation remains precarious. Even in the economy, where the most spectacular progress has been achieved, serious dangers began to appear as early as 1974. The trade deficit with the West began to take on alarming dimensions,<sup>39</sup> and the efforts to reduce it through increased exports, including coal, have not yet had much impact. At home, the economy was beginning to show familiar signs of boom and overexpansion, and these grew more ominous in 1975. The most serious were inflationary pressures which resulted, *inter alia*, in considerable price increases for most consumer goods, apart from those meat and dairy products whose prices were frozen after the fall of Gomulka for purely political reasons. Gierek's dilemma, arising from the circumstances in which Gomulka fell and in which he survived his first few months of power, is that economic problems, particularly as they directly affect the mass of the people, are also political problems, affecting internal stability; and this is true to a degree operating in no other Eastern European country.

If he needed reminding of this, the reminder came in 1975 when, on top of his other economic problems, food shortages occurred in many Polish cities. These led to widespread popular resentment and to some incidents calling for police intervention. In themselves these were not serious, but they were a portentous indication that the threshold of popular tolerance was still far too low for the leadership's comfort. The Polish masses will continue to support the Gierek leadership as long as their standard of living continues to rise or is at least maintained. If either the one or the other cannot be guaranteed, there is a real danger of political and social instability. Gierek's political position has become the hostage of his own economic success. He has made notable progress in the last five years in gaining public support;

but he has not succeeded in gaining anywhere near the degree of public identification with himself and his goals that is necessary for him to withstand economic difficulties with popular understanding rather than with disaffection and the threat of instability.

A further source of instability could well lie in those policies by which the Party seeks to strengthen or broaden its authority. On several issues this inevitably brings it into collision with the Church, Poland's other government. The Gierek leadership has tried hard, and for the most part successfully, to avoid serious confrontation with the Church. But its determination to extend Party power makes conflict sooner or later inevitable. For his part, the Polish Primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, now appears to believe that time is not on the Church's side. It is not impossible, therefore, that he--rather than, in the first instance, the regime--will seek to initiate a confrontation that could have the most serious consequences. The clergy's hold over the peasantry is still impressive; a peasantry threatened by the "socialist transformation of agriculture" could be a dangerous weapon in its hands. This, however, is only one of the possible areas of confrontation. In fact, every measure of modernization enacted could be a source of destabilization, since each involves an increase of party authority at the expense of a society still profoundly influenced by the Roman Catholic Church.

The key question appears to be whether the leadership can maintain economic prosperity. If it can, the dangers alluded to could remain potential. If it cannot, a situation not unlike that of 1956 or 1970 could arise again. The immediate problem would then, of course, be Gierek's; the larger problem would be Brezhnev's. The world economic crisis and Moscow's virtual monopoly of raw materials within the alliance will certainly greatly increase Soviet economic leverage over its Eastern European allies. If this leverage is handled unwisely it could, particularly in Poland's case, boomerang with dire results from the Soviet point of view.

#### Rumania

The Rumanian regime, first under Gheorghiu-Dej's and then increasingly under Ceausescu's leadership, has pursued a self-interested

national policy for well over a decade now. Though not--at least, yet--publicly criticized as such, this policy has been deviationist in that it has cut across both the Soviet leadership's general notion of relations between socialist states and its specific policies on certain key issues and in certain areas.<sup>40</sup>

Historically, the outstanding characteristic of this Rumanian deviation is that it was the first of its kind on the national level--as opposed to the domestic--in Europe under a Communist regime installed by the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav and Albanian deviations, both on the national level, were initiated by regimes which essentially brought themselves to power. The two other great deviations in Eastern Europe, the Hungarian in 1956 and the Czechoslovak in 1968, began at the domestic level, although the Hungarian quickly spread to the national as well and the Czechoslovak would probably also have done so. At the height of the Hungarian revolution, the Imre Nagy government announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. In Czechoslovakia, criticism of Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact and in the alliance as a whole was growing, and, more important, the persistent rejections by the Dubcek leadership of Soviet complaints about internal developments were beginning to put the Prague deviation on the national level as well.

Almost inevitably, therefore, a deviation beginning at the domestic level spreads to the national level because of interference from, even the presence of, an external factor like the Soviet Union. The evidence so far, however, does not suggest that the converse is necessarily true, at least if domestic deviation is considered only in the sense of a "rightist deviation" or "revisionism," i.e., toward a diminution of Party absolutism. In Yugoslavia, of course, the converse does happen to be true: After an initial period of tightening Party control, its leadership embarked on its "revisionist" course. But the cases of Albania and Rumania suggest domestic deviation in the opposite direction, toward an enhancement of Party rule dominated by a single individual.

Further parallels and contrasts may be considered. The three Eastern European countries where national deviation has taken place--Yugoslavia, Albania, and Rumania--were not militarily coerced;<sup>41</sup> the two in which the great domestic deviations took place--Hungary and

Czechoslovakia--were. Any conclusions that can be drawn from this would be tenuous. Extraneous or fortuitous factors partly explain the impunity of Yugoslavia and Albania and presumably also that of Rumania, to some extent. But if Czechoslovakia or Hungary had not been geographically contiguous to the Soviet Union, if physical and strategic factors had made military action against them difficult, would their internal deviations have still proceeded uncoerced? Definite conclusions are impossible. The factors entering into a Soviet decision are not constant but subjective, shifting, varying in importance according to time and perception.

In the case of Rumania, however, the possible reasons for Soviet restraint have intrigued observers for several years now. One reason, paradoxically, may well have been Rumania's geographical position. While its long, common border with the Soviet Union makes Rumania very vulnerable to Soviet invasion, it makes it less important strategically to the Soviets. It is generally "tucked away" inside the perimeters of the alliance system, bordering on no Western allied state. But the main reasons for the Soviet restraint have been political. The primary reason advanced is that although the Rumanian leadership has rejected, albeit indirectly, one of the two-Soviet notions of Communist legitimacy--Soviet leadership--it has strongly preserved the other--the leading role of the Party.

This is a persuasive argument. It is quite probable that if the Rumanian leadership had combined its deviation at the national level with even a Kadarite domestic policy, then the Soviet leadership would have put aside whatever constraints existed and invaded Rumania. At the very least it would have publicly denounced the Rumanians. But the Yugoslavs, at least at first, and the Albanians, throughout, did preserve the orthodox notion of the leading role of the Party. They were publicly denounced, excommunicated, and subjected to every kind of pressure short of military invasion. Obviously pressure, including apparently some economic pressure, has been applied to Rumania also at times. But only in 1968 when it denounced the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, and perhaps in 1971, after Ceausescu's visit to China, were public criticisms made of Rumanian policy, and even then they were few

and muted. In sum, what the evidence suggests is extraordinary Soviet restraint.

Is this to be accounted for solely by the Rumanian maintenance of Party absolutism? If, for other pressing reasons, the Soviet leaders found it expedient to coerce an Eastern European state militarily, would the fact that the leading role of the Party was being upheld there be sufficient to deter them, assuming there were no restraints of a military, logistic, or diplomatic variety? Hardly. It is far more likely that, hugely important though this principle of unchallenged Party rule is, the real determinant is the *mix of other factors* which, along with this principle, form the decisionmaking impetus at any particular time.

Another reason often advanced for Rumania's impunity so far has been its skillful diplomacy, particularly its leadership's manipulation of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Again, the arguments here are persuasive. But the manner of this manipulation should be constantly kept in mind. Here it is instructive to compare Rumania's policy vis-à-vis China with Albania's. The Hoxha leadership in Tirana used the Sino-Soviet dispute as a weapon against Moscow, but the Albanians opted early on for an alliance with the Chinese against the Soviets, although they never openly condemned Moscow until Khrushchev attacked them at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961. The Rumanians have also manipulated the Sino-Soviet dispute against Moscow, but they have manipulated it within the limits of certain rules in relations between socialist states which they know the Soviets themselves are officially loath to transgress, and they have done their best to preserve the niceties of these rules. By ostentatiously proclaiming a policy of friendship with *all* socialist states and by ostensibly seeking on occasion to mediate between Moscow and Peking, the Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu leaderships have made it all the more difficult for the Soviets to cross the fine line between justified exasperation and "justifiable" intervention.

Only in 1971 did it appear that the Rumanians had overplayed their hand in the case of China. In the spring of that year Ceausescu made an ostentatious visit to China, and later the Chinese government agreed to give Rumania a credit of nearly 250 million dollars. During the

same year Sino-Romanian military collaboration appears to have been stepped up, at least judging from the exchanges of important visits of military officers. It was no coincidence, therefore, that it was during the summer of 1971 that Moscow's pressure on Bucharest increased. It is also no coincidence that subsequently the Romanians have maintained their links with China in considerably lower key.

There are, therefore, important differences in the ways in which the Albanians and Romanians used China in their dispute with the Soviet Union. And these differences have, at least in part, restrained the Soviet leaders from publicly calling the Romanians to account. But the Romanian strategy regarding China has always been a dangerous one because the real key to Soviet reaction to it--Moscow's own perception of Sino-Soviet relations--is outside Romanian control. The Soviet leaders could at any time perceive relations with China as so bad that their threshold of tolerance for Bucharest's relations with Peking would be crossed. Then the choice for the Romanians would be conformity or open defiance.

In addition to China, Romania has also used other factors in international relations to preserve and enhance its degree of independence. Its relations with the United States should be seen particularly in this light. President Nixon's visit to Romania in 1970 was the beginning of a relationship (now maintained by President Ford's visit of August 1975) which soon came to mean very much more to Bucharest than it did to Washington. Ceausescu's visits to the United States in 1971 and 1973 should be seen as diplomatic ventures designed to further Romanian security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Indeed, Ceausescu's indefatigable world travels should also be seen partly in this light, as should his cultivation of Yugoslavia. Obviously, good relations with Zaire or Costa Rica are in themselves no guarantee against Soviet intervention, but more world attention means less national isolation. Romania is in the unique position of having to seek protection against its own allies, often among states that are ostensibly its adversaries.

No effort to explain Romania's impunity so far would be complete without some consideration of Soviet policy priorities since Bucharest's deviation began. Although some strain in Soviet-Romanian relations

could be detected earlier, the first open comprehensive formulation of Rumania's new policy was contained in the famous Central Committee resolution of April 1964, six months before Khrushchev's dismissal. This resolution, *inter alia*, rejected the leadership of the CPSU and proclaimed the equality of all parties in the world movement and states within the alliance, the sovereignty of all socialist states, and their right to conduct every aspect of their own affairs without interference. If Khrushchev had remained in power it is possible that an open breach would have occurred, preceded and followed by efforts to unseat the Gheorghiu-Dej leadership. But Khrushchev fell in October 1964, and there followed the long period of vacuum in Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe. Short of the greatest provocation by Rumania, such as a decision to leave the Warsaw Pact or Comecon, the new Soviet leadership was not likely to be distracted from priority domestic tasks to devote any efforts to bringing Rumania to heel. Subsequently attention became riveted on the Czechoslovak situation, a more dangerous deviation than the Rumanian in a country strategically more vulnerable and more vital to the Soviet Union. Immediately after the coercion of Czechoslovakia, it did appear that Rumania itself was in serious danger because of Ceausescu's refusal to take part in the invasion and his strong condemnation of it. Then, however, several constraints worked to stay the Soviet hand: President Johnson's warning to Brezhnev; NATO's strong statement; the shock to world opinion caused by the move against Czechoslovakia; the awareness that there would be at least some Rumanian resistance to an invasion; the lack of any real "legitimizing" pretext; and the Rumanian lapse into silence about the invasion after the initial condemnation of it.

After August 1968, especially after the tense episode caused by Ceausescu's visit to China in 1971, Soviet policy toward Bucharest appears to have banked more and more on the hope of Rumania's becoming so isolated that its national deviation would steadily lose its potency. International détente would certainly appear to have been working in this direction. For example, Rumania once enjoyed a favored priority in its relations with West Germany, especially when the rest of Eastern Europe was prevented from responding to Bonn's overtures in early 1967. Now, however, with the West German government approaching Eastern Europe

through Moscow and the prohibition on intercourse with Bonn lifted, Rumania's privileged position has been lost. After the Soviet Union, the countries mainly occupying West German attention since 1969 have been the CDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Indeed, it sometimes has appeared that Rumanian differences with the Soviet Union, once welcomed by the West for their nuisance value in an era of confrontation, are now perceived as a nuisance to the West in an era of negotiation. Rumanian initiatives, for example, at the European security deliberations at Geneva and at the MBFR talks in Vienna, were not always welcomed by the Western delegations, particularly those representing the larger powers.

It was probably Ceausescu's awareness that the international situation was developing against Rumania that prompted him to begin new initiatives aimed at preserving and enlarging Rumania's independence. His world travels, previously noted, have continued. Since 1972 he has so intensified relations with Yugoslavia that it is no exaggeration to speak of an unofficial defensive alliance between these two states. He has also apparently sought to offer Rumania's "good offices" in efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, on the strength of his good relations with both sides. Finally he has not only sought to intensify Rumania's relations with developing countries, including an effort to win observer status at the next nonaligned conference in Colombo in 1976, but since 1974 he has been trying, without much success, to get Rumania recognized as a developing country itself.

This "developing country" concept is simply one indication of Rumanian awareness that economic as well as diplomatic trends have been moving against them. The massive shift in Rumanian trade from East to West which saw the Soviet share drop from 51 percent in 1958 to 25 percent ten years later has brought advantages to Rumania, economic as well as political. But whether they have been worth the large trade deficits Rumania has recently accumulated in the West is open to question. In fact, with world inflation and the raw-material crisis adding to their difficulties,<sup>42</sup> the Rumanians now appear to be pursuing an essentially more balanced economic policy between West and East. In the West they still continue their efforts for trade and aid on the best possible terms--witness Ceausescu's astonishing session with U.S.

Congressmen in Washington in June 1975 in his attempt (one which finally proved successful in August) to convince them of the sincerity of Rumania's emigration policies and, hence, of Rumania's eligibility for most-favored-nation treatment.<sup>43</sup> Bucharest is also seeking to intensify relations with the European Communities in Brussels, and it is likely that the Rumanians will establish direct relations with the Commission. At the same time, they are showing an increasing willingness to join in certain Soviet-sponsored Comecon ventures, something they would not even have considered doing some years ago.

The Rumanians cannot, however, blame external factors entirely for the seriousness of their economic situation. While still showing certain impressive quantitative characteristics, the Rumanian economy continues to reveal serious qualitative weaknesses. Inefficiency, mismanagement, low labor morale and productivity; constant reorganizations, yet a persistent reluctance to reform; a backward agriculture, even by Balkan standards--these are some of the hallmarks of the Rumanian economy under Ceausescu's rule.

In fact, it is this Rumanian economic weakness, and the possibility that it will worsen, that probably constitutes the main Soviet hope for an erosion of Ceausescu's independent position and the main reason why Moscow is prepared to be patient. The Soviets may expect, with some justification, that little economic advantage will come from Ceausescu's "developing country" gambit and that Rumania's intensified efforts to gain relief from the West will nowhere near meet expectations.<sup>44</sup> The only recourse in that case would be to turn back to the East, to Comecon, and greater economic dependence on the Soviet Union itself. Though the political implications of this would be serious for Rumania, the purely economic results might not be so unfortunate; in fact, the general standard of living in Rumania might even benefit from an economic reorientation Eastward, since Rumanian efforts to open up trade with the West have necessitated considerable sacrifices on the part of the population. Here the Polish situation stands in striking contrast: Poland's economic opening to the West has been a key factor in raising its standard of living over the last five years, and the maintenance--even broadening--of that opening is essential if Polish living standards, so vital

to stability in Poland, are to be kept up. Hence it would be far more difficult for Poland than for Rumania to reduce its relations with the West substantially.

The Soviets may also see some potential in Ceausescu's own style and inadequacies of rule. His mismanagement of the economy has recently caused a growing alienation on the part of Rumania's economic and technical intelligentsia, and there is evidence suggesting disaffection among Rumanian workers, who have been relatively passive in the past. Other aspects of his policy, and more particularly his highly personal style of rule,<sup>45</sup> have also led to a decline in his popularity. Even more crucial has been the increasing exasperation among Party cadres at all levels at Ceausescu's inconsistencies and unpredictability. No Party official has been sure of his position for any length of time. Basically, of course, the cadres approve of one of the few consistencies in Ceausescu's policies: the strengthening of the role of the Party at all levels. But the personal insecurity caused by the leader's methods has considerably dimmed the attractiveness of his philosophy. There is reason to believe that the structural changes made in the Party leadership in March 1974 and Ceausescu's obvious attempt to institutionalize his own personal rule, together with the more lavish aspects of his own personality cult, have considerably increased Party dissatisfaction. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that at the Rumanian Party Congress in November 1974, this dissatisfaction was sufficiently focused and articulated to check some aspects of the Party leader's absolutism in the interest of more collective rule.<sup>46</sup>

How far this varied dissatisfaction has eroded Ceausescu's legitimacy based on his (implicitly anti-Soviet) nationalism is difficult to say. So far, probably very little. But its corrosive potential over the long term should not be ignored. Even now, the leadership's nationalism arouses considerably less popular enthusiasm than it did; and even in the Balkans, nationalism alone is not enough. The regime cannot continue to base its legitimacy solely on that factor.

The Soviet leadership can draw nothing but comfort from this development. In fact, if the situation ever demanded it, several recent aspects of Ceausescu's rule could provide the Soviets with plausible grounds for criticism. They obviously could not accuse Ceausescu of

abandoning Party rule but they could accuse him of building a personality cult and of distorting Party institutions, rules, and practices so that, under him, the Rumanian Party had ceased to be a genuinely Marxist-Leninist one. Among Party cadres who are already thoroughly demoralized such charges might find considerable echo regardless of the danger they implied for Rumania's carefully nurtured sovereignty.

Such charges, if ever made, would presumably be secondary to the main charge of national deviation. Whether any, in fact, will ever be made depends on how the Soviet leadership perceives its priorities, that multiple mix of factors that will prompt its decisionmaking in any given situation.

#### Albania

Albania enjoyed considerable limelight, European and worldwide, from the beginning of its rift with the Soviet Union, which became evident in 1959, to Khrushchev's open denunciation of the Hoxha leadership at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961. From then on Albania settled, with relatively little more discomfort than usual, into the obscure role of a Chinese client and has enjoyed the distinction of being Peking's only permanent satellite since 1961. Immediately after its break with the Soviet Union, there was a widespread belief among Western observers that the Tirana regime would follow the example of Yugoslavia after 1948 by opening up diplomatic and economic relations with the West, thereby avoiding much of the damage wrought by the comprehensive Soviet boycott.

This belief, which turned out to be quite wrong, was apparently based on a misunderstanding of several essential factors in the Albanian situation: First, the Albanian leadership was determined to resist the corrosive dangers of intercourse with the West. This was presumably prompted by a morbid, though understandable, fear of Albania's three closest neighbors, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy; second, the very low degree of economic, political, and cultural advancement in Albania made it much less essential than in the case of Yugoslavia to try to replace the trade and aid of the Soviet Union and its allies; third, China was well able to supply the necessary capital, equipment, experts, and know-how to keep Albania's developing extractive industries running; and

fourth, the Hoxha leadership was almost totally unconcerned--nor did it feel a need to be concerned--with Albanian public opinion, such as it was, or with public aspirations, as they might develop.

The result has been that Albania has survived as a Balkan backwater of Stalinism for well over a decade now. Its political institutions have scarcely developed at all, and it is the only remaining European state where terror has been used systematically as an instrument of government. But its economy has developed considerably, its basic extractive industries even to the point of some relative sophistication, as a result of Chinese aid, the volume and character of which are not easy to discern.<sup>47</sup> Albania has also conducted a modicum of trade with the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies but apparently none with the Soviet Union, at least not directly. The collapse anticipated by many after 1961 did not therefore materialize. In fact, in some ways China turned out to be an ideal patron for the Hoxha leadership. It maintained the state's economy but was too far away to interfere or threaten. Throughout its brief and checkered history since 1913, the Albanian state has never had such a patron.

During this period of Chinese patronage, Tirana's relations with Moscow have been confined to trading insults in the press and across the airwaves. The Albanian media have also often attacked both the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies (the exception, for obvious reasons, being Rumania).<sup>48</sup> The burden of Albanian propaganda against the Soviets and their allies is that their leaderships are revisionist and in collusion with the Western, particularly the American, imperialists. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Albanians have echoed the Chinese charge of "social imperialism" against the Soviets.

This anti-Soviet activity, however, has passed almost completely unnoticed except by the few Albania-watchers in the West as well as in the East. So did the rigidly hard domestic policies of the Albanian leadership throughout the 1960s, the Albanian version of the Chinese cultural revolution in 1968, and the real economic progress that was undoubtedly achieved.

The truth is that Albania is noticed only when it plays a role in diplomatic combinations or permutations that may affect the international

status quo. As an ally first of the Soviet Union and then of China, it is pitchforked into world prominence whenever it appears that its adherence to one or the other is in question. Since the American attempts at rapprochement with China, which began in 1971, there has indeed been some speculation about the future of the Sino-Albanian alliance, and it is on this account that there has been some revival of Western interest in Albania over the past two years. China and Albania were mainly of use to each other while reveling in their self-inflicted isolation from the two most powerful international alliances of the day. China's use to Albania was obvious; Albania's potential use to China was as a bridge head in Eastern Europe for exploitation against Soviet domination. Despite rumors about a Chinese-sponsored Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest axis in 1971 being formed to meet the threat of Soviet coercion, Albania has not proved the bridgehead the Chinese seem originally to have hoped for. It still, however, retained a symbolic value as long as the Chinese were determined to operate outside the established perimeters of world diplomacy. Once the diplomatic revolution occurred, however, and the Chinese began to cultivate normal relations with the American and other Western governments, it was natural that the durability of this once special relationship between Peking and Tirana should be questioned.

Most of the questions must have come from the Albanian rather than the Chinese side. Though much less important than before, Albania still had its symbolic, propaganda, prestige, and psychological importance for the Chinese. If it were lost and returned to Soviet domination, it would represent a considerable defeat. As for the cost of patronage, this cannot be inconsiderable, but political advantage still carries more weight than cost-accounting in Peking, at least as far as Albania is concerned.

The question the Albanians were asking must have centered precisely on whether this patronage would continue. Albania's misfortune is that it is, by definition, a client state. Its brief 20th century history as a separate state has seen it under the tutelage first of Austria, followed by Yugoslavia, Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia again, the Soviet Union, and now China. If set adrift by China, Albania would, sooner or later, have to seek economic and diplomatic support elsewhere. The Albanian leadership obviously disapproved of China's diplomatic

maneuvering with the United States. It did not openly say so, but from 1972 onward the warmth of the Sino-Albanian relationship has appeared to drop several degrees, while the attacks on the United States in the Albanian media have continued unabated and U.S. overtures--for example, in Under-Secretary Rush's Annapolis speech in April 1973--have been ignored. More important, as an apparently precautionary measure, the Albanian government has taken several concrete steps to normalize its relations with Yugoslavia and Greece, its two traditional enemies.

In the course of 1974 it became obvious that the uncertainties over the future of Albania's position in the world were having their effect on regime unity. The purge of two Central Committee members, apparently for "liberal" and Western-oriented sympathies, was followed by a much more significant series of incidents reflecting disunity within the armed forces. They revolved around the personality of General Beqir Balluku, Politburo member and Minister of Defense, who disappeared from public view in the summer and was officially replaced as Minister of Defense in October by Mehmet Shehu, who retained his post as Premier. At the same time, there was considerable reshuffling at the Ministry of Defense and in the top echelons of the army. It appeared that Shehu, the regime's number-two "strong man," had taken over the defense ministry (at least temporarily) to restore order and obedience to the official Hoxha line.

There has been considerable speculation about the reasons for Balluku's disappearance. Some Western observers have considered him as urging a shift in Albanian alliances, back to closer, or at least "normalized," relations with the Soviet Union--in fact, some have considered him an Albanian Peng Teh-huai or even Lin Piao. There is no direct evidence for this, simply strong circumstantial presumptions. The possibilities of total Albanian isolation because of changes in Chinese foreign policy and the increasing instability in the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East all raise questions that seriously affect the military establishment of which Balluku was the head. If, as would be quite possible, they were accompanied by concern about China's ability to supply the Albanian forces with modern armaments, then it is not difficult to see why disaffection should be

centered in the armed forces. Whatever the reasons, the Albanian regime acknowledged its first serious disunity since the early 1960s. The disappearance of Balluku was accompanied by strong attacks on the Soviet Union by Hoxha, Shehu, and others, along with indirect hints of Soviet interference (though Balluku himself was never criticized or even mentioned). The alliance with China was strongly reaffirmed and any fears that the Hoxha-Shehu leadership was wavering in its alliance commitments were dispelled. In fact, the small, closely knit group leading the Albanian regime would appear now to have little option but to retain their present policies. The danger to them is the increasing pressure for change from the echelon just below.

The Sino-Albanian alliance, therefore, still remains intact. It has not served the Albanian regime badly and is a reasonably viable opposition as long as Albania is not physically threatened. In such a case, of course, Albania would be virtually defenseless, but the prospects of invasion or attack are still remote. A stable, constitutional government in Greece, as now seems likely in the short term, will hardly seek to undo the conciliatory policy toward Albania inherited from its predecessors. In any case, the memory of the disastrous move against Cyprus and the ensuing preoccupation with this problem should be enough to inhibit Athens from any northern irresponsibility for years to come.

As for the Soviet Union, military intervention against Albania would be terribly difficult, this being one of the main reasons why the Albanians were able to throw off Soviet tutelage in the first place. Moreover, the Chinese, if only to protect their credibility, would have to respond in some fashion to try and save their one permanent loyal ally; otherwise, they would experience a humiliation which every third-world country would witness and draw its lesson from. Chou En-lai could dissolve any Yugoslav hopes (if there ever were any) of Chinese support in case of Soviet intervention by his admonition that "distant waters do not quench fires." But he could hardly fob off the Albanians, China's only ally for many years, with such folkish wisdom. Perhaps a strong Chinese demonstration on the Soviet frontier would be sufficient to deter any Soviet intentions to move against Tirana. The Soviets would have to consider not only the Chinese response to such a possible move

against Albania, but also--and this would be more important--the American and Western European response. Soviet aggression in this part of Southeastern Europe, driving a wedge between allied Greece and neutral Yugoslavia, threatening Italy, providing a base for Soviet naval squadrons, and perhaps refurbishing the submarine base at Valona are possibilities that NATO could hardly entertain and the fragile bonds of East-West détente could hardly contain.

More likely than any military threat to Albania's security or any sudden break in the Albanian alliance with China is the steady erosion of that alliance. Even this is by no means certain over the short term, say, the next five years, although over a longer term it is quite possible. Much will depend on the stability of the leaderships in both China and Albania. For their part, the Albanians must be watching more closely than most the factionalism in the Chinese leadership, strongly hoping that it produces a reversion to the anti-Western obduracy of the sixties, as well as maintaining an implacable anti-Sovietism. They will also watch even more closely the succession problem in China, whose climax cannot long be delayed. As for the Albanian leadership, until it changes there seems little prospect of an end to the inward-looking, paranoid ferocity that has characterized it for over 30 years. But both Party Secretary Hoxha and Premier Shehu are well over 60. Their health is dubious and both are believed to have been in the West fairly recently for medical treatment. Whatever its concern over Chinese policy, the present leadership will presumably cling to the Chinese connection as long as it can. As previously mentioned, it could hardly return to Moscow and it could never embrace Yugoslavia, the two previous patrons it has known. There have been indications since 1973 of some readiness to enlarge relations with Western Europe, especially with Italy, France, Austria, and the FRG, and it is not impossible that Albania may follow China's lead in making contacts with the EEC in Brussels. But it is very difficult to see the Hoxha leadership countenancing the kind of rapprochement with the West that would open up Albania to considerable Western influences and contacts.

With a new leadership in both Tirana and Peking, and a continuing erosion of the link with China, the situation might be different. The

end of the Hoxha era could well usher in a new period of domestic instability in Albania, with clan and regional politics reassuming their traditionally important roles. But it could also lead to new diplomatic alignments for Albania that could have considerable international repercussions. As at the Greek court in the 19th century, there could well develop as many factions as there are actual or potential international patrons. A faction demanding the reinvigorating of the Chinese alliance would almost certainly be present; a group demanding a return to Moscow could emerge; the Yugoslavs would almost certainly see to it that they too had their champions; there might also be a group, impressed by the Yugoslav and Rumanian examples, urging closer political and economic ties with the West as the best way of engineering at least some national autonomy.

When Albania took the Chinese option some 15 years ago, it was regarded as a diplomatic sensation fraught with the most explosive implications. Now, if any new leadership in Albania chose to continue that option it would be regarded as a stabilizing factor of considerable importance on the international scene. Any other choice would certainly have destabilizing tendencies. The least destabilizing, at least internationally, would be the Western option, provided it were pursued with restraint. (Internally, of course, this could prove very destabilizing.) The predominance of a Yugoslav faction in Tirana which, considering Albanian hatred and fear of the Serbs, is perhaps the least likely outcome, would produce serious strain with the Soviet Union. It might also produce instability in Yugoslavia itself, where the Albanians in Kosovo might seek to use Tirana to win further concessions from Belgrade. Moreover, such a development could only worsen Yugoslavia's relations with Italy. In the unlikely event of the Yugoslav option ever coming up, therefore, the chances are that it would not remain in the ascendant for long.

It is the Soviet option, of course, that would constitute the most destabilizing factor. The result would be tantamount to a Soviet occupation of the country, with all the advantages that would accrue to the Soviet Union but without the penalties mentioned previously that a military occupation would invoke from either China or the United States.

Neither could retaliate militarily or diplomatically if a new Albanian leadership itself chose to reforge its links with Moscow. On the other hand, a prolonged period of leadership instability in Tirana in which no faction held the decisive advantage could lead to an untidily dangerous situation. Then, the opportunities for miscalculation and mischief would be all too numerous. As a country whose potential international significance is in inverse ratio to its size and intrinsic importance, Albania is well worth watching. Most observers see possible future instability in the Balkans as coming from Yugoslavia. They may be right; but they should not neglect Albania's potential in this respect.

#### ASPECTS OF INTRA-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS

This treatment of the seven Eastern European states provides some idea of how each has retained very strong traits of individuality despite more than a quarter of a century of Communist rule and despite the strong Soviet imprint on all except Albania and perhaps Rumania. Moreover, all these states, no matter how dependent, loyal, even docile, have in one way or another presented the Soviet Union with problems in its relations with them or have the potential of doing so.

It is now worth considering an often-neglected aspect of the Eastern European political scene, the relations of the Eastern European states with each other. This question has been neglected for two reasons: (1) the sheer dominance of the Soviet Union, and (2) a tendency to assume that because of this dominance, the Eastern European states have so little individuality that their relations with each other have little significance.

There is much logic in this reasoning. Soviet dominance has had an even more restraining effect on the external than the internal policies of the states concerned, and Soviet policy has shown itself mistrustful of associations between them that might acquire a profile and momentum of their own. Stalin at first appeared to encourage a South Slav federation involving Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but later, in 1948, abruptly changed his mind. In his own relations with Eastern Europe he strongly preferred the bilateral approach. His successor, Khrushchev, while by no means neglecting bilateralism, moved steadily after 1956

to a more multilateral alliance system through the instruments of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. It was under him that the term "socialist commonwealth" was brought into use. Brezhnev has intensified this multilateral approach on many levels. It is a system which might at first appear to facilitate groupings of Eastern European states, but the Soviet Union's determination to retain its power monopoly has, in general, impeded their formation. In this context, the Soviets have been assisted by intra-Eastern European differences. Historical rivalries (for example, that between Hungary and Rumania over Transylvania), national prejudices, and more immediate factors pertaining to issues within the Soviet alliance system have also impeded the formation of exclusively Eastern European multinational associations. There have, for example, been serious differences over economic cooperation and specialization. The origin of the Rumanian policy of independence probably lay in East German and Czechoslovak suggestions in the late fifties and early sixties that Rumania should modify its program of comprehensive industrialization and content itself with remaining a mainly agrarian and raw-material producing country.<sup>49</sup> There have also presumably been serious rivalries between the Eastern European states over Soviet credit and raw-material allocations. Indeed, the sheer magnitude of Soviet domination and power must inevitably have led to a whole range of jealousies among the smaller members of the alliance.

There were, however, three examples in the sixties of informal groupings of Eastern European states which indicated that despite all the rivalries between them, these states are capable of acting together out of political, economic, or geographical interest. It is significant, however, that these groupings were discernible roughly during the period 1964 to 1968, when Soviet control in Eastern Europe was at its weakest.

The first was the so-called "iron triangle" involving Poland, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia. These three states, geographically contiguous and industrialized--or, in the case of Poland, rapidly becoming so--in many economic respects did form a natural association, in spite of historical antagonisms. Along with the Soviet Union they constituted the so-called "northern tier" of the socialist camp, disposing of by

far the greater part of its population, its industrial wealth, and its resources.<sup>50</sup> In addition, two of its members, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, bordered on the FRG, still considered the spearhead of a hostile West.

There is little concrete evidence indicating the real nature or purpose of this triangular grouping. Some observers have even tended to doubt its existence. But there is some evidence suggesting that informal efforts were made, mainly at the GDR's inspiration, through multifarious contacts based on a broad community of interest, to form a tri-national association within the Soviet alliance having a distinctive character of its own and with a policy of rigid hostility toward West Germany. The effort did not get very far. For one thing, the Novotny leadership in Czechoslovakia, never enthusiastic about the idea, became involved in the most serious domestic difficulties. For another, both Poland and Czechoslovakia may have suspected the domineering pretensions of the GDR and of Ulbricht personally. In addition, there was apparently a deep personal antagonism between Ulbricht and Gomulka that made any *positive* cooperation all the more difficult.<sup>51</sup> In the end, therefore, what was left of the "iron triangle" concept was a negative, but by no means impotent, community of interest between the Polish and East German leaderships--hostility to West Germany and, in 1968, to the new reformist leadership in Czechoslovakia.

A more intriguing concept of an association of Central and Eastern European states was advanced, quietly and informally, by Hungarian publicists, obviously with some official backing, in the middle sixties. This was the concept of "cooperation among states of the Danube Basin." It was seen by observers at the time as a tentative attempt by Hungary, though a loyal member of the Soviet alliance, to gain a little more leeway for itself in foreign affairs. The most striking feature of the Hungarian proposals was that they included Austria in the cooperative project. The Soviet Union, of course, being itself a riparian state was not excluded, but it was fairly clear that the three key states were to be Hungary, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, and it was in these last two countries that the response was most positive. After the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 the discussion quickly petered out.

A third informal grouping emerged briefly in 1968. It embraced Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, thus evoking memories of the prewar "little entente." This grouping was essentially based on a defensive community of interest against Soviet interference and was prompted by Yugoslav and Rumanian support for Czechoslovakia's right to pursue a policy of its own choice. It was characterized by an intensified exchange of official visits among the three countries concerned and strong mutual expressions of sympathy. Like the Hungarian proposals for Danubian cooperation, it was dissolved as a result of August 1968--though even more abruptly.

Since 1969, the active Soviet domination in Eastern Europe has been such as to preclude national groupings of these kinds. The introduction into Comecon practice of the "interested party" principle may possibly in the future lead to the emergence of an association of a number of members committed to a specific project without the Soviet Union being included. But up to now every association or project within Comecon has involved the Soviet Union and has been under its direction, and the prospects of Soviet nonparticipation in an economic association of any importance seem very remote.

In Southeastern Europe, where firm Soviet control is restricted to Bulgaria, there exist the most propitious conditions for future regional groupings among both Communist and non-Communist states. Already a close bilateral link exists between Yugoslavia and Rumania, almost a defensive alliance against Soviet pressure. Little came of the anti-Soviet Belgrade-Bucharest-Tirana defensive "triangle" under Chinese protection that some observers saw developing in 1971. But in view of the already existing Rumanian-Yugoslav connection and obvious Albanian overtures for better relations with Yugoslavia, it is by no means impossible that an informal, essentially anti-Soviet, grouping of these three states could develop, with Chinese sympathy but no assurances of other than moral support. Rumania, for several years now, has also strongly advanced proposals for multilateral Balkan cooperation involving the four Communist states in the region plus Greece and Turkey. So far nothing has come of this, partly because of Greek-Turkish enmity but also because most states have preferred to seek harmony in the

region through bilateral approaches. The fact that Bulgaria has also advocated the bilateral approach would suggest Soviet disfavor of the multilateralism proposed by Rumania. This Soviet view, however, could change. The advantages of involving Greece, for example, more closely in a Balkan regional grouping, thereby drawing it further away from the Western alliance, might be seen by Moscow as outweighing the dangers or uncertainties of an undertaking it did not directly control.

In Eastern Europe as a whole, therefore, the Soviets discourage multilateral groupings. What they do tolerate, however, and probably encourage are certain special *bilateral* relationships. One of the most conspicuous of these at present is that between the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Judging from the close economic cooperation between Prague and East Berlin, the numerous exchanges of visits that have developed since 1972, and the very close series of bilateral consultations on a wide variety of issues, there seems little doubt that a special relationship is intended by the two partners and is almost certainly recognized and accepted by the Soviet leadership. It is a natural relationship economically, and the two states share a common border with the FRG, even though that "problem" now is perceived differently from the way it was in the sixties. But there would also appear to be an aspect of East German political tutelage in the relationship--at least as seen from East Berlin--of which Moscow might also be benignly aware. Certainly the Soviets could choose no more reliable assistant to help oversee the process of normalization in Czechoslovakia than the East German Communist Party. As for the Husak leadership, it may have welcomed such tutelage in the early uncertain phases of normalization. As that regime becomes more stable and confident, however, this contentment may evaporate.

With the lifting of restrictions on travel between East Germany and Poland in 1972, relations between these two countries appeared to be developing on new, encouraging paths affecting not only the states but their societies. But this bold experiment had to be drastically curtailed, and it appeared to leave a trail of popular bitterness that was hardly conducive to its being soon repeated. Since then, though personal relations between Honecker and Gierek seem to be far better

than those between their predecessors, and economic relations have developed successfully, the links between East Berlin and Warsaw have hardly been such as to justify talk of a special bilateral relationship.

Even more intriguing than the special relationship between the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and considerably more difficult to explain, is the one that has developed between Rumania and Bulgaria. Only cool correctness could have been expected in bilateral dealings between the two countries, whose relations with the Soviet Union could hardly be more different. Yet political as well as economic cooperation between Bucharest and Sofia over the last five years has displayed a surprising pace, comprehensiveness, and cordiality. During periods of strain between the Soviet Union and Rumania--for example, in 1971 after Ceausescu's visit to China--when Rumania was openly attacked in other Eastern European media, those of Bulgaria were silent. In fact, references to Rumania in Bulgarian media are almost invariably friendly: Areas of mutual agreement are stressed, issues on which there is sharp disagreement are glossed over. The special relationship of the two states is illustrated by the fact that early in 1975 Ceausescu and Zhivkov, the heads of state and Party leaders of the two countries, formally agreed to meet each other at least twice a year in the future. No leaders of any other Communist states have ever undertaken such a commitment.

Obviously these two neighboring socialist countries at roughly the same stage of economic development have strong mutual economic interests, one of which is certainly a desire for higher agricultural prices within Comecon. And between them there exists no divisive issue like Macedonia, which bedevils relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, or Transylvania, which similarly affects those between Rumania and Hungary.<sup>52</sup> Some degree of cooperation was only to be expected between them. But their fundamental differences in relations with the Soviet Union and its alliance system would seem to preclude a relationship as close as that which actually exists. It can best be explained by Bulgaria's being specially designated by the Soviet Union as a bridge to Rumania, as the loyalist ally best suited to maintain good relations and, if necessary, to act as intermediary or contact during times of serious

strain. As for Rumania, it probably has no objection to Bulgaria's being used in such a role and may well see the advantages it offers.

A similar Soviet rationale may help to explain another special bilateral relationship in Eastern Europe, that between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Over the last five years, especially since Brezhnev's successful visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971, Hungarian-Yugoslav relations have developed rapidly in all fields to the point where a uniquely friendly relationship has been established between a loyal member of the Soviet alliance and independent, "revisionist" Yugoslavia. Clearly the Soviets are aware of this friendship, and obviously they see the advantages to themselves of this link to a country in which they have never lost a quasi-proprietorial interest. Hence, in the Soviet perspective, Hungary may be intended to be to Yugoslavia what Bulgaria is to Rumania. If this hypothesis is correct, then it must be acknowledged that the Soviets are applying a sophisticated tactic, hardly new in international relations generally, but inconceivable under Stalin or even Khrushchev.

But it is a tactic not without danger. In the near future, the danger lies not so much in either Bulgaria or Hungary being infected with the independent spirit of policy of its partner, but in these special relationships acquiring a momentum of their own and assuming aspects to which the Soviets are not privy, or from which they are actually excluded. Hungary, for example, attracted in any case to Yugoslavia because of its enlightened treatment of the Hungarian minority in the Voivodina, might see its relations with Belgrade as providing some degree of elbow room outside the strict confines of the Soviet alliance. The same impulse, therefore, that prompted the proposals for Danubian cooperation in the sixties may now be quietly at work in the special relationship with Yugoslavia in the seventies. On another level, Hungarian economic officials, imbued with the spirit of the NEM, almost certainly find cooperation easier with their Yugoslav counterparts than with the Soviet or many of the Eastern European officials.

The putative dangers for Bulgaria in its association with Rumania would seem considerably smaller and fewer. But they exist, nonetheless, and there is no assurance that even the Bulgarians can always remain

immune from them. Wherever special relationships exist in Eastern Europe, with or without Soviet blessing, they contain a danger to the degree and nature of control which the Soviet leadership considers essential for the retention of its hegemony.

PART III

PATTERNS, CONCLUSIONS, AND PROJECTIONS

PATTERNS, CONCLUSIONS, AND PROJECTIONS

In Part I of this survey we attempted to identify Soviet goals in Eastern Europe and to analyze the differences in the methods used by Khrushchev and Brezhnev in attaining them. Part II dealt at some length with more recent general trends in Soviet-Eastern European relations and the factors affecting them and discussed in some detail bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the individual Eastern European states.

The analysis in Part I indicates that the Soviets, in the first five years of this decade, have undoubtedly achieved a degree of success in restoring cohesion and stability in Eastern Europe after the turbulence of the sixties, when centrifugal forces, both at national and domestic levels, produced an instability perceived in Moscow as undermining Soviet hegemony. "Normalization" has in general been achieved in Czechoslovakia. Hungarian internal developments have been contained, even circumscribed. The leadership in the GDR has changed and the new one presents fewer problems to the Soviet *Westpolitik* and fewer irritations within the Soviet alliance itself. The serious upheavals in Poland in 1970 were managed with insight and restraint. Rumania's deviation, though far from overcome, has for most of the last six years been contained within tolerable limits. At the regionwide level, the multilateral process of integration has been begun and some progress made. Standards of living throughout Eastern Europe, particularly those of the workers, have increased perceptibly, and in some countries, such as Poland, even impressively. The economic and technical intelligentsia occupy positions of influence in all Eastern European countries. The political influence of the creative intellectuals, the writers, has for the most part been neutralized. More recently the Soviet economic grip over the Eastern European states has been strengthened through the effects of world inflation and the increase in the prices of Soviet raw-material deliveries.

There are, therefore, legitimate grounds for Soviet satisfaction. But perceptive Soviet leaders probably see no reasons for complacency.

In the first place, six years is far too short a time in which to judge the real success of Brezhnev's policy in Eastern Europe. The crisis of 1968 has been successfully overcome and "normality" restored. But it is much too early to say that the fundamental causes which led to the Czechoslovak crisis and the need for intervention have been eradicated. Nor is it at all certain that the Soviet concept of integration, which does appear designed to eradicate those causes, will not in its further implementation revive them, aggravate them, and even create new factors of instability and disunity.

PROBLEMS: ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL

Part II of this survey, especially the section dealing with developments in the individual countries, showed what a variety of situations and problems--actual and potential--Eastern Europe still presents to the Soviet Union. Cohesion and integration, despite some progress, have obviously done little so far to remove these. They can be roughly categorized as follows.

Nationalism. This remains the most serious, certainly the most explosive problem still facing the Soviets in their relations with Eastern Europe. It explained Yugoslavia's break with the Soviets in 1948 and Albania's in 1961. It also explains the Rumanian deviation. It remains a continual problem in Poland, where several factors, discussed in Part II, might well exacerbate it in the future. In a much less serious dimension, it could cause problems with Bulgaria over the Macedonian question. In a situation of instability it could dangerously arouse feelings in Hungary over the situation of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Even in the artificial creation of the GDR, for so long a Soviet dependency almost by definition, a leader of Ulbricht's stature acted in defiance of Soviet wishes to the point where he had to be quietly removed. Even now the danger of an irritating East German self-assertiveness may not have been entirely removed.

Societal Tensions. The dangers of societal tensions have been mitigated over the last five years because of the deliberate "consumerist" policies introduced in most Eastern European countries, as well as in the Soviet Union itself. But the Polish upheavals in 1970, which

themselves certainly hastened the introduction of such policies, were very much a reminder of the continued, if latent, presence of these tensions. They still, in fact, present the greatest dangers in Poland, where a confident working class is now a looming, unwelcome but unavoidable partner in economic and social decisionmaking. The problem in Poland is also compounded by the existence of an overwhelmingly private peasantry backed by Poland's other government, the Roman Catholic Church, and the regime's obvious intention to gradually change the structure of Polish agriculture. But if Poland is a special case, it is not the only one. Rapid industrialization and urbanization in Eastern Europe over the last 30 years have led to a huge increase in the industrial proletariat, augmenting working-class centers that already existed in East Germany, the Czech lands, and parts of Poland and Hungary.<sup>53</sup> By now a much larger-scale working-class consciousness is beginning to develop. Despite inadequate housing conditions in the overcrowded urban centers, this element has been kept relatively satisfied, over the last few years, by rising pay, job security, and a tempo of work that by Western standards has been relaxed and casual. (These are factors which, incidentally, have generally made Eastern European workers distrustful of many aspects of economic reform which, with its stress on rationalization, efficiency, greater productivity, etc., threatened to upset the reasonably tolerable working conditions enjoyed hitherto.) Now, however, with the economic outlook bleaker than at any time since the fifties, because of world inflation, the increase in Soviet raw-material prices, and an acute shortage of labor in Eastern Europe, all the regimes are warning their populations of considerable austerity ahead and the need for harder and more serious work. If, then, a perceptible drop in living standards occurs or even if previously rising expectations are seriously disappointed, societal tensions could result throughout Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union, therefore, will have to take good care that its greatly strengthened economic control over its allies is not pressed to the point where societal instability results.

Eastern European Bargaining Leverage. This factor is closely linked with the previous one. In the cases of Czechoslovakia and the GDR, weakness and dependency could possibly be parlayed into effective

bargaining leverage in relations with the Soviet Union, as discussed in Part II. In a situation of economic crisis, brought on by international developments, the economically weaker Eastern European states--Hungary could be a typical example here--might be in a position to extract considerable concessions from the Soviet Union simply by pointing to the potential disruptive consequences if they were not granted. Another tactic that could be adopted by seriously affected Eastern European states would be to point to the serious dangers to the very execution of central economic planning caused by the Soviet Union's newly instituted policy of changing its raw-material prices every year. The unexpected decision to increase prices from the beginning of 1975 rather than 1976 undoubtedly threw short-term planning in the Eastern European economies into disarray. A threat of planning chaos with its inevitable consequences of spontaneity and improvisation could be an effective weapon for the Eastern Europeans to use in Moscow against a Soviet leadership thoroughly fearful of spontaneity. Alternatively, if in two or three years' time Soviet raw-material prices are indeed little different from those prevailing on the world market, it is not difficult to see some Eastern European states threatening to look elsewhere to fulfill more of their raw-material needs. They had in fact already begun to do so well before the Soviets increased their prices, since Moscow itself had warned that over the long term it could not fulfill all their growing requirements. At the Comecon Council session in Budapest in June 1975 the Soviets did their best to reassure their allies that they were doing all they could to maintain and increase supplies of their raw materials; they also took the opportunity to stress that Soviet prices were still cheaper than those on the world market. Whether they completely convinced all concerned is probably doubtful.

Intra-Elite Tensions. As compared with the turbulence of the fifties, the present leaderships of Eastern Europe give the outward appearance of considerable stability. Factionalism, though certainly still present in some leaderships (for example, the Czechoslovak, in spite of Husak's ascendancy), is generally contained. In addition to Tito, several Eastern European leaders can boast remarkable longevity: Hoxha has been Party leader since 1941, Zhivkov since 1954, Kadar since

1956, Ceausescu since 1965. But it is precisely because of this longevity that succession problems in several states are bound to arise in the near future, probably calling for Soviet political intervention. It is true, of course, that succession crises are no longer considered inevitable facts of Communist political life: In the Soviet Union in 1964, in Rumania in 1965, and in the GDR in 1971, changes in leadership were managed with considerable aplomb and success. But there is no assurance that this will apply in every case. In Hungary it could be so, but in Bulgaria and Albania, not to mention Yugoslavia, there are distinct possibilities of instability when the present leaderships change, and these will occur in an area which, as already mentioned in Part II, will probably draw increasing Soviet attention. But apart from possible strains within the leaderships, the possibility of tensions affecting the economic and technical intelligentsia in some Eastern European states should not be overlooked. For the present, this particular elite may be satisfied or appeased but, as mentioned in the coverage of Hungary in Part II, the contraction of the scope of the NEM could lead to disaffection among many of those technocrats who inspired it, implemented it, and profited from it. In other Eastern European countries, too, the strong "worker-oriented" policy of the leaderships, especially in the sphere of remuneration and professional advancement, could seriously threaten the position and privileges of this particular elite. Finally, a major economic crisis could damage the morale of the economic and technical intelligentsia and result in an alienation of that group on which modernization and economic progress depend so heavily.

#### SOVIET INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON EASTERN EUROPE

One of the factors mentioned in Part I as playing a role in shaping the Soviet perception of the importance of Eastern Europe was the "ideological security" factor. It assumed great importance under the Brezhnev leadership--in fact, it appears to have been the prime motivation for the renewed emphasis on cohesion so noticeable in the last six years. The importance assigned to this factor is explained partly by the perceived need to restore stability after the Khrushchev era

and its aftermath, and partly by the precautionary measures deemed a necessary concomitant of the Soviet *Westpolitik* and the ensuing international relaxation.

But a third explanation has also been implicit: a growing inability within the Soviet leadership itself to respond to its own domestic problems with anything but centrally controlled bureaucratic mechanisms and conservative political and economic policies. These domestic problems should not be so magnified as to picture the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse. But even the most restrained analysis would suggest that in the economy, the nationalities sphere, and that complex of problems relating to greater political and cultural expression, the Soviet Union is urgently in need of a drastically reformed governing system. The present leadership, however, is not only unwilling but unable to provide this. It relies on the principles and methods in which the senior members of it were trained and tends to respond to difficulties and the rising tide of problems with a repressiveness typical of a stale bureaucracy. New ideas are not welcomed, as they often were under Khrushchev, but are mistrusted and feared. Thus the boldness and strength exhibited by the Soviet leadership abroad is paradoxically accompanied by an essential timidity and sense of insecurity at home.

Therefore, attempts to reimpose orthodoxy, conformity, and closer control over Eastern Europe may increase in vigor rather than diminish as long as the present leadership retains power. New challenges at home will be met with new repressiveness, or at least by a stronger recourse to old methods, which is likely to be projected onto Eastern Europe. In such a situation the imperative of cohesion will probably assume even greater importance in Soviet policy, with viability being relegated even further into the background. The balance, therefore, already tilted perceptibly in favor of cohesion during the last six years, could become even more dangerously upset.

What may be expected, therefore, in the way of practical Soviet policy in Eastern Europe for the second half of the seventies? The logic of the situation would suggest accelerated and intensified efforts to enhance coordination in the economic, military, political, foreign policy, and ideological spheres--all subsumed by the term

*integration.* Previous assurances that integration was a long-term program would now no longer be seen as corresponding to the urgency of the situation.

In the *economic sphere* it may be expected that the Soviets will seek to exploit their increased economic advantage *vis-à-vis* their dependent allies by speeding up the process of integrated planning within Comecon, forcing more Eastern European investments in Soviet raw-material industries, and promoting economic schemes that would enhance the supranational or transnational elements in Soviet-East European cooperation at the expense of the very large measure of national control each state now holds over the management of its economic affairs. It is probably no coincidence that the Rumanians have once again begun complaining about suggestions being made in the media "of foreign countries" that "international production complexes" and the like should be created; obviously, they recall the proposals made in 1964 by Professor E. B. Valev in Moscow, evidently reflecting Khrushchev's preferences, to which they reacted sharply at that time.<sup>54</sup>

Regarding the *military functions* of the Warsaw Pact, one can expect the maintenance of a Soviet dominance which is even now so pronounced that there would seem little that can be done to make it more so. As to the *political-consultative functions* of the Pact, it would not be surprising if the Soviets pressed ahead with their reported wish to create some kind of centralized machinery to facilitate closer and quicker coordination on foreign-policy affairs. It would be a typical response to the perceived dangers of international relaxation and the final conclusion of the negotiations on European cooperation and security.

In the *ideological sphere*, the Soviets, as mentioned in Part II, are in a particularly delicate situation. There is no doubt that, ideally, they would wish to establish closer ideological conformity in Eastern Europe and some instrument for ensuring and perpetuating it. The preparations for the European Communist Party Conference in the first half of 1975 attest to this. But as argued in Part II, they are well aware that this would alienate--in fact, it has already alienated--important parties in the European and international Communist movement. Previous experience has shown, however, most notably with regard to

Czechoslovakia in 1968, that when the stakes in Eastern Europe are considered high enough or the dangers there perceived as crucial, the Soviets will demonstrate the priority of their interest in Eastern Europe, if necessary at the cost of their prestige and influence elsewhere. What could happen in this context is that the Soviets will make some concession to the sensitivities of independent-minded parties and relax their insistence on tighter ideological cohesion at the European Communist Party Conference and at any eventual world conference. But among those parties in Eastern Europe that will accept it, the Soviets will demand greater orthodoxy and coordination under their control, even to the point of establishing some kind of informal mechanism--regular meetings of ideological secretaries, for instance. Parties like the Rumanian and, of course, the Yugoslav would refuse to cooperate; but in this sphere too, the "interested party" principle could be allowed to operate. Again, as mentioned in Part II, the risk is considerable because other parties in the European and world movement, seeing what is happening in Eastern Europe, will construe this as the *real* Soviet view of Party relations. But it is a risk that, in the circumstances, Moscow would have to take.

All these measures to ensure greater coordination would meet varying degrees of resistance from several Eastern European governments and parties, not just the Rumanian. Resistance is likely to be strongest in the economic sphere, where stubbornness on the part of the leaderships--say, in the GDR, Poland, and Hungary--would be strongly supported by the economic and technical intelligentsia. If the Soviets pressed too hard and fast, situations could arise in some Eastern European countries similar to that which prompted the Rumanian deviation in the late fifties and early sixties. Pressured to modify its plans for comprehensive economic expansion, the Rumanian leadership saw the danger of whatever legitimacy it had or hoped to have seriously threatened. It responded defiantly. Today, an Eastern European leadership, asked to participate in the erosion of the distinctive national identity of its country, might well face an even greater crisis of legitimacy and decide against it. Here, the resilience of Eastern European nationalisms would reassert itself, and the anti-Soviet emotionalism that could

accompany it in a country like Poland or Hungary is not difficult to imagine.

Moreover, if the Soviets decide to accelerate the integration process, then the relative patience, skill, and sophistication with which they have pursued it so far could be replaced by impatience and maladroitness; a domineering directness would supersede the method of directed consensus employed till now. If this should occur, then, despite every advantage the Soviets have in their relationship with the Eastern Europeans, they cannot expect their path to be as relatively smooth as it has been over the last six years.

#### THE SOVIET SUCCESSION AND BEYOND

Finally, there remains a factor which could have profound consequences for Soviet relations with Eastern Europe: the Soviet leadership succession. The aging oligarchy that rules the Soviet Union must in the near future begin to dissolve. Brezhnev's own retirement as Party leader is now being forecast by many for the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976. Even if it were simply a question of his own departure, it would be a momentous occasion fraught with uncertainty and clouded by potential instability.<sup>55</sup> But several others of the most powerful members of the Soviet oligarchy--Kosygin, Grechko, Kirilenko, Podgorny, Suslov--are older than Brezhnev, who is 68. This must inevitably complicate an already serious problem, since what is involved is not simply the changing of one leader but an imminent changing of the guard.

In these circumstances it appears doubtful whether the Soviet Union can avoid a period of some leadership instability before the end of the seventies. And if this hypothesis is correct, then it is probable that the change will have an unsettling effect on Eastern Europe. If precedent is anything to go by, this will certainly be the case. The death of Stalin resulted in serious upheaval in Eastern Europe; the leadership vacuum of more than three years after the dismissal of Khrushchev led to a serious acceleration of instability from the Soviet point of view. Nor does precedent indicate that it matters whether the succession is turbulent or smooth. After Stalin there was a lengthy crisis in the Soviet leadership; the succession to Khrushchev, on the other hand, was arranged and followed through skillfully.

Even if, despite the probability, there is no crisis after Brezhnev's own departure--if, say, there is an interim leadership arrangement devised by the veterans still clinging to power--there is still every likelihood of Brezhnev's policies of cohesion in Eastern Europe being even more accelerated along the lines outlined above, by rulers still more apprehensive than before and without the authority Brezhnev had acquired in his years of rule. The same is likely to happen, at least over the short term, even if a younger member of the oligarchy assumes command, since his logical course of action would be to take no chances in Eastern Europe (even if he would ever be disposed to take any) until he had secured his authority at home. In either event, therefore, Brezhnev's policy in Eastern Europe would be retained, but its pace would be accelerated and the methods used to apply it would be less refined.

If, however, as appears more likely, there is a protracted succession crisis in the Soviet Union, then it is difficult to see how the infrastructure of integration which Brezhnev had so carefully begun to build will survive the reemergence of those centrifugal forces both at the national and domestic levels which, however latent, have by no means been eradicated. After all, the infrastructure will still be far from complete, the interdependence still far too fragile. Not six years, or even a decade, but more likely a whole generation or more of patient building would be necessary for any confidence to be felt in the durability of the integration begun under Brezhnev--and even then there could be no certainty of it. Whether Soviet policy imperatives could ever be reconciled, not to say harmonized, with a genuinely Eastern European development, taking account of the variety, the needs, the impulses, and the aspirations in the region, is very much a matter of doubt.

What then, specifically, might be expected in Eastern Europe if a serious succession crisis occurs in the Soviet Union?

1. Soviet authority would decline throughout Eastern Europe.
2. An initial nervousness and inertia would develop among most leaderships as they watch developments unfold in Moscow. In some leaderships this uncertainty could produce the revival of open factionalism.

3. Left far more to themselves than before, some leaderships--perhaps the Polish, the Hungarian, even the East German--would begin orienting their policies along more national lines, this being facilitated by the weakening of the integration network built under Brezhnev. Rumania would presumably use the opportunity to ease further out of its Comecon and Warsaw Pact commitments. (Yugoslavia's own succession problem would also be made infinitely easier if it roughly coincided with that of the Soviet Union.)

4. Groupings and associations of European states could now begin to form unhindered. Special relationships--for example, those between Rumania and Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary--could be strengthened. On the other hand, national animosities, previously inhibited by Soviet domination--for example, between Hungary and Rumania over Transylvania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia--might flare up in virulent form.

5. Economically and, to a lesser degree, politically, some states--Rumania, obviously, but perhaps also Poland and Hungary--would seek closer collaboration with the West. In all the Eastern European states there would be strong social pressures for this.

6. In internal affairs, initial regime nervousness could lead to tighter, repressive measures against the societies of the countries concerned. Especially in Poland, but perhaps also in Hungary and the GDR, this could lead to widespread discontent and even upheavals. In the event of difficulties arising from a breakdown in economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, the ensuing economic hardship would certainly lead to mass discontent. Alternatively, some elements in most or all leaderships would press for a more relaxed policy at home and a more assertive one vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This would undoubtedly bring them more legitimacy and popularity. Immediately below the leadership level, many members of the economic and technical intelligentsia would press for the introduction or revival of economic reforms now abandoned or modified.

Not all these possibilities might be translated into practice. But some of them, in varying degrees of seriousness, probably would. Many of them, either singly or in combination, could lead to serious friction with the Soviet Union, even to the point of prompting military

intervention. But even if this were not required, the Soviet leader or leaders who emerged triumphant from the succession crisis would have to begin once more the Sisyphean task of devising a system for Eastern Europe that combined cohesion with viability. In the meantime, the impact of and the need for a coherent Western policy toward Eastern Europe would have become more important than ever.

NOTES

Notes to Part I

1. Some of the analysis below is based on Richard Löwenthal's essay, "Changing Soviet Policies and Interests" in *Soviet-American Relations and World Order: The Two and the Many* (Adelphi Papers No. 66, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March 1970, pp. 11-23). The analysis has also been influenced by Fritz Ermath, *Internationalism, Security and Legitimacy: The Challenge to Soviet Interests in East Europe, 1964-1968* (RM-5909-PR, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1969).
2. In "Changing Soviet Policies and Interests," *loc. cit.*
3. See Charles Andras, "European Security and 'Social Progress'" (Radio Free Europe, Research and Analysis Department Background Report, 21 July 1975).
4. By far the best book on Soviet-East European relations is Zbigniew Brzezinski's *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967).
5. The "New Course" in the GDR was actually announced a few days before the East Berlin rioting on 17 June 1953. But almost immediately after the riots further economic concessions were announced.
6. See Francois Fejtö, *A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin* (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1971). Also J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe: The Khrushchev Era and After* (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1966).
7. The fact that it was the publication of Professor Liberman's proposals in the Soviet Union in 1962 that gave the green light for the Eastern European reformers does not necessarily mean that all the various concepts of reform originated in the Soviet Union and were exported to Eastern Europe. The probabilities are that most of the reform concepts originated in Eastern Europe itself but needed to receive public endorsement in the Soviet Union before they could be acted on.
8. There is a wealth of good literature on the reform movement in Czechoslovakia before and during 1968. One very good book on the process briefly described here is Galia Golan, *The Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 1971). On the development in Hungary, see William F. Robinson, *The Pattern of Reform in Hungary; A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis* (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1973).

9. This discussion is perhaps oversimplified to the extent that it tends to assume that the Soviet delegates come to all these meetings representing a unified view of their leadership in Moscow. Obviously, this must not be the case on every occasion. When it is not, the Eastern Europeans presumably assume a greater role not just in the consultative but sometimes also in the decisionmaking process.
10. For a discussion of this aspect of Rumanian policy see Kenneth Jowitt, "Political Innovation in Rumania" (*Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Autumn 1974, pp. 132-151).
11. There exists, of course, a potentially even more explosive issue between the Soviet Union and Rumania than China: Rumanian claims to Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, ceded to the Soviet Union in 1940. The Rumanian Communist regime officially recognizes Soviet control over these territories but since 1964 has made it clear, in numerous *indirect* ways, that it resents this control and considers these territories, especially Bessarabia, rightfully Rumanian.
12. It is not possible in this survey to analyze the attitudes and composition of Eastern European party elites, although this is a highly important factor in the whole issue of Soviet-East European relations. A helpful factual and analytical study in this respect is Carl Beck, Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., Milton Lodge, Derek J. Waller, William A. Welsh, and M. George Zaninovich, *Comparative Communist Political Leadership* (David McKay Company, New York, 1973).
13. Actually, the name "New Economic System" was discontinued in 1967 in favor of "The Economic System of Socialism," and renewed emphasis was given to central planning at that time. It was "The Economic System of Socialism" that was terminated in 1971.

Notes to Part II

14. See, for example, A. Ross Johnson, "Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito" (*The Washington Papers*, Vol. 2, No. 16, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Sage Publications, Beverly Hills/London, 1974).
15. An exception to this generalization is the work of Louis Zanga. Two recent papers by him of importance are, "The Albanian Leadership at the Crossroads?" (Radio Free Europe, Research and Analysis Department Background Report, 6 November 1974), and "Kosovo: An Important Element in Yugoslav-Albanian Rapprochement" (Radio Free Europe, Research and Analysis Background Report, 2 June 1975).

16. For a study of Comecon's development under Stalin and Khrushchev see Michael Kaser, *Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies* (Oxford University Press, 1965).
17. For a detailed study of Comecon developments under Brezhnev, see Henry Wilcox Schaefer, *Comecon and the Politics of Integration* (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Public Affairs, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1972).
18. It is interesting to note here that the unanimity principle was not mentioned in the Charter of Comecon, published in 1960--11 years after its founding. But the principle of "declaring an interest," which implied acceptance of the majority principle, was mentioned (Article IV, para. 3). Yet the unanimity principle was applied in all Comecon operations till 1970, while the principle of "declaring an interest" was not. This is an excellent example of how paramount custom and desuetude are in the workings of Eastern alliance institutions like Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, it had become such an accepted Comecon trading practice to fix prices of goods and commodities for a period of five years that when the Soviets decided to raise their raw-material prices as of the beginning of 1975, many observers concluded that a breach of Comecon rules had occurred. This was mistaken: What occurred was a breach of *established practice*. The Soviets were also able to point to a 1958 Comecon decision which authorized the changing of price rates within a five-year period if circumstances warranted it.
19. For more on the Warsaw Pact, see A. Ross Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview" (draft manuscript, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1975) and Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Warsaw Pact Today" (*Survival*, May-June 1974, pp. 122-126). For a more historical treatment, see Thomas W. Wolfe, *The Role of the Warsaw Pact in Soviet Policy* (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, P-4973, March 1973), and Robin R. Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971).
20. On this subject, see Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (eds.), *East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation* (Praeger Special Studies in International Politics and Government, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974).
21. The writings of Keven Devlin are the most informative on such developments within the European and world Communist movements. See especially his "The Inter-Party Drama" (*Problems of Communism*, July-August 1975).
22. For a history of Bulgaria mainly since 1953, see J. F. Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970).

23. This subject is also discussed in Robert R. King, "Bulgarian-Soviet Relations: 'Socialist Internationalism in Action'" (Radio Free Europe, Research and Analysis Department Background Report, 26 May 1975).
24. For a description of agro-industrial complexes (AICs), see F. Stephen Larrabee, "The Agro-Industrial Complexes in Bulgaria" (Radio Free Europe, East Europe Research and Analysis Background Report, 4 September 1972). The Soviets may have fostered this development in Bulgaria with a view to its being applied in the Soviet Union itself and its application encouraged in other parts of Eastern Europe. In 1974 there were in fact indications that the Soviets were experimenting on similar lines in the Moldavian Republic.
25. For a useful study of the Macedonian question--in fact, of the whole relationship between nationalism and Communism in the Balkans--see Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans* (Doubleday, New York, 1969).
26. For a recent study of Bulgarian-Yugoslav differences over Macedonia, see Robert R. King, "The Macedonian Question and Bulgaria's Relations with Yugoslavia" (Radio Free Europe, Research and Analysis Department Background Report, 6 June 1975).
27. The Rumanians' fears that the Soviets were indeed contemplating a move of this sort may have prompted them to leak information during the summer of 1974 that the Soviets were demanding a "transit corridor" across Rumania to Bulgaria. The Soviets may actually have asked the Rumanian government for an agreement regularizing their military transit facilities through Rumania, a request which the alarmed Rumanians then deliberately exaggerated or even distorted.
28. Zdenek Mlynar, born in 1930, was secretary of the CPC Central Committee's Legal Commission between 1964 and 1968. During the Prague Spring he was the main author of the Party Action Program. Between June and November 1968 he was a Central Committee secretary, and between September and November 1968, a Central Committee Presidium member. At the November 1968 Central Committee plenum he resigned from all his Party posts and in September 1969 was expelled from the Party.
29. Some observers legitimately question whether Husak's elevation to the presidency does mean a securing of his authority. They contend that opposition inside the Czechoslovak leadership might continue to prevent Husak from adopting a more positive policy. Some even see his election to the presidency as the beginning of his political demise, thinking it possible that he will be forced to give up his position as Party leader at the next Czechoslovak Party Congress in April 1976. (See, for example, Angela Nacken in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 May 1975.) The notion that frustrating opposition will continue is plausible, that Husak faces political demise, less so.

30. See his speech to the Slovak Central Committee plenum, 9 November 1972 (*Rude Pravo*, 13 November 1972). In this speech Bilak ridiculed what he termed "the blue sky theory," i.e., the notion that the situation in the country was so restored that the "sins" of 1968 could be "forgiven and forgotten."
31. See, for example, Josef Goldman in *Politicka Ekonomie*, January 1975, and Herbert Durkovic in *Tvorba*, 4 and 11 December 1974. These articles are discussed in Thomas E. Heneghan, "Czechoslovakia: The Economic Discussion Continues" (Radio Free Europe, Research and Analysis Department Background Report, 19 March 1975).
32. Some of the dissidents responsible for the defiance in 1975 were subject to house searches and were detained for interrogation. But the stipulations of the law were apparently observed. Dubcek was victimized by being given a lower job in the Slovak forestry commission. How far Western attention served to save the dissidents from prosecution is hard to tell. Husak, however, has never favored political trials.  
Karel Kosik, in particular, was harassed so much that this led to embarrassing protests (from the leadership's point of view) from Communist circles in the West, including Jean-Paul Sartre and the Italian Communist Party.
33. For a discussion of this aspect of Ulbricht's policy and of the interaction between East German domestic and foreign policies, see Melvin Croan, "East Germany," in *The Communist States in Disarray*, edited by Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone (University of Minnesota Press, 1972, pp. 73-94).
34. See Peter Christian Ludz, *The Changing Party Elite in East Germany* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1972).
35. It is just possible that the Soviets tolerated the Hungarian NEM with a view to applying it, in whole or part, in the Soviet Union itself if it were successful. There may well have been Soviet economic officials who quietly viewed it in this way. But it is most unlikely that anyone in the Soviet political leadership would countenance the introduction of such a reformist model in their own country. Such a notion runs contrary to all that is known about Soviet policy in Eastern Europe since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is one thing to consider applying a Party-dominated experiment like the Bulgarian agro-industrial complexes, but quite another to see the NEM as a possible model.
36. The Hungarian news agency MTI (7 January 1974) stated that Hungary had "over 600" cooperation agreements with Western firms. It is estimated that since 1971 Hungary has borrowed between 380,000,000 and 400,000,000 dollars in the West. This includes three bond issues and at least six private loans. (It is not Hungarian policy to take Western government loans.) The Hungarian total non-socialist

(mainly Western) trade deficit was 714,000,000 dollars in 1974; in the first quarter of 1975 alone it was 400,000,000 dollars (*Havi Statisztikai Kozlemenyek* (Monthly Statistical Bulletin), I-V, 1975).

37. H. Peter Dreyer in *The Journal of Commerce*, 7 May 1975, quoted a "banker's estimate" of Poland's foreign indebtedness of 2.8 billion dollars--actually the figure may have been a little higher--and said that the same estimate saw Poland as good for another 500 million dollars. Since then, as a result of President Giscard's visit in June 1975, France has agreed to extend a credit to Poland of 7,000 million francs. In August 1975, Bonn finally agreed to grant a long-term, low-interest loan of 1 billion marks.
38. An interesting reflection of anti-Soviet sentiment--very embarrassing for the Gierek leadership--occurred in December 1974, when a number of Polish intellectuals addressed a letter to the Ministry of Culture in Warsaw drawing attention to the lack of cultural and travel facilities for Poles living in the Soviet Union. The letter was moderately expressed but it raised by implication the annexation of large territories of eastern Poland by the Soviet Union as a result of World War II.
39. Dreyer, *loc. cit.*, put Poland's Western trade deficit in 1974 at 2,000 million dollars.
40. For background to the following analysis see Gabriel Fisher, "Rumania," in Bromke and Rakowska-Harmstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-179. For an original and stimulating analysis of the origins of the Rumanian deviation, see Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Rumania, 1944-1965* (University of California Press, 1971).
41. The Yugoslavs were subject between 1948 and 1951 to a war of nerves which included numerous border incidents. In 1961 Albanian Admiral Teme Sejko was executed for having attempted a naval action against the Hoxha leadership, apparently with Soviet backing. But none of these actions constituted major efforts at military coercion.
42. Though not as affected as countries like Hungary, the GDR, or Czechoslovakia by the Soviet decision to raise raw-material prices, Rumania will still suffer from it, being dependent on large supplies of a number of Soviet raw materials, including iron ore. It should also be remembered that, though Rumania has in the past imported no oil from the Soviet Union, it had to import about 6 million tons of crude in 1974. It had hoped to begin importing Soviet oil which, at least in the next two years, will still be cheaper than OPEC oil. Obviously, Rumanian needs here are something Moscow can exploit for political purposes.

43. The basic fact here, however, was that in order to get most-favored-nation status, Ceausescu was openly prepared to tolerate American interference in Rumanian affairs, on the emigration issue--interference that he has made a public principle of rejecting from the Soviet Union.
44. H. Peter Dreyer in *The Journal of Commerce*, *loc. cit.*, referred to concern in Western financial circles about Rumania's growing deficit with Western countries. One banker is quoted as saying that the till was empty and that payments due were coming in even more slowly than usual. Obviously, the very serious flooding in Rumania in the summer of 1975 will further weaken the country's financial, economic, and political position.
45. See Robert R. King, "Nicolae Ceausescu and the Politics of Leadership" (Radio Free Europe, East Europe Research and Analysis Department Background Report, 29 March 1973).
46. See Robert R. King, "Ceausescu's Role at the 11th RCP Congress in Perspective" (Radio Free Europe, Research and Analysis Department Background Report, 28 February 1975).
47. For data on Chinese credits to Albania up to 1969, see Kurt Seliger, "Albaniens Beziehungen zu China," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart, April 1975, pp. 235-245). The data given there, however, probably do not give the full picture: The figures for the credits promised for 1968 and 1969 should have been higher. In speaking about the economic agreement of November 1968 (signed by Adil Carcani in Peking), Premier Mehmet Shehu noted that the Chinese loan was, in terms of size, "unprecedented" (*Zeri i Popullit*, 3 December 1968). He said that the projects to be constructed during the 1971-1975 period on the basis of the 1968 loan agreement included:

A metallurgical combine to process about 800,000 tons of iron nickel ore annually and to manufacture 250,000 tons of steel products; a plant for the deep processing of oil with a capacity of 1,500,000 tons of petroleum; a hydropower station with a capacity of 400,000 MW; a plant for the production of nitrate fertilizers; the extension of the superphosphate plant; a chemical plant for polychlor vinyl and caustic soda; a printing plant; a plant for plastic products; the doubling of the size of the tractor spare parts plant; a number of plants for the enrichment of chromium and copper ores, coal, and asbestos; and the construction of a number of new mines.

Altogether 30 new plants were to be constructed on the basis of the 1968 loan, in addition to the expansion of the merchant fleet and the strengthening of agriculture. This compares with only 20 major industrial plants built during the mid-sixties. The 1968 loan is believed to have been close to 200,000,000 dollars.

A farm loan agreement was signed in Peking on 11 April 1972, which supplemented the financing of the 30 major industrial projects scheduled for construction during the present (fifth) five-year plan. The Minister for Agriculture, Piro Dodbiba (who signed the agreement), had the following to say about this credit:

The number of tractors and agricultural machines will increase in order to enable us to accelerate the spring agricultural work and carry out all the necessary tasks at the proper time. The level of mechanization in the livestock sector will be raised and greenhouses will be built over large areas to produce large quantities of early vegetables. The mechanical base for the repair and maintenance of existing and additional machinery will be reinforced. The new loan will enable our country to secure from the PRC a considerable quantity of hybrid corn, soya, sorghum and cotton seeds, as well as machinery, equipment, and raw materials for the production of herbicides, insecticides, and so forth. The introduction of new methods and equipment for commercial fishing will also be provided by the PRC. (*Zeri i Popullit*, 27 April 1972.)

The loans, of course, also cover the financing of Albania's military hardware, which is never discussed in detail.

On 3 July 1975, the press announced the signing of the new agreement in Peking by Li Hsien-nien and Carcani. The protocol calls for "an interest-free and long-term credit, a protocol for supplying Albania with complete mechanical equipment for certain projects, a protocol for providing Albania with general supplies, and an agreement for the exchange of goods and payments in the years 1976-1980." (*Zeri i Popullit*, 4 July 1975.)

I am grateful to Louis Zanga for having provided me with this material.

48. A favorite Albanian target has been Poland. This is one consequence of Tirana's having become the headquarters of a splinter Polish Communist Party, led by Kazimierz Mijal, a former Central Committee member who left the country in 1966. Mijal and his associates publish their own newspaper, *Czerwony Sztandar*, and run a colorful Polish-language service on Radio Tirana which, in its attacks, first on Gomulka and then Gierek, makes up in vehemence what it lacks in accuracy. In early 1975 Mijal visited China for several weeks. His activities are probably subsidized by the Chinese--indirectly, through the large grants the Albanian government must be receiving from Peking for the maintenance of Radio Tirana's extensive foreign broadcasting program.
49. See John Michael Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967).

50. For a very early discussion of this "northern tier" concept, see David J. Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin* (J. B. Lippincott, New York, 1961, pp. 364-365).
51. Erwin Weit, *At the Red Summit: Interpreter Behind the Iron Curtain* (Macmillan, London, 1973) gives colorful examples of this dislike.
52. The issue of South Dobrudja, of course, at one time affected Rumanian-Bulgarian relations. (It was surrendered by Rumania to Bulgaria in 1940.) But it was never an issue comparable to either Macedonia or Transylvania--or Bessarabia, for that matter.

Notes to Part III

53. Much more work needs to be done on the enormous social changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe which will undoubtedly have their longer-term impact on relations with the Soviet Union. See, however, David Lane, *The End of Inequality? Stratification under State Socialism* (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1972); and Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order: Social Stratification in Capitalist and Communist Societies* (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971).
54. For a brief discussion of some of these articles, see Harry Trend, "Backdrop for the 29th Comecon Council Session" (Radio Free Europe, Research and Analysis Background Report, 16 June 1975). On the 1964 Valev incident see Brown, "The New Eastern Europe...," pp. 129-130.
55. For an informative discussion of Soviet succession problems, see Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union" (*Problems of Communism*, March-April 1973, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, pp. 1-21).

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A comprehensive survey of Soviet East-European relations since 1969, analyzing Soviet goals in Eastern Europe, the successes and failures of Soviet policy in pursuing those goals, and future prospects. Policies toward the East European countries differed considerably in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. In seeking a balance between cohesion and viability, Khrushchev instituted reforms in economic structure, planning, and policy that led to increased nationalism and a serious threat to Soviet absolutism; the Brezhnev leadership, since 1964, has tilted the balance back sharply in favor of cohesion and the restoration of Soviet control. This report appraises regionwide developments in the Eastern European countries and discusses the bilateral relations of each country with the Soviet Union. Intra-East European ties, which are of considerably less importance, are also briefly considered. The report concludes with a discussion of problems and prospects for the immediate future and suggests some possible developments that may occur with the eventual succession of a new Soviet leadership. (JMD)

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